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ABSTRACT 
The U.S. is the largest single contributor to the UN budget.  U.S. funding consists 
of assessed contributions (approximately 70 percent) and voluntary contributions (the 
remaining 30 percent).  The U.S. share of the regular UN budget, part of assessed 
contributions, has been lowered on three occasions, from 39 percent in 1946 to 32 percent 
in 1954, to 25 percent in 1973, and to 22 percent in 2001.  As of 1992, the U.S. 
contributed more money to UN peacekeeping than in regular dues.  In 1973 the UN 
instituted separate assessments for peacekeeping missions.  The U.S. was assessed 
between 30 and 31 percent for peacekeeping dues until 2001, when the assessment was 
lowered to 28 percent and in 2009 to just below 26 percent.  The Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, House International Relations Committee, and the Senate and 
House Appropriations Committees play the critical roles in determining U.S. funding for 
the UN.  UN procurement and internal management reform, abortion, the Human Rights 
Council, and the degree of U.S. influence in the UN have been significant factors 
affecting congressional funding decisions.  Attempts to withhold funding to influence UN 
policy have produced mixed results.  
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. OVERVIEW 
As the largest single contributor to the UN, the U.S. government has an interest in 
how the UN operates.  Congress has an important role in determining how much the U.S. 
government will provide to the UN each year and under what circumstances.  While the 
dollar amounts involved are not large in relation to most U.S. domestic programs, they 
are closely tied to U.S. policy towards the UN.  What the U.S. budget provides for the 
UN can be explained with relation to both dollars and purpose.  This thesis will identify 
and explain the processes used to provide this funding, including the key players within 
Congress and the administration, and the policies that have shaped this funding.  It will 
also examine the issues affecting this funding as the major budget players have attempted 
to achieve various policy objectives. 
The UN is made up of variously interconnected components, including 
specialized agencies, voluntary funds and programs, peacekeeping operations, and the 
UN organization itself.  The organization is financed by contributions from member 
and/or participant states. The contributions are usually made in two ways: assessed 
contributions that are required “dues” as percentages established by the UN for each 
member, and voluntary contributions that represent more than half of the total aggregate 
funds received by the UN. 
Article 17 of the UN Charter requires each UN member state, including the 
United States, to contribute to the expenses of the organization as assessed by the General 
Assembly.  The UN General Assembly has adopted a scale of assessments, which is based 
in large part on a country’s capacity to pay.  The United States pays the maximum, or 
around 22 percent of the UN regular budget, while over 50 members pay the minimum, 
or 0.001 percent.  There have, however, been instances where the U.S. has not agreed 
with certain UN policies or decisions, and has not always paid 22 percent of the UN’s 
regular budget. 
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A number of issues affect the amount the U.S. budgets for the UN.  One issue is 
the UN budget itself.  As the largest contributor to the UN, a larger UN budget would 
lead to a larger U.S. budget for the UN if the U.S. voted to approve the UN budget.  
Another issue is the internal management of the UN and its current policies.  If the U.S. 
does not agree with how the UN is functioning in a certain area, it may approve less 
money that year to the UN.   
An example of one such area is the UN Population Fund.  The U.S. initially 
supported it in the early years, but has subsequently withheld donations to the UN due to 
disagreements on how the fund should be spent.  Also, incidents such as the management 
of the oil for food program have led to diminished support for the UN until changes were 
implemented with internal controls.  The amount of money the U.S. owes in arrears can 
also be a factor in how much the U.S. budgets for the UN. 
B. PRIMARY AND SECONDARY RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
Primary Question:  How does the U.S. budget for the UN and what are the 
primary policy issues affecting that budget? 
Secondary Questions: 
1.  Where is the U.S. contribution to the UN found in the congressional 
budget resolution? 
2.  Which authorizing committees and subcommittees have the most 
influential role in determining the budget outcome for the U.S. 
contribution to the UN? 
3.  Which subcommittees of the congressional appropriations committees  
have appropriations jurisdiction over the funds that make up the U.S. 
contribution to the UN? 
4.  What policy issues have affected the U.S. budget for the UN the most? 
5.  How do the policy issues relevant to the U.S. budgets for the UN play out 
in the congressional budget process? 
6.  What is the composition of the UN’s budget and how are these funds 




The methodology used in this thesis research will consist of the following steps: 
1.  Conduct a literature search of books, journal articles, and other 
information resources. 
2.  Conduct a thorough review of the U.S. budgetary system. 
3.  Look at major committees and subcommittees that influence the budget 
for the UN. 
4.  Look at the shape of the UN budget and important changes that have taken 
place in the budget in the past 10 years. 
5.  Identify the major factors affecting U.S. government funding for the UN. 
6.  Identify measures Congress has put in place that influence the U.S. budget 
for the UN. 
D. CHAPTER CONTENTS 
Chapter I provides an overview of U.S. funding of the UN, including some issues 
that affect funding.  The primary research question and secondary research questions are 
also stated.  In addition, the methodology is presented that will be used in the thesis 
research. 
Chapter II begins with a short history of the UN.  The structure of the UN and 
how the UN creates its budget is also examined.  In addition, past and current challenges 
and reforms are considered. 
Chapter III deals with an explanation of the U.S. budget process, concentrating on 
how the U.S. Congress formulates a budget. 
Chapter IV begins with an introduction to the history of U.S. funding for the UN.  
Where the UN budget is located in the U.S. budget is also examined.   
Chapter V examines factors such as withholding and reform efforts.  In addition, 
the major Committees and Subcommittees that influence the U.S. budget for the UN is 
explored.   
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Chapter VI looks at factors affecting the U.S. budget for the UN.  Major themes 
that have affected the amount budgeted for the UN in the past are examined in addition to 
current themes.   




II. UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATION 
A. INTRODUCTION AND BRIEF HISTORY 
1. History of UN  
The catastrophic events of WWII were the major motivation for the establishment 
of the UN in 1945 by the victor states of WWII.  It inherited not only many of the 
features of the League of Nations, but also added and increased those functions in areas 
of conflict resolution, human rights, and economic affairs.  It has suffered from the 
paradox of all international bodies, since it was created by member states and can only 
function well when it receives support from national governments, mainly the larger 
powers.  The conflict between sovereignty and internationalism is persistent and 
unavoidable (Sitkowski, 2006, Foreword).   
The current UN system has transcended the scope of the organization that was 
begun in 1945.  Its goals have reached past the traditional interest in interstate diplomacy 
to the sovereignty of the individual (Moore, 2006, 33).  The UN is a constantly evolving 
and expanding organization, with offices, in addition to the UN plaza in New York City, 
in Geneva Switzerland; Nairobi, Kenya; Vienna, Austria; Rome, Italy; The Hague, The 
Netherlands; Paris, France; Washington, D.C.  Each year, more conferences are held in 
Geneva than in New York City.  Geneva is the primary point for the UN’s social, 
humanitarian, and cultural activities, and home to numerous UN specialized agencies and 
treaty-monitoring committees.  The UN Office in Nairobi (UNON) was officially created 
in 1996, but the UN has been operating there since the 1970s with a focus on the issues 
presented by environmental degradation and Third World development.  Vienna is the 
newest of the UN’s four headquarters and is home to several UN and treaty bodies, 
including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), whose mission is to 
accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity 
all over the world.  The only principal organ of the UN that is outside New York City is 
the International Court of Justice, which is located in The Hague, The Netherlands.  Two 
UN specialized agencies, the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the 
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International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD), in addition to the Word Food 
Program, the largest international provider of food aid, have their headquarters in Rome, 
Italy and work closely to feed the world’s hungry (Moore, 2006, 14–26).   
The first important wartime conference meeting that laid the plans for the UN was 
the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, held from August 21 to October 7, 1944.  The 
conference gave rise to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals for the Establishment of a General 
International Organization. The proposals were in the form of twelve chapters that 
represented a key step towards the establishing of the UN.  In Yalta, from February 4–11, 
1945, the Big Three–Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, Joseph Stalin–met to 
resolve crucial post-war era questions.  The three leaders refined their understanding 
about the UN’s structure and membership and proposed the date for the organizing 
conference, which was scheduled to be held in San Francisco.  The Big Three agreed to a 
definition of “peace-loving,” and therefore which countries could join the UN as original 
members.  Stalin only wanted nations that were at war with the Axis to be admitted as 
founding members, while Roosevelt, sensitive to the concerns of Latin American nations, 
secured agreement from Stalin that nations not yet in the war could, before March 1, 
1945, be defined as peace-loving and become members.   
In Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, the UN Monetary and Financial Conference 
convened from July 1–22, 1944.  Three institutions were drafted by the conference 
members to create a postwar global free trade system:  the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), also know as 
the World Bank, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).  GATT was 
planed to be a temporary agreement until an International Trade Organization (ITO) was 
established, but it remained in place until January 1, 1995, when the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) replaced it.  The success of the measures started at Bretton Woods 
depended on the U.S. to fund these institutions and maintain monetary policies beneficial 
to world economic growth, since its economy in 1944 accounted for more than half of the 
world domestic product (Moore, 2006, 52–53).   
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Between April 25 and June 25, 1945, around 850 delegates from 50 countries 
came to San Francisco to consider the proposals drafted at Dumbarton Oaks the previous 
fall.  The meeting ended on June 26, and 50 original members signed the Charter.  That 
the conference succeeded was attributed to the solving of several major issues, the most 
serious of which was the Security Council.  The Security Council was to have five 
permanent members and six nonpermanent members and was authorized to implement 
mandatory enforcement measures against an aggressor.  Numerous proposals from 
several states attempted to changed this set up, but the major powers made it known that 
major change to the composition, powers, or responsibilities of the council would mean 
the end of the great power support for the organization.  After fierce negotiations, the 
majority of states agreed to the proposed set up of the Council (Moore, 2006, 56–57).   
There was also the issue of the veto power by the permanent members.  The 
smaller states were worried that the great powers’ control over peace and security issues 
would minimize their role within the organization, lessen the competence of the General 
Assembly, and marginalize other purposes important to the weaker powers.  A 
compromise was reached that recognized the authority of regional arrangements to 
manage local affairs if their actions were consistent with the principles of the UN.  In 
addition, the competence of the General Assembly was expanded during the San 
Francisco meetings, as it was given control of the UN budget (Moore, 2006, 56–57).   
Another serious challenge was from the states that wanted a Charter commitment 
to full independence and decolonization.  The British and French made it known that no 
reference to independence would be allowed in the Charter.  The sponsoring powers, 
however, did accept a commitment to self-government and a declaration within the 
Charter calling on administering states “to assist [these territories] in the progressive 
development of their free political institutions.” (Moore, 2006, 57–58).   
Former first lady Eleanor Roosevelt took a very active role in the United Nations, 
particularly in the area of human rights.  In 1946, the Economic and Social Council 
(ECONSO) asked her to serve on a commission to make recommendations for a 
permanent commission on human rights.  The most important recommendation was to 
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write a bill of human rights, and on December 10, 1948, the General Assembly approved 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  Mrs. Roosevelt was very active in 
negotiations leading up to the approval (Moore, 2006, 60).   
2. Cold War 
The Cold War severely affected the functioning of the UN, with the U.S. and the 
USSR battling within the UN.  The U.S. and USSR both blocked the admission of several 
countries that aligned with the other country.  The Cold War divided the UN members 
into competitive East and West camps and made collective action difficult and in some 
cases impossible.  With the ideological divide and superpower veto in later years, the 
Security Council was limited from taking up significant issues such as the French and 
later U.S. interventions in Vietnam and the Soviet presence in Hungary and 
Czechoslovakia to suppress anti-Communist movements.  Stalin often used the veto to 
block Western initiatives, and when Mao Zedong’s forces took over China in 1949, he 
boycotted the Security Council to protest rejection of the Communist’s regime’s taking 
the seat held by the Nationalist Chinese government (Moore, 2006, 64–65).   
When Stalin gave his approval for North Korea to invade the South, the UN 
decided to use force to counter the attack.  The Soviet delegate returned to the Security 
Council to block any further UN actions in Korea.  The U.S. went around the council by 
getting the General Assembly to approve the Uniting for Peace Resolution, which made it 
possible for the assembly to make recommendations on the restoration of peace and 
security when the council was deadlocked by the veto.  Cold War tensions continued 
during the 1950s, with nonaligned nations upset at the inability of the UN to meet their 
needs and lessen the contest between Moscow and Washington (Moore, 2006, 65–66).  
During the Cold War era, the UN was seen as trying to gain international authority, 
which the U.S. Congress often interpreted as infringing upon American sovereignty 
(McDermott, 2000, 177).   
The Congo crisis in the 1960s further defined the challenge of the Cold War to the 
UN.  A civil war broke out in the Congo after it became independent in 1960, with one 
side supported by the Soviet Union, one side by Washington, and the third trying to 
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secede.  A UN presence was sent to the Congo to try and restore order.  The Soviet Union 
believed the UN was acting out of the wishes of the U.S. and, along with the French, 
refused to donate their assessment for the Congo operation, claiming it was illegal since 
the Security Council did not approve it.  Their refusal to pay contributed to a financial 
crises for the UN that would last for the rest of the century.  Since the UN was not able to 
raise the funds through normal budgeting processes, it turned to unorthodox financing 
methods.  The General Assembly permitted the sale of $169 million in bonds, which in 
essence was borrowing against the future assessment income.  The UN also postponed 
payment to countries that contributed troops and material to the Congo operations.  In 
1965 the assembly created a special account for sought after voluntary contributions as a 
cushion against future unplanned expenses (Moore, 2006, 67–70).   
While the UN was involved in a number of areas around the globe, its relevance 
came into question from time to time, especially during the early 1960s.  During the 
Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962, the most serious threat of possible nuclear exchange during 
the Cold War, the U.S. and Soviet Union resolved the issues with almost no UN 
participation.  A major event that did involve the UN occurred in 1971 when the 
government in Beijing replaced the Republic of China in the UN, and became an official 
permanent Security Council member.  The U.S. was able to use its great support in the 
General Assembly to keep the seat for the government in Taiwan at first, but as the 
assembly shifted in the 1960s, the U.S. used the strategy of making any effort to replace 
Taiwan with a delegation from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) an “important 
question.”  Under the Charter, any important questions needed a two-thirds majority to 
pass in the assembly.  The strategy failed when supporters of the PRC achieved the two-
thirds needed, and the assembly seated Mao Zedong’s government and humiliated the 
U.S. by removing Taiwan from the UN (Moore, 2006, 67–70).   
3. Peacekeeping 
UN peacekeeping missions were originally funded from the UN’s regular budget, 
but in 1973 the costs of peacekeeping in the Israel—Egypt truce in Sinai became too 
erratic to predict.  The U.S. agreed to pay 31 percent of the Sinai mission, and the rest of 
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the UN members would pay based on their ability to pay at that time.  In later UN 
peacekeeping missions, the permanent members were asked to pay a premium for 
peacekeeping in addition to their fair share of costs based on their national economies.  
Poorer and smaller nations paid as little as 10 or 20 percent of what they would be 
charged if based on UN regular budget percentages.  A complex formula of special 
discounts by many nations further biased the system (Crossette, 2000).   
In May 2000, UN diplomats began discussing a revision to the peacekeeping 
budget for the first time in 27 years.  The U.S. proposal did not place a ceiling on U.S. 
contributions, but reflected a country’s capacity to pay by evaluating per capita income 
and other indicators every three years or so.  The pay scale would be tied to a system 
similar to the way payments for the regular UN budget is made.  Developing nations 
would not have to pay more than they currently did, while countries that had seen a large 
degree of economic growth over the last 30 years, such as Mexico, South Korea, and 
Oman, would pay more (Pisik, 2000). 
While the U.S. often displayed animosity towards the UN during the 1980s, there 
were also some achievements.  For example, the U.S. and Soviet Union worked together 
through UN channels to end the Iran—Iraq war, and, for the first time in history, the 
superpowers jointly sponsored a UN resolution on the Middle East.  The Soviet Union 
became more supportive of the UN in the late 1980s, and, when it broke up in 1991, it led 
to an increase in UN membership.  With the Cold War over, peacekeeping and 
peacemaking jumped to the forefront of UN concerns.  In addition, arms control and 
weapons proliferation became significant issues with the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-
Ban Treaty in 1996 and the extension on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 
1995 (Moore, 2006, 66–92).   
The Security Council unanimously passed tough resolutions following Iraq’s 
invasion of Kuwait in 1990, demanding the withdrawal of Iraqi forces and later 
authorizing a coalition of forces under U.S. command to expel the invaders from Kuwait.  
In 1991, a large coalition launched the first UN-authorized military action since the 
Korean War and drove Iraq out of Kuwait.  Following the 9/11 attacks, the Security 
Council on September 12, 2001 unanimously adopted Resolution 1368, denouncing the 
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assault.  The council viewed combating terrorism as a primary responsibility under the 
UN Charter.  On September 28, the Security Council passed Resolution 1373, calling on 
all states to prevent and suppress the financing of terrorist actions.  While the UN 
supported ousting Iraq from Kuwait, the UN did not support the invasion of Iraq in 2003, 
but the U.S. decided to act without the UN’s support and invaded Iraq to remove Saddam 
Hussein (Moore, 2006, 69–70).    
Early in the UN’s history, many thought the Security Council would have greater 
authority than any other international council before, but the availability of veto power 
among the 5 permanent members frustrated that idea.  An exasperated General Assembly 
urged unanimity among the Big Five, and it even established its own interim committee 
to deal with sudden international crises if the Security Council was divided, but it lacked 
enforcement power and gradually faded away.  A similar attempt to overcome the lack of 
a consensus among the Big Five was the Uniting for Peace resolution in 1950, in which 
the General Assembly would meet and discuss feasible actions, but it had no 
constitutional power and was ineffective.  The paradox was that it was much easier to get 
consensus on less momentous regional issues that on the really serious matters, like 
Korea, Taiwan, the Arab—Israeli tensions, that could lead to a major war and the 
breakdown of the international security system (Sitkowski, 2006, 55–59).   
Topics that have received ever-increasing attention over the years are the 
environment and peacekeeping.  In December 1972 the General Assembly created the 
UN Environmental Program (UNEP), currently the lead agency for international efforts 
to protect the environment.  The largest, most expensive, and most widely covered UN 
meeting occurred in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the UN Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED), also known as the Earth Summit.  The attendees tried to balance 
the desires of developed states for greater environmental protection with the developing 
countries’ desires to protect their sovereignty and conduct unrestrained national economic 
policies.  UNCED produced various documents, such as the Rio Declaration and the 
Statement of Forest Principles, that tried to balance the concerns of the developed states 
for greater environmental protection with the developing countries’ goal to protect their 
sovereignty and pursue unrestrained national economic policies (Moore, 2006, 268–269).  
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The Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) was established in 1992 to handle 
the increased size of UN peacekeeping.  The department has administrative, managerial, 
planning and preparation responsibilities for every peacekeeping mission.  The General 
Assembly also established the Training and Evaluation Office to oversee training for all 
peacekeeping units (Moore, 2006, 204).   
4. Achievements and Future 
The UN has had many noteworthy achievements over the years.  One important 
UN accomplishment was the Central American peace accords, especially the rescue of El 
Salvador from internal disorder.  Another one was the UN Iran—Iraq Military Observer 
Group, UNIMOG, an international military observer group that helped put an end to the 
Iran—Iraq hostilities.  The UN Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan, 
UNGOMAP, monitored the withdrawal of about 100,000 Soviet troops from 
Afghanistan.  The ending of apartheid in South Africa and the holding of democratic 
elections with a return of the country to the General Assembly were significant as well.  
Also, a transition assistance group supervised Namibia’s move to independence, all of 
this happening in the 1990s (Kennedy, 2006, 92–93).   
The Gulf War was also a victory for the UN security system, for the image of the 
Security Council, for the creators of the Charter, and for the rule of law.  Quickly 
following this success for the UN, however, was the explosion of civil wars, ethnic and 
religious violence, human rights violations, and humanitarian emergencies that occurred 
in the early 1990s.  All these crises posed a serious threat to the UN system, because the 
internal chaos in places like Haiti and Somalia were not covered in the Charter at all, 
there were too many emergencies at one time, resources to carry out the Security 
Council’s mandates were extremely inadequate, and costs were spiraling out of control 
for all these missions (Kennedy, 2006, 64–65). 
Many would argue the UN is nowhere near the goals announced in the 1940s, 
and, with regard to issues like ethnic and religious tolerance, very little progress has been 
made.  The numerous parts of the world organization often overlap and are top heavy and 
inefficient.  It could be the case, however, that the global agenda in the UN Charter is too 
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ambitious.  It is tempting to say that there is still much to be desired in the social, 
environmental, or cultural areas (Kennedy, 2006, 176).  In the area of international 
human rights, however, in the fifty years that has transpired since the adoption of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the world has witnessed a veritable revolution in 
transforming visions of international human rights into reality.  Never before have there 
been so many achievements in extending rights to former colonial peoples, setting 
standards through declarations and binding covenants, protecting rights through 
mechanisms of treaty implementation and non-treaty procedures, promoting rights 
through education and the media, and enhancing rights through such means as advisory 
services and technical assistance in the field where people actually suffer (Kennedy, 
2006, 204–205).  
International security can only be achieved in the post-Cold War era in a multi-
layered method, involving several arrangements and actors.  No firm basis can be applied 
to all events and a flexible approach is needed (Alagappa, 1999, 292).  The UN, however, 
can play a legitimate role in achieving international peace.  The UN is the only 
international organization formally entrusted with the legal authority to preserve peace in 
situations other than national or collective self-defense.  It also has the authority to 
advance the expansive political, social, and economic conditions that are conducive to 
preventing conflict and handling its cause once it has started.  The UN is thus the only 
institution with a truly global scope.  As the organization of last resort for global conflict 
and difficult disputes, the UN promotes and expresses the rules that govern the increasing 
interdependence of countries (Doyle, 1999, ISM, 452–453).  Enforceability is the 
Achilles heel though, and UN policies and resolutions depend on the degree of 
enforceability. 
B. STRUCTURE OF UN 
1. UN System Components 
The UN system is comprised of the UN organizations, functions, programs and 
funds, specialized agencies, and international bodies related to the UN.  Some groups in 
the UN system act on their own, but intrasystem UN communication is directed to six 
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principal organs of the UN.  The six organs are: International Court of Justice, Security 
Council, General Assembly (GA), Economic and Social Council, Trusteeship Council, 
and Secretariat.  Four of the six, the General Assembly, the Security Council, the 
Economic and Social Council, and Secretariat, provide guidance for the entire 
arrangement.  The Secretary General manages this system with the Chief Executives 
Board (CEB) for Coordination.  The CEB is made up of the heads of UN bodies and 
agencies, its 28 leaders meeting twice a year with the Secretary General.   
The General Assembly is the legislative branch of the UN, comprised of 191 
members, and meets in formal session every fall at UN headquarters in New York City.  
The General Assembly uses six standing committees to do specific initial steps of 
debating and voting on issues, and then presenting resolutions to the GA for 
consideration: The GA First Committee deals with disarmament and international 
security; the GA Second Committee is the Economic and Financial Committee; the GA 
Third Committee is the Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Committee; the GA Fourth 
Committee is the Special Political and Decolonization Committee; the GA Fifth 
Committee is the Administrative and Budgetary Committee; and the GA Sixth 
Committee is the Legal Committee.  Every member state is represented on each 
committee.  Since the end of the Cold War, more than 70 percent of all GA resolutions 
have been passed by unanimous consent, although a majority is all that is required to pass 
resolutions (Moore, 2006, 118–124). 
The Secretariat works for the UN at the headquarters in New York City and 
around the world, and the international civil service staff administers the day-to-day 
operations of the UN.  The Secretary General is the head of the Secretariat, appointed for 
a five-year term, with the possibility of reelection.  The GA appoints the Secretary 
General on recommendation from the Security Council, where the Five Permanent 
members retain their veto power (Moore, 2006, 137).  
According to Article 39 of the UN Charter, the Security Council is responsible for 
maintaining or restoring international peace and security.  Comprised of 15 members, the 
Security Council has five permanent members, also called the P5, and ten nonpermanent 
members.  An amendment to Article 23 of the Charter in 1965 enlarged the number of 
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nonpermanent members from the original six to ten.  The nonpermanent members serve 
for two-year terms and are elected by the assembly based on an equitable geographic 
distribution: five from Africa and Asia, two each from Latin America and the Caribbean, 
Western Europe, Other States, and Eastern Europe, with non- permanent members unable 
to be reelected for a second continuous term.  Each Security Council member has one 
vote, with nine votes needed for a proposal to pass.   
There is a difference, however, between “procedural” and “substantive” matters.  
All the P5 have to support, or abstain, for a substantive resolution to pass—this is often 
referred to as veto power.  Only the Security Council has the ability to execute its 
mandates and require all members to follow its directives when it imposes enforcement 
measures against a state.  While GA resolutions are not legally binding, those passed by 
the council are binding under international law, giving the council greater power than any 
other UN organ or international body in history (Moore, 2006, 111–128).   
The U.S., Great Britain, and France had all said they would support the addition 
of Germany and Japan as permanent members to the council, without veto power, 
numerous times over the years.  Some observers thought the veto has limited the Security 
Council’s effectiveness and gave too much influence to just a few superpowers, and have 
suggested adding veto-laden permanent members to the council, while others have 
proposed getting rid of the privilege altogether or instituting a “weighted” veto, by 
allowing only two or three members in conjunction to veto a proposal (Moore, 2006, 
129).    
The UN Security Council has used a variety of methods to deal with problems, 
including economic and diplomatic sanctions, commissions and other organs with the 
ability to make binding decisions, prosecute individuals, dispose of assets of states and 
individuals, governance of territories, and armed force (Matheson, 2006, 233).  The UN, 
though, is not well suited for involvement in areas involving coercive force.  The UN’s 
traditional ideology has been towards protecting national sovereignty.  Countries with 
battalions in UN peace operations are hesitant to see their troops engaged in combat 
under UN authority, worrying that a UN commander of any nationality other than their 
own will not take the appropriate care to minimize risks.  In the past, countries that have 
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seats on the Security Council have been pressured from fellow member states to deal with 
a humanitarian crisis, and assigned missions to UN peace operations without the 
necessary means since they were reluctant to deal with the UN’s financial resource crisis.  
In addition, action by the UN can lead to a nationalist opposition to the foreign forces 
(Doyle, 1999, ISM 450–451). 
The ECOSOC supervises the economic and social sphere, including human rights, 
educational cooperation, employment, and other activities directed at raising the standard 
of living.  Around 70 percent of the UN’s budget went towards ECOSOC related 
activities in 2003.  Membership size increased in 1965 from 18 member states to 27, and 
then to 54 in 1971.  Nations represented on the ECOSOC have only one representative, 
serve a three-year term, and can be reelected for a continuous term (Moore, 2006, 133).   
The International Court of Justice (ICJ), or World Court, was established in 1945 
as an independent institution, and is the UN’s principal judicial organ.  The World Court 
is separate from the International Criminal Court (ICC).  Fifteen judges make up the ICJ, 
elected by the General Assembly and Security Council for nine-year terms only to handle 
disputes between sovereign states (Moore, 2006, 139–140).   
The ICC came into being on July 1, 2002 after 60 states ratified it.  The ICC has 
jurisdiction over crimes such as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.  The 
U.S. voted against the adoption of the ICC statute for a number of reasons.  One primary 
reason was the potential negative effect on U.S. peace operation involvement abroad if 
U.S. military personnel and political leaders were held liable and subject to the possibility 
of prosecution for actions without authorization by the Security Council.  In December 
2000, President Clinton authorized signing the statute, but said he would not recommend 
U.S. ratification until these concerns were met.  In May 2002, the Bush administration 
told the Secretary General that the U.S. was not going to become a party to the statute 
(Matheson, 2006, 209–210). 
The final UN principal organ, the Trusteeship Council, which is responsible for 
overseeing the conversion of colonial status territories to self-government, accomplished 
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its goals and suspended operations on November 1, 1994 when Palau, the last remaining 
UN trust territory, gained independence (Moore, 2006, 136). 
Specialized agencies are intergovernmental organizations made up of member 
states that have signed a treaty establishing the agency.  They have their own hierarchy 
and their own separate budgets, which are funded through members’ contributions.  The 
contributions are frequently voluntary, but some organizations have their own ways of 
assessing their members, different from the UN regular budget methods.   
Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) play a vital role in the UN system, as spelled out 
in Article 71 of the Charter.  NGOs are nonprofit, voluntary citizens groups that are 
organized on a local, national, or international level.  NGOs are usually organized with 
specific issues in mind, and often provide analysis and expertise and help monitor and 
implement international agreements (Moore, 2006, 61–62).  The UN also has certain 
programs and funds, such as the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), to supervise activities 
central to UN Charter mandates.  Programs and funds also rely on members’ voluntary 
contributions for the most part for funding.  There are also related organizations, such as 
The IAEA, that are completely independent of the UN administrative requirements but 
are associated with the UN, usually through special agreements (Moore, 2006, 143).  
Independent organizations, such as the IAEA, typically are funded through their own 
budgets with assessments to UN members, and from voluntary contributions. 
2. UN Charter 
The founders of the UN wanted to avert any new armed conflict, and this is 
reflected in many provisions of the UN Charter (Matheson, 2006, 15).  The UN Charter 
has all the necessary legal authority for substantial international action to handle armed 
conflict, including the means for the Council to take numerous steps to restore and keep 
the peace.  The system, however, depends ultimately on the ability of the Council to act 
swiftly and decisively.  The development of political consensus, especially with the 
permanent members, is the precondition for the exercise of this authority (Matheson, 
2006, 39).   
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The UN’s Charter is its “constitution.”  The Charter contains a preamble and 19 
chapters containing 111 articles.  Chapter I outlines the UN’s purpose and principles; 
Chapter II deals with UN membership; Chapter III lists the five principal organs; 
Chapters IV and V detail provisions for the GA and Security Council; Chapters VI and 
VII are the core of the development of UN peacekeeping policies and outline the 
collective security measures the UN may use to restore peace; Chapters VIII and IX 
define and sanction regional organizations to keep the peace and promote economic and 
social cooperation; Chapter X defines and sets parameters for Economic and Social 
action; Chapters XI and XII deal with non-self-governing territories; Chapter XIII 
establishes the Trusteeship Council; Chapter XIV provides for the ICJ; Chapter XV 
creates the Secretariat; Chapter XVI establishes the priority of the Charter over other 
international agreements; Chapter XVII sorts out specific matters that concluded WWII; 
Chapter XVIII deal with the method for amending the Charter; and Chapter XIX 
describes the time line and process for Charter ratification (Moore, 2006, 78–79).    
C. UN BUDGET 
1. UN Budget Process 
Article 17 of the UN Charter states that the General Assembly shall consider and 
approve the budget of the UN and expenses of the UN shall be borne by the members as 
apportioned by the General Assembly.  Finances are the responsibility of the Fifth 
Committee of the General Assembly.  All states may be represented on the Committee, so 
its views are governed more by partisanship than a level of expertise found on other 
financial committees.   
Budgets started off as annual, but moved to being biennial starting in 1974–1975, 
giving the major contributors, such as the U.S., veto power.  The purpose of moving to a 
biennial budget was to allow coordination and planning for medium and large programs 
and to synchronize all budgets within the entire UN system.   
The system set up to fund the regular budget comes from assessed contributions 
from members based on a capacity to pay.  Included in this calculation of capacity to pay 
is the GDP of a country, total national income, its population growth and external debts, 
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and other factors.  This approach did not run into any major problems until peacekeeping 
operations became politically controversial in the late 1950s and 1960s (McDermott, 
2000, 58).  The Committee on Contributions, which consists of 18 members, is in charge 
of submitting the scales of assessments to the General Assembly (McDermott, 2000, 
137).  Starting with the 1987–88 UN budget, approval was changed from voting to 
approval done by consensus.  Agreement is thus now achieved by informal meetings of 
which no records are kept.   
Approximately 27 percent of the 2002–2003 UN budget went towards economic 
and social development, 23 percent to administration and support services, 17 percent to 
conference servicing, and 15 percent to overall policy making.  The high cost of servicing 
conferences is due to the UN use of six official languages: Arabic, Chinese, English, 
French, Russian, and Spanish.  All statements must be interpreted and all documentation 
translated from the original to the six languages (Ozmanczyk, 2003, 238–240).   
The Secretary General’s program budget proposals are finalized about 10–12 
months before the targeted biennium.  They are then submitted to two subsidiary organs 
of the General Assembly, the Committee for Program and Coordination (CPC) that 
examines their programmatic content to make sure the proposed activities were mandated 
by the member states, and the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary 
Questions (ACABQ), that analyses the related resource requirements, cost assumptions, 
and other administrative aspects.  The ACABQ provides budget analysis for the UN and 
specialized agencies, and advises the General Assembly on all administrative and 
financial questions.  Its observations on the budgets of the specialized agencies, however, 
are not binding on their executive councils.   
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Tables 1 and 2 show the UN budget process for an off-budget and budget year: 
 
Table 1.   UN Regular Budget Cycle, From Office of Programme Planning 
 
Table 2.   UN Regular Budget Cycle, From Office of Programme Planning 
The 16-member ACABQ has allowed the General Assembly to assert itself 
against the immense strength of the five permanent members of the Security Council and 
to exercise a measure of control over the Secretary General’s spending.  The two 
committees’ recommendations are submitted with the Secretary General’s own program 
budget proposals to the Fifth Committee of the General Assembly at the session held in 
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autumn of the year before the biennium to be covered by the proposed program budget.  
At that session, the Fifth Committee considers revisions to the initial estimates based 
upon updated currency exchange rates and inflation indictors and assumptions, and other 
requirements related to new decisions by organs such as ECOSOC and the assembly’s 
own main committees.  These add-ons undergo the same process of scrutiny as the 
Secretary General’s initial proposals.  Provisions for follow-on adjustment of approved 
appropriations are included given the difficulty of accurately predicting future inflation 
and exchange rate movements (Ozmanczyk, 2003, 238–240).   
Through the use of “performance reports,” the Fifth Committee considers 
adjustments that the Secretary General submits at the end of each year of the biennium.  
The primary purpose of the second performance report is to ensure compliance with the 
requirement of the financial regulations that expenditures for the budget and for each 
appropriation line do not exceed the amounts appropriated.  Each time a budget is 
approved, the General Assembly adopts a resolution on unforeseen and extraordinary 
expenses, which authorizes the Secretary General to enter into additional commitments 
relating to keeping the peace and security not greater than $5 million in one year, and 
also commitments relating to expenses of the ICJ and to interorganizational security 
measures.   
After the General Assembly approves the budget, the controller issues allotments 
to departments and offices.  The Secretary General may transfer resources between 
objects of expenditure and from one activity to another within the same appropriation 
line, but transfers between appropriation lines need the prior concurrence of ACABQ.  
Each peacekeeping operation has its own budget that is considered separately and 
approved by the General Assembly.  Each operation also has its own schedule of budget 
periods corresponding to the length of time for the operation.  The Secretary General has 




2. Improving the UN Budget 
Various proposals have been made to improve the UN budget system.  One idea 
has been a review of the UN’s mandates.  A review of the UN’s mandates periodically 
makes sense, and will make sure the UN’s financial resources are allocated in the most 
effective and efficient way.  Getting rid of low-priority and redundant mandates will 
allow higher priority activities to get funding.  A number of member states have been 
against a review in conjunction with other key reforms that will improve accountability 
and efficiency.  The UN’s regular budget has increased an average of 17 percent annually 
over the past five years, and has increased 193 percent since the 1998/1999 biennial 
budget.  The U.S. budget has only grown an average of 7 percent over that period.  The 
growth of the UN budget has been significantly larger than budget increases for all the 
major contributors.  At different times in the past, many U.S. policymakers felt the U.S. 
should oppose any budget increase for the UN until it makes budgetary reforms.  The 
policymakers felt that UN budget increases should not occur if corruption was still 
prevalent at the UN.  Opposing the budget increase, the policymakers argue, will be 
beneficial to American taxpayers and all the other member states, since the UN will have 
more of an incentive to effectively prioritize its resources and reduce corruption 
(Schaefer, 2007). 
UN budgets have grown over the years, but over the last 50 years the growth has 
been at a modest rather than alarming rate.  The 1946 regular budget was about $20 
million, and by the late 1990s was about $1.3 billion, which works out to around 65 times 
larger over those 50 years.  The overall situation, however, has become more forbidding 
as the sizes of the budget and percentage of arrears have grown.  The number of major 
contributors not paying their full amount also increased over the years.  While some 
countries have not paid their dues on time, the pace of voluntary giving has increased 
substantially over the years.  Voluntary contributions to the UN’s specialized agencies, 
programs, funds and other organs rose from $815 million in 1971 to $6.9 billion in 1995 
(McDermott, 2000, 49).  The UN, however, has been consistently underfunded, requiring 
the movement of money between budgets to make payments (McDermott, 2000, 38).   
 23
The rules and regulations that have govern the UN’s finances have never been 
entirely binding.  The UN system is financed in multiple ways.  The three primary 
mechanisms are percentage assessments on member states for the regular budget, 
peacekeeping budgets, and voluntary contributions from governments, organizations, and 
individuals to the UN special organs and programs.  The financial operations of the 
regular budget and peacekeeping budget are under the direct control of the UN 
administration, while the specialized agencies are not under the UN’s direct control.  The 
costs of the peacekeeping and regular budget are small compared with total UN expenses.   
In 1997, for example, the total cost for the entire UN system was about $18 
billion, of which the regular and peacekeeping budgets were about $2.3 billion.  The 
assessments for the leading contributors in 1946 and 1947 were the U.S. with around 50 
percent, Britain with 10.5 percent, the Soviet Union with 6 percent, and France at 5.5 
percent.  In comparison, the leading UN contributors in 2006 were the U.S., Japan, and 
Germany, with 22 percent, 16 percent, and 8 percent of the UN budget, respectively.  The 
regular and peacekeeping budgets are based on scales of assessments, differ between the 
two budgets, and are related to the ability of a UN member to pay.  The U.S. has argued 
over the years that it is not healthy for the UN to be excessively dependent on one nation 
for the bulk of its funding (McDermott, 2000, 40–42).  
3. Peacekeeping Budgets 
The first few peacekeeping missions took place in the Middle East, involved 
Israel, Egypt, and Lebanon, and were financed out of the regular budget. Member states 
have been slow to pay their contributions for operations, as a result of which there has 
frequently been a shortage of money in the beginning.  Some peacekeeping budgets, 
however, have been in surplus and have been used as emergency funding for the regular 
budget on occasion.  Although peacekeeping mandates are renewed every six months, the 
flow of money may not be regular, and renewals may not correspond to a calendar or 
fiscal year.  Arrears also mean delays in reimbursing states that contribute troops and 
equipment.  In 1997, the UN owed over $1 billion to member states in the form of 
reimbursement (McDermott, 2000, 81–83).    
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Operations in the mid 1950s were funded by assessments similar to the scale for 
the general budget.  In the early 1970s, another form of assessment began that put a 
greater percentage on the five permanent members of the Security Council.  The five 
permanent members were subject to a surcharge amounting to around 25 percent for their 
privileged position.  Also, the member states were put into four groups: A, the permanent 
five; B, countries that pay their regular budget shares; C, countries paying at 20 percent; 
and D, countries paying at 10 percent.  
During the 1970s, the UN, as William Durch observed  
had increasingly come to be seen as a tool by which the new voting 
majority of the poor, ‘Third World’ or ‘non-aligned’ states, with the 
voting support of the socialist bloc, could press an agenda designed to 
redistribute wealth from North to South.  UN bureaucracy grew as the 
General Assembly’s majority established programs and agencies that the 
West was obliged to pay for, but over which the West maintained little 
political control and from which it saw little apparent return on 
investment. (McDermott, 2000, 97)   
During the 1980s, the regular and peacekeeping budgets came under greater 
pressure due to political arguments over UN policy and non-payment by member states.  
When the U.S. started to withhold payments, the UN already was over $100 million in 
arrears from other members.  The U.S. made withholdings on specific programs based on 
legal and political decisions, disapproval of UN activities, and a feeling that the UN was 
a marginal player in international politics (McDermott, 2000, 99). 
Attempts were made to make changes in the budget process in 2006, including 
removing the General Assembly’s power to micromanage operations and budget 
functions, and moving that authority to the Secretary General’s office.  Another proposal 
would authorize long-range contracting authority in areas like peacekeeping that will 
allow smoother and more cost-efficient operations.  The General Assembly is reluctant, 
however, to give up the power to spend money and hire and fire staff (Making the UN 
Work, 2006).   
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In March 2008, the UN presented its top donors with a request for nearly $1.1 
billion in additional funds over the next two years, increasing current UN expenses by 25 
percent and putting in place the highest administrative budget ever.  Since 2000, UN 
administrative costs have more than doubled, to about $2.5 billion a year.  Peacekeeping 
expenses have increased threefold—almost 110,000 peacekeepers were serving in 20 
missions at a cost of around $7 billion in 2008.  Some of the additional funds would be 
used to renovate the UN headquarters in New York. The total cost of the renovation is 
estimated to be $1.6 billion, covered by added dues assessments for the 191 member 
countries over 5 years.  The U.S., the largest contributor, would pay 22 percent.  The 57-
year-old structures have below minimal safety standards, asbestos, lead paint, and leaking 
roofs (Hodge, 2006).  Since the bulk of the money in the latest UN supplement request 
would fund missions and initiatives that the U.S. approved or assisted in creating, the 
U.S. has limited leverage in trying to slow the growth of UN expenses, which was a 
major goal throughout the 1990s (Lynch, 2008). 
D. CHALLENGES AND REFORMS IN RECENT YEARS 
1. Peacekeeping Challenges 
Although the UN Charter contains no mention of the word peacekeeping and 
gives no guidelines to this form of collective action, peacekeeping actions have played a 
major UN role (Kennedy, 2006, 77).  While the peacekeeping efforts have demanded a 
lot of the UN’s attention and resources, some have been successful, while others have not 
gone well.  The primary actors in the peacekeeping realm are the UN Security Council, 
the UN Secretariat, the governments contributing troops and the military personnel in the 
field.  The UN Secretariat translates the UN mandates into directives for action by the 
military personnel in the field.  Even though the UN set out to prevent further wars when 
it was established, approximately 150 conflicts have occurred since 1945 at the cost of 22 
million lives.  Since 1948, when the UN was started, there have been over 60 
peacekeeping operations at a cost of over $40 billion and 2,200 lives (Sitkowski, 2006, 
143). 
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One UN operation that did not go as envisioned was in the former Yugoslavia 
during 1992 to 1995.  The UN was not able to achieve any of its peacekeeping goals in 
the ex-Yugoslavia, with the exception of some humanitarian aid.  The UN peacekeeping 
operation there was conducted under the most restrictive mandate and even more 
restrictive rules of engagement.  The UN troops used the right of defense only when 
under attack, and rarely tried to defend their mandate established under the Charter.  Most 
of the bloodshed in the ex-Yugoslavia might have been prevented had the UN identified 
the aggressor and applied sanctions allowed by its Charter (Sitkowski, 2006, 140–141). 
A major issue the Security Council has dealt with over the years in the application 
of sanctions has been the difficulty of enforcing them against determined efforts by the 
sanctioned entities to sidestep them.  This difficulty has been further hampered by the 
relative inexperience of most countries in enforcing sanctions and the indecisiveness of 
many governments and economic actors about the necessity of the sanctions.  The 
Council has used legal tools and standards to deal with sanction evasions, such as 
allowing the use of force to limit violations and imposing secondary sanctions on states 
that aid such violations.  The Council has had difficulty maintaining and enforcing 
sanctions, minimizing collateral effects of sanctions on unintended civilian populations, 
and avoiding fraud by the sanctioned country (Matheson, 2006, 83–96). 
Local violence, while infrequently posing a threat to international peace and 
security, violates people’s human rights and hampers the attainment of basic needs 
(Alger, 1998, 72).  Violence in Rwanda in 1994 did not threaten international peace but 
the UN was aware of the mass killing that was occurring.  The massacres in Rwanda and 
the unwillingness of the UN to intervene are viewed as the single worst decision the UN 
has ever made.  The few, under-armed, under-funded UN observers were quickly 
defeated.  The international observer troops under the Canadian general Dallaire 
repeatedly warned that exterminations was just ahead and asked repeatedly for more 
troops and a mandate to intervene, but nothing was forthcoming (Kennedy, 2006, 103).  
Issues such as delayed troop movements and logistic problems were offered as reasons 
for this failure.  In Rwanda, the UN ignored the experience from Somalia in which the 
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peace agreements were ignored and the UN was overly overoptimistic.  When the 
Rwanda disaster began the Secretariat and the Council did not work quickly enough to 
address the massacres (Sitkowski, 2006, 123).  
The first combined UN–U.S. mission was in Somalia from 1992–1993, and was 
destined for failure due to a lack of a coherent political and military strategy to achieve its 
overambitious goals.  Somalia provided a very valuable lesson for the U.S. and the UN in 
what is likely and unlikely to work in the type of complex political-humanitarian 
emergency that is becoming common (Sitkowski, 2006, 108).  The U.S. government 
persuaded the Council to approve a large American-led peace enforcement operation, the 
United Task Force, UNITAF, in Somalia.  A problem was that a mandate for strong 
military action now lay alongside previous Council authorizations for a humanitarian 
relief operation, and there was thus a possibility that the two would become entangled.   
By the spring of 1993, however, the UNITAF operation was becoming unpopular 
with American politicians and the mission was given back to the UN.  By this point the 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement missions were intertwined, with different ground 
troops pursuing different targets, and the lines of command were confusing.  A raid to get 
Somali insurgents in 1993 went badly, resulting in 18 American casualties.  The Clinton 
administration decided to withdraw its troops a few months later.  The move towards a 
democratic Somalia ended in failure, and the UN suffered a heavy blow to its reputation 
(Kennedy, 2006, 94–96). A disheartening fact is that although there has been an increase 
in unrealistic mandates and ignoring disasters in the field, in the 60-year history of the 
UN there has not been a single case of the Council calling anyone to account for failures 
in the operations it mandated (Sitkowski, 2006, 21– 24). 
2. Transitions in Peacekeeping 
Post-1990 UN operations have included mandates exceeding traditional 
peacekeeping with respect to scope, purpose, and responsibilities; instead they have dealt 
with civil wars, which reflect a change in the nature of conflicts from inter-state conflict 
to intra-state conflict.  The UN expected most of its operations would only call for lightly 
armed peacekeepers, with more robust operations the exception.  The ability of rouge 
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forces to use highly destructive weapons, however, is turning this idea upside down 
(Hoagland, 2000).  Thus there has been a shift from operations like monitoring cease-
fires, demilitarized zones, and post-conflict security in UN peacekeeping operations to  
more complex military interventions, civilian police duties, human rights interventions, 
overseeing elections, and post-conflict reconstruction.   
The Security Council has approved over 40 new peacekeeping operations since 
1990.  Half of all ongoing peacekeeping operations have been approved since 2000.  
Between 2000 and 2005, the number of peacekeepers under the UN jumped from 48,000 
to 86,000 (Reforming, August 27, 2006).  There were 17 active UN peacekeeping 
operations at the end of May 2008, in addition to three political or peace-building 
operations supported by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO).  These 
17 missions involved around 88,000 uniformed personnel from 117 countries, including 
over 74,000 troops, 2,500 military observers, and 11,000 police.   
With the increased peacekeeping missions came an increase in the budget.  The 
DPKO’s budget from July 2007 to June 30, 2008 was about $6.8 billion.  The estimated 
UN peacekeeping operations budget for July 2008 to June 30, 2009 is $7.4 billion.  This 
equates to a 10 percent increase over the previous budget and an almost threefold 
increase in budget and personnel since 2003 (Schaefer, 2008).  The U.S. has approved of 
the increase in the peacekeeping budget for the most part.  The U.S. sees it is in its best 
interest to support UN operations as a useful, cost-effective method of influencing 
situations that impact U.S. national interest without direct U.S. involvement.   
All permanent members are charged a premium above their regular assessment 
rate for peacekeeping operations.  For 2008–2009, the U.S. peacekeeping budget 
assessment is just under 26 percent; for China it is 3.15 percent; France 7.4 percent; 
Russia 1.4 percent; and UK 7.8 percent.  The U.S. is charged more than all of the other 
permanent members combined.  The U.S. will pay close to $2 billion under the proposed 
2008–2009 budget for peacekeeping, while the 30-plus countries assessed the lowest rate 




five permanent members contribute in sum less than 6 percent of the UN uniformed 
personnel, with the U.S. contributing a total of 14 troops, 16 military observers, and 259 
police as of May 31, 2008.   
Because costs are growing as the UN is expanding its peacekeeping role, some 
members of Congress are proposing some changes in the process of assessments for 
peacekeeping.  Policymakers in the U.S. have also followed closely improper actions 
associated with peacekeeping missions.  With the growth in UN peacekeeping have come 
investigations into procurement fraud and abuse, and also crimes from UN staff.  An 
Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS) audit of $1 billion in DPKO procurement 
contracts made in a six-year period discovered at least $265 million of waste, fraud, or 
abuse.  In a 2007 OIOS study, $1.4 billion in peacekeeping contracts were investigated 
and more than $600 million worth of contracts involved significant corruption.  In the last 
few years there have been reports of crimes by UN personnel, including rape and forced 
prostitution of women and young girls (Schaefer, 2008).  
The UN Secretariat agreed to implement stricter requirements for peacekeeping 
troops after pressure from the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Mission to the UN.  
A memorandum of understanding between the UN and troop contributors grants troop-
contributing countries jurisdiction over military members who are involved in UN peace 
operations; however, not much is done to countries that fail to investigate or punish 
personnel who commit such crimes.  Some argue in favor of a reevaluation of all UN 
operations dating back to the early 1990s to find out if the UN is making any progress.  
Though the majority of those missions are smaller than more recent ones, it would send a 
message of accountability that has been absent in the rubber-stamp process of 
reauthorizing peacekeeping operations.  A UN presence somewhere must be evaluated to 
see if it will likely improve or destabilize the situation, with clearly established and 
achievable operation objectives, carefully planned requirements for accomplishing them, 
securing pledges for what is needed to accomplish them before authorizing the operation, 
and establishing an exit strategy to avert perpetual mission creep.  If a mission has not 
secured its objectives or made obvious progress toward those objectives, the Security 
Council should determine it if is serving a worthwhile function.  The UN could build up a 
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peacekeeping capability around the world, and develop a UN database of qualified, 
trained, and pre-screened uniformed and civilian personnel available for UN operations 
(Schaefer, 2008). 
In 2000, Secretary General Kofi Annan said the UN’s peacekeeping efforts 
needed the kind of military help that the U.S. was then unwilling to provide.  During the 
UN operation in Sierra Leone from 1998–1999, the U.S. was only willing to transport 
troops from other countries, not put U.S. troops on the ground abroad.  The situation in 
Sierra Leone and other countries required sophisticated and experienced military teams to 
assess and handle problems, but such missions are being carried out with poorly equipped 
and lesser-trained troops in many countries.  The U.S. changed its policy in 2000 and sent 
hundreds of American soldiers to Nigeria to train and equip West African battalions that 
went to Sierra Leone to support the hard-pressed government troops and UN 
peacekeepers (Perlez, 2000).  
The UN doesn’t have a standing armed force and must depend on member states 
to donate troops and other personnel for peace operations.  The UN does have a Standby 
Arrangements System (UNSAS) where member states make conditional commitments to 
prepare and maintain resources such as specified personnel, material, and equipment on 
standby in their home countries to achieve specified tasks in support of UN peace 
missions.  Some have proposed that the UN should also install mandatory, uniform 
standards of conduct for civilian and military personnel involved in UN peace operations.  
States that do not keep their commitments to discipline their troops should be prevented 
form providing troops for peace operations (Schaefer, 2008).   
A shortage of managers for the operations has also been an issue.  In 2000 there 
were just 32 military officers at the UN’s headquarters to oversee 27,000 troops deployed 
in 14 operations around the world, and just 9 police specialists to supervise 9,000 police 
officers (Strengthening, September 7, 2000).  Just 1.25 percent of the peacekeeping 
budget went to headquarters administration, thought to be too little to allow for sufficient 
planning (Crossette, 2000). 
 31
3. Peacekeeping Recommendations 
In addition to instances of financial and other scandals, the UN peacekeeping 
bureaucracy is notoriously slow at rallying and deploying forces.  Some would argue, 
though, that the UN’s peacekeeping operations are only as good as the Security Council 
requires them to be, and as good as the forces they can amass (It’s Not Easy, 2006). A 
panel of international experts in the late 1990s recommended that the UN peacekeeping 
department be enlarged and undergo more professionalization, including getting some 
intelligence gathering ability that was not allowed during the Cold War.  The experts also 
suggested additional effort go into preventing situations from becoming more severe, and 
not wait on the Security Council for guidance.   
Another recommendation was that peacekeeping officials not allow a lot of 
direction from larger countries on their day-to-day routines.  Their suggestions also 
recommended a quicker response time for peacekeeping operations so they can be started 
in 30 days instead of several months, and the use of expert advance teams to regions with 
complex military and political situations (Crossette, 2000).  Clearly, knowing what kind 
of operation the UN forces are expected to carry out is crucial before commencing any 
operation.  Secretary General Kofi Annan said that war fighting and peacekeeping are 
separate activities, and peacekeepers should not be sent into an environment where no 
case-fire or peace agreement is in place.  
4. Delinquent Dues 
Throughout its history the UN has had to deal with countries not paying their 
assessments on time, and UN components often have to look at ways to cut operations 
due to limited funds.  In 2000, the UN International Atomic Energy Agency, which is 
responsible for halting the proliferation of nuclear weapons, was facing a financial crisis 
and had to look at ceasing some operations due to countries refusing to pay their bills on 
time.   
In addition to the problem of some countries accumulating arrears for the UN’s 
regular budget there is the difference between UN budget cycles and the budget cycles of 
contributing countries.  U.S. Congressional officials have said the U.S. is keeping to a 
 32
long-established schedule of paying its dues in the fourth quarter of the calendar year, 
after Congress passes the budget for the new fiscal year.  The U.S. thinks the UN 
agencies should coordinate and manage their funding so their operations are not disrupted 
(Drozdiak, 2000). 
The General Assembly began a new reform effort in 2005 in light of scandals like 
the “Oil for Food” program in Iraq.  In September 2005, the heads of UN member states 
met for the World Summit at UN headquarters to discuss institutional reform.  The 
Summit Outcome Document was a result of those discussions, and it listed a number of 
reforms, including replacing the Human Rights Commission with a new Human Rights 
Council and requesting the Secretary General suggest improvements in UN management, 
personnel, programs, oversight, and accountability (Blanchfield, 2008, 1).   
A big issue over the years has been the micromanagement of the Secretariat by 
the General Assembly.  Almost every proposal to improve UN management and 
accountability needs approval by the member states, many of which are opposed to 
reform.  Also, the UN makes it difficult to track reform due to the large volume of 
documents it produces.  No one would say there are no inefficiencies in the UN.  In fact, 
some think the spreading structure of the UN makes it almost certain that inefficiencies 
approaching 20 percent are expected (McDermott, 2000, 176).  The ECOSOC’s and UN 
Development Programme’s (UNDP) records show how inefficiency and duplication can 
exist in a bureaucracy.  Their deficiencies have been one of the major targets of reform 
efforts as a result of confusion in carrying out the UN’s economic programs and agency 
coordination in the field when dealing with humanitarian intervention (McDermott, 2000, 
51). 
Another problem in the UN is that it is devoted to a balance in regional 
representation.  One reason inefficiency and corruption exist in the UN is the attempt to 
balance UN Secretariat representation based on nationality, sex, and type of appointment, 
taking into account the UN Charter principles and the General Assembly guidelines 
(McDermott, 2000, 159).  Attempting to appoint positions to satisfy geographical 
considerations can lead to more qualified individuals being passed over.  Allegations of 
fraud can have lasing consequences for the UN.  Following the December 2004 
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earthquake and killer waves in Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, and other Asian countries, the 
UN did not have access to any relief money following accusations it was involved in the 
embezzlement of oil for food money (Sands, 2005).   
The U.S. was at the forefront of a campaign to cap the UN assessed regular 
budget at $950 million as an incentive for the General Assembly to approve the Secretary 
General’s reform proposals, which were submitted in March 2006.  The $3.8 billion 
2006–2007 UN budget included a $950 million cap on the first half of 2006 and tied 
additional spending requests to the fulfillment of management changes (Hoge, 2005).  
The Secretariat and the Secretary General, though, are not the principal hurdle to the UN 
reform effort.  The General Assembly is the primary hurdle. 
5. UN Reform 
The progress of reform has been a continuing issue for the UN throughout its 
existence.  While some countries, such as the U.S., have been full proponents of reform 
efforts, for many countries UN reform has not been an important topic.  The Group of 77 
is seen by some countries as being a major hurdle to reform efforts.  The Group of 77 (G–
77) was established on 15 June 1964 by 77 developing countries, signatories of the “Joint 
Declaration of the Seventy-Seven Countries” issued at the end of the first session of the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in Geneva. The 
largest intergovernmental organization of developing states in the UN, the G–77 provides 
the countries of the South a means of articulating and promoting their collective 
economic interests and enhancing their joint negotiating capacity on all major 
international economic issues within the United Nations system, and promoting South-
South cooperation for development.   
The U.S. and Japan, which combined contribute almost 42 percent of the UN 
budget, opposed approving the rest of the UN budget unless the General Assembly 
passed various UN management, personnel, and oversight reform proposals.  Led by the 
G–77, the cap was removed in 2006 and the remainder of the UN budget was approved 
without the reforms desired by the U.S. and other major contributors.  In fact, out of 23 
key reform proposals, only one was not blocked by the G–77 (Schaefer, 2008). 
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Another reform involved decreasing the roughly 9,000 directives that have 
accumulated over the decades, many of which are outdated or redundant.  The majority of 
UN members agreed to only a very small reduction between 2006 and 2008.  An editorial 
in the New York Times in 2006 said that reforms are not a concession to Washington or 
other big donors, but are a necessity for all UN members.  The UN cannot function 
effectively under budget and management rules that were devised for a much smaller 
organization.  The UN cannot move forward unless both the big donor countries and less 
developed countries are satisfied (Crisis Postponed, 2006). 
The disparity between what the major funding countries pay and the majority of 
other states’ funding has been a source of contention for some countries, particularly the 
U.S.  There has not been any shift toward moving portions of the UN regular budget from 
assessed funding toward voluntary funding, as some countries, particularly some of the 
larger UN contributors, would like.  The major argument for more voluntary funding of 
UN programs is that it will enhance accountability and provide the incentive for 
efficiency in how the funds are spent.  If donor countries do not feel their contributions 
are being spent effectively, they can decide to cut back their giving or not give anything 
at all.  Nor has there been any movement toward balancing financial contributions and 
influence in the UN budgetary procedures by giving large contributors more say in 
budgetary matters. 
Approximately 50 countries have the lowest UN assessment, just .001 percent of 
the regular budget, paying only about $19,000 each per year.  They still get one vote, the 
same as the U.S.  The 128 lowest-paying countries, which are about two-thirds of the 
General Assembly, all together pay less than 1 percent of the UN budget.  This imbalance 
makes reform difficult due to the lack of incentive for the lowest contributors.  These 
countries are focused on enlarging the UN’s power as a way of increasing their own 
influence and priorities and having the organization give out more international aid and 
transfers.   
Thus, there are a large number of countries whose focus is not necessarily on 
efficiency, but on enlarging and strengthening the UN system.  On the other hand, the 
major donors want their contributions to be spent effectively, and so are more interested 
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in reform.  The efforts at reform, however, may be impeded by the major donors not 
sharing the same view as may smaller contributing countries when it comes to the size 
and strength of the UN.  
According to Andrew Natsios, the major powers may prefer to keep the UN weak: 
Perhaps the most closely held secret of the UN is that its country 
members, for widely divergent reasons, want the institution to remain 
weak.  The great powers wish to avoid complications in the formulation of 
their foreign policy introduced by an institution that is at least partially 
managed by developing countries with bitter memories of their colonial 
past and unstable or unreliable political systems.  The great powers have 
regarded the UN as an instrument to promote their foreign policy 
objectives; they have, to a limited degree, succeeded in using it for this 
purpose, especially when their objectives have broader international 
appeal. (McDermott, 2000, 182–183) 
With the major powers only wishing the UN get bigger if it operates more 
efficiently, and in accord with its policy objectives, there seems to be a difference of 
opinion in where the UN should be headed in the future.  
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III. U.S. BUDGET PROCESS 
A. INTRODUCTION TO BUDGET PROCESS 
The Constitution gives Congress the power to levy taxes and provides that money 
can be spent only according to appropriations made by law.  It does not state how these 
powers are to be used, and it does not provide for a federal budget or for the president to 
have an important role in the nation’s financial matters, other than signing and vetoing 
Congressional bills.  The practice of budgeting was unknown when the Constitution was 
signed.  In the early twentieth century, modern budgeting was imported to the U.S. from 
Europe (Schick, 2007, 10).  Government budgeting is a process that attempts to conform 
resources and needs in an organized and recurring way to allow properly funded 
collective choices.  There is no single budget document that encapsulates all the money 
that flows into and out of the federal government.  Each government agency is a 
participant, estimating future income and operating expenses over a given time (Jones, 
2008, 6).  Congress plays a central role, responding to executive branch proposals with a 
series of budget documents. 
1. Important Acts 
An important budgetary milestone in the U.S. during the early twentieth century 
was the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, which established a presidential budget 
system that has been in place for more than 80 years.  This act gave the president a 
formal role in budgeting before Congress approved appropriation bills.  The law 
mandated that the president give an annual budget to Congress and prevented agencies 
from giving their requests directly to Congress.  The act created the Bureau of the 
Budget, which was renamed the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) in 1970, to 
assist the president in deciding on the amounts to be requested.  The president’s annual 
budget gives revenue and spending recommendations that influence Congress, but does 
not bind Congress to follow them (Schick, 2007, 14). 
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Congress felt the president had too much control in the budget process during the 
1970s, and created the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act (CBA) of 
1974 to help level the playing field.  The act requires Congress to adopt an annual budget 
resolution that sets revenue, spending, debt totals, and allocates spending across a series 
of categories called functions.  The 1974 act enlarged Congress’s budget responsibilities, 
but did not change the formal role of the president.  The president still submits a budget 
each year, and Congress decides whether to accept his recommendations.  Now, however, 
Congress has its own Congressional Budget Office (CBO), which helps devise its own 
budget blueprint, economic assumptions, and spending priorities, as well as Budget 
Committees charged with developing budget resolutions for consideration in the House 
and Senate.  The president and Congress thus each have their own budgets, and neither 
one has a formal say in what the other decides.  The two branches must, however, resolve 
their differences to make appropriations and changes to revenue and entitlement laws 
(Schick, 2007, 18–20). 
2. Budget Overview 
The budget consists of four primary funds: general, special, trust, and revolving.  
General funds, which account for around two-thirds of federal revenues and outlays, are 
not earmarked by law for specific purposes; hence, there is no direct link between taxes 
paid and services provided.  Almost all individual and corporate income taxes are 
deposited into the general fund, and items such as national defense, interest on public 
debt, and operating expenses of most federal agencies are paid out of the general fund.  




Figure 1.   Composition of Federal Receipts by Source, From Walker. 
Trust funds, on the other hand, are designated by law for certain purposes.  Just as 
Congress creates the funds, it can erase them and change the amounts paid in or out of 
them, and even change the purposes for which the fund’s assets are used.  Social Security 
is an example of a trust fund.  The government typically borrows all trust fund balances 
and pays the prevailing rate of interest on Treasury bonds of comparable interest to them. 
Special funds, which share qualities of both the general fund and trust funds, are 
mostly financed by user fees and other earmarked revenues.  The National Wildlife 
Refuge Fund is an example of a special fund.  Revolving funds function like a business 
and sell goods and services, using the income to finance their operations (Schick, 2007, 
43–45). 
Figure 2 conveys the budget process, starting with the president’s budget request, 
and ending with the president signing or vetoing budget legislation. 
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Figure 2.   Congressional Budget Process, After Doyle. 
Two centuries of practice has produced a complex budget process that has many 
players, defined rules, and layers of procedure.  At any given time, the federal 
government is typically handling three fiscal years: the year in progress, or current year, 
the year Congress is considering, or the budget year, and the year after that for which 
agencies are preparing budget requests, or the first out year.  This overlap of several 
fiscal years has turned budgeting into a year round activity.  A key date on the budget 
calendar is October 1, when the new fiscal year begins.  Each agency uses its own 
procedures and guidelines to prepare its request for inclusion in the president’s budget, 
which usually takes around eight to ten months to completely assemble.  The agencies 
prepare their budgets in the spring and summer of the calendar year before submission to 
Congress, and OMB reviews their requests in the fall, recommending program and 
spending amounts (Schick, 2007, 53–54).  
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OMB’s review has several distinct stages: staff review, where OMB examiners 
review the requests, consult with agency officials, and make recommendations; director’s 
review, where major issues are handled, OMB examiners defend their recommendations, 
and the OMB director makes budget decisions; passback, where agencies are told of these 
decisions and have an opportunity to appeal for reconsiderations; appeals, first taken to 
OMB, but to the president or aides if needed for resolution; and final decisions, where 
budget documents are printed.  Once informed of final decisions, agencies amend their 
budgets to align them with the president’s.  Agencies have a short time period to ask for 
more funding than OMB recommended, and once all the issues have been resolved, the 
budget is printed and given to Congress.  The president is required to submit his budget 
to Congress no later than the first Monday in February for the upcoming fiscal year 
(Schick, 2007, 53–54, 99).  
The congressional budget process starts when the President’s budget is submitted.  
The House and Senate Budget Committees are in charge of marking up and reporting the 
budget resolution.  The Budget Committees hold hearings, get “views and estimates” 
reports from other committees, and receive information from CBO in developing the 
budget resolution.  The House and Senate committees’ reports give the Budget 
Committees information on the preferences and legislative plans of congressional 
committees regarding budgetary matters within their jurisdiction.  The budget resolution 
is supposed to be adopted by April 15 (Keith, 2008, 12–15). 
The House and Senate rules required that agencies and programs be authorized in 
law before an appropriation is made for them.  An authorizing act is a law that establishes 
a program or agency and the terms and conditions under which it functions, and 
authorizes the enactment of appropriations for that program or agency.  Either the House 
or Senate may originate authorizing legislation, and it can be considered at any point in 
the year.  Many agencies and programs have temporary authorizations that must be 
renewed either annually or every few years (Keith, 2008, 20). 
Once the president submits his budget to Congress, the appropriations 
subcommittees hold hearings where agency officials explain the amounts requested.  The 
subcommittees are independent of each other, and most are limited by discretionary 
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spending caps set under the annual budget resolution.  Agencies must get apportionment 
of funds from OMB before they can spend their appropriations.  Many federal agencies 
also have an allotment process that apportions available funds to their individual units.  
Agencies must spend their funds based on the terms and conditions set by Congress, but 
they sometimes reprogram funds by shifting them from one purpose to another in the 
same account.  Agencies may also transfer budget resources from one account to another, 
pursuant to statutory authorization.  An agency can defy congressional intent if it 
impounds and refuses to use all or part of an appropriation.  Every impoundment is either 
a deferral, which delays the use of funds, or a rescission, which cancels budget activity 
(Schick, 2007, 281–286).   
OMB makes a single apportionment for each appropriation account or fund.  
Agencies make allotments to their divisions and other organizational subunits.  After 
funds are allocated, they may make obligations, which are an agency’s binding 
commitment to another party for goods or services to be provided.  Once a good or 
service is received, a payment is made to liquidate the obligation, which is called an 
outlay (Schick, 2007, 49–57).   
As opposed to state and local governments, the federal budget does not separate 
capital and operating expenses.  Both expenditures for current operations and for the 
acquisition of buildings and other fixed assets are budgeted as outlays.  The main reason 
for combining current and capital investment expenditures is to show the budget’s total 
impact on economic activity (Schick, 2007, 49–57).   
The spending process concludes when an appropriations account is closed, which 
means all remaining balances are canceled and are not available for expenditure.  The 
account will be in an expired status for five years after the open period, where no new 
obligations can be made but old ones are paid off as they become due.  At the end of five 
years the account is closed.  The final phase of the budget cycle is review and audit 
(Schick, 2007, 276–280). 
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For a federal expenditure to be justified, it must bear a logical relationship to the 
appropriation charged, not be prohibited by law, and not otherwise be provided under 
another appropriation.  Three important characteristics of appropriations are purpose, 
time, and amount.  According to 31 U.S. Code Section 1301, appropriations shall be 
applied only to the objects for which they were made except as otherwise provided by 
law.  A primary means of congressional control is placing time limits on the availability 
of appropriations.  By imposing a time limit, Congress can periodically review a given 
program or agency’s activities.  The Antideficiency Act is the most significant statute that 
relates to the amount an agency can spend.  The act prohibits making or authorizing an 
expenditure from, or creating or authorizing an obligation under, an appropriation or fund 
in excess of the amount available in the appropriation unless it is authorized by law 
(Potvin, 2007, 75–86).  
3. President’s Budget 
No president can ignore the budget. Submitting the budget to Congress is one of 
the few tasks a president must complete each year, no matter the outlook of the economy, 
the origin of the problems, and the availability of a solution.  The winner of interbranch 
disputes depends on the relative political strength and bargaining skills of the two sides.  
The president wins when he has a low number of attainable demands, does not allow the 
give and take of negotiations to deter him from his key objectives, does a good job at 
reading public opinion, and successfully threatens to veto congressional actions that 
lower his political standing.   Figure 3 shows the executive budget process with times 
activities generally occur. 
The long lead times and the fact that appropriations have not been made yet for 
the next fiscal year leads to agency budgets that are prepared with a large amount of 
uncertainty about economic conditions, presidential policies, and congressional actions.  
Agencies deal with this uncertainty by keeping options open until late in the process, 
basing future budgets on past ones, and asking for more than they expect to get (Schick, 




Date              Activities____________________________________________ 
               Calendar Year Prior to the Year in Which Fiscal Year Begins  
 
Spring  OMB issues planning guidance to executive agencies for the budget 
beginning October 1 of the following year.  
 
Spring and Summer   Agencies begin development of budget requests.  
 
July  OMB issues annual update to Circular A-11, providing detailed 
instructions for submitting budget data and material for agency budget 
requests.  
 
September    Agencies submit initial budget requests to OMB.  
 
October-November   OMB staff review agency budget requests in relation to  
President’s priorities, program performance, and budget  
constraints.  
 
November-December   President, based on recommendations by the OMB director,  
makes decisions on agency requests.  OMB informs agencies of 
decisions, commonly referred to as OMB “passback.”  
 
December  Agencies may appeal these decisions to the OMB director and in some 
cases directly to the President.  
 
                      Calendar Year in Which Fiscal Year Begins  
 
By first Monday in February  President submits budget to Congress.  
 
February-September   Congressional phase.  Agencies interact with Congress,  
justifying and explaining President’s budget.  
 
By July 15    President submits mid-session review to Congress.  
 
August 21 (or within 10 days       Agencies submit apportionment requests to OMB for each  
after approval of a spending bill)     budget account. 
                
September 10 (or within 30 days  OMB apportions available funds to agencies by time period, 
after approval of a spending bill)  program, project, or activity. 
 
October 1    Fiscal year begins.  
 
                   Calendar Years in Which Fiscal Year Begins and Ends  
 
October-September   Agencies make allotments, obligate funds, conduct activities,  
and request supplemental appropriations, if necessary.  President  
may propose supplemental appropriations and impoundments  
(i.e., deferrals or rescissions) to Congress.  
 
September 30    Fiscal year ends.  
Figure 3.   Executive Budget Process Timetable, From Heniff. 
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The president is required to submit a midsession update by July 15, taking into 
account changes in economic conditions, congressional actions, and other developments.  
Also, the president may revise his budget at any point in the year.  Changes that are given 
to Congress before it has acted on the original request are amendments; requests for more 
funds that are made after Congress has acted on the affected appropriations bill are 
submitted as supplementals (Schick, 2007, 101).  The president must also know when to 
keep a safe distance and when to become involved in the budget process, when to 
threaten a veto and when to concede, when to delegate to others the job of reaching a 
agreement, and when to act as his own budget director (Schick, 2007, 108).  If the 
president fails to pick his budget battles wisely with Congress, he will have more 
difficulty getting his priorities funded to the level he would like. 
4. Authorizing and Appropriating 
There are two separate ways Congress can establish and fund federal programs.  
Authorizing legislation establishes the legal basis for the operation of federal agencies, 
while appropriation of money allows agencies to incur obligations and expenditures.  
These two steps are routinely taken in separate measures, but may be combined in direct 
spending legislation.  House and Senate rules prohibit unauthorized appropriations and 
putting legislation into appropriation bills, although the rules are sometimes waived or 
ignored.  One reason for the separation of the two functions was the worry that argument 
over legislation would slow the flow of funds to federal agencies (Schick, 2007, 194–
195).   
According to House and Senate rules, before funds are appropriated, the program 
or agency budgets that get the funds must be authorized by law.  Congress must first pass 
a law establishing the program and saying how it operates before it appropriates funds for 
that purpose.  Most congressional committees are authorizing committees; there is not a 
set structure to authorize legislation, as each committee does it its own way (Schick, 
2007, 56).   
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An authorization law applies to how Congress can consider appropriations, and 
also to allowing federal agencies to operate.  Budget rules distinguish between 
discretionary authorizations, which provide authority to appropriate, and direct spending 
legislation, which provides authority to obligate.  Therefore, appropriations committees 
have the advantage in controlling discretionary spending, while authorizing committees 
have the upper hand in determining direct spending amounts.  Authorizing legislation is 
permanent unless the law specifically limits its length, with the permanent provisions 
continuing until they are repealed or changed by new authorizing legislation.  Annual 
appropriations are for a single fiscal year and generally for a fixed amount of money, 
while multiyear authorizations are usually in effect for two to five years and have to be 
renewed when they expire.  There is no set legislative path for authorizations, and they 
may start in the House or Senate.  With the exception of the Budget and Appropriation 
Committees, the majority of a congressional committee’s work involves its authorizing 
duties (Schick, 2007, 194–200).   
The three primary factors that determine authorizing activity are: the degree to 
which the White House promotes new legislation; the extent to which funds are available 
to pay for new or expanded programs; and the House or Senate’s ability to pass 
legislation its committees produce.  Over the last three decades, the trend has been 
towards more specificity in authorizing legislation, stating specific amounts for certain 
projects.  Both authorizing and appropriation committees often earmark funds, specifying 
how funds are to be spent (Schick, 2007, 200–203). 
There are four types of appropriations.  Twelve regular appropriations provide 
budget authority to enter into obligations for the upcoming fiscal year.  Supplemental 
appropriations provide additional budget resources when the regular appropriation is not 
sufficient or for activities the regular appropriation did not fund.  Continuing 
appropriations fund agencies that did not receive regular appropriations at the start of the 
fiscal year.  Permanent appropriations are available without current Congressional action.   
The House and Senate Committees on Appropriations have jurisdiction over the 
annual appropriations proceedings.  Appropriations committees used to control just about 
all federal spending, but by 2008 control only one-third.  Annual appropriations are found 
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in regular appropriation bills, each one within the jurisdiction of parallel House and 
Senate Appropriations subcommittees (Schick, 2007, 56).  During the 110th Congress, 
both committees reorganized their subcommittees, and now each committee has 12 
subcommittees.  Each subcommittee has jurisdiction over an annual appropriations 
measure that gives funding for agencies within the subcommittee’s jurisdiction (Streeter, 
2003, 2).  
An appropriation is a kind of budget authority that not only provides the authority 
to make obligations, but also gives the agency the legal authority to make follow-on 
payments from the Treasury.  Appropriations have to be obligated in the fiscal year (or 
years, in the case of multi-year appropriations) for which they were intended.  New 
budget authority, as opposed to previously enacted budget authority, is provided by 
appropriations measures (Streeter, 2003, 3).  Figure 4 displays this distinction in budget 
authority, with some budget authority being spent in 2009 and the rest in future years, 
and previous years authority being spent along with new authority to produce total 
outlays for 2009. 
 




Characteristics that differentiate the Appropriations Committees from other 
congressional committees are the bounded jurisdiction of the appropriations committees, 
the near certainty of congressional action on their bills, and the importance of their 
subcommittees.  The Appropriations Committees rarely make large revisions in the bills 
they receive from the subcommittees.  Once both the House and Senate pass an 
appropriations bill, a conference committee is held to resolve differences between the two 
versions.  Appropriations bills, like all legislation, can only become law if the House and 
Senate pass identical forms of the bills (Schick, 2007, 222–240).   
5. Spending and Incrementalism 
The budget process for discretionary spending is controlled by the appropriations 
process, while authorizing and tax legislation control direct spending.  In 2009, 
approximately one third of federal expenditures come under discretionary spending, 
including almost all defense expenditures and operating costs of most federal agencies.  
Direct spending consists mostly of entitlement programs, which are provided for 
automatically by the permanent appropriations part of the law establishing the entitlement 
program.  The largest and best-known U.S. entitlement programs are Social Security, 
Medicare, and Medicaid.  These three programs, together with other retirement and 
disability programs, totaled more than 94 percent of all federal entitlement spending in 
2007 (CBO, 2007).  Figure 5 illustrates how mandatory programs have taken a larger part 




Figure 5.   Federal Spending for Mandatory and Discretionary Programs, After Walker. 
Most federal agencies budget on the idea that almost all activities funded in the 
current budget will be continued in the next and that program initiatives will be funded 
from incremental resources.  This has led to incremental budgeting, with agencies 
concentrating on how much more to seek for new or expanded programs and how to 
handle changes in government priorities (Schick, 2007, 95).  The 1980s and 1990s budget 
process contained improvisational budgeting routines that had a large number of 
Continuing Resolution Appropriations (CRAs), appropriations passed before 
authorizations, and a government shutdown (Jones, 2008, 221).   
6. Earmarks, Supplementals, and CRAs 
OMB defines earmarks as funds provided by Congress for projects or programs 
where the congressional direction, either in the bill or report language, circumvents the 
merit-based or competitive allocation process, or specifies the location or recipient, or 
otherwise curtails the ability of the Executive Branch to properly manage funds (OMB, 
Earmarks, 2009).  Some types of earmarks are floors, which specify a certain minimum 
amount of money that is to be spent on a project or purpose, while others may be ceilings, 
which tell the agency the maximum that it will spend on something.  Usually the specific 
purpose that Congress alludes to is labeled an earmark because it benefits a limited group 
of people in a congressional district or state.  The standard practice is to earmark funds in 
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committee reports rather than in the authorization or appropriations bills.  Agencies are 
generally expected to comply with earmarks, as well as any other guidance issued by the 
appropriations committees.  Appropriations bills often contain funding for projects that 
are included at the request of lobbyists, state and local governments, and others who 
benefit from federal spending.   
In the current era of large appropriation bills, earmark use has been prevalent 
(Jones, 2008, 244–55).  The fiscal year (FY) 2008 appropriation bills had 11,620 
earmarks worth $17.2 billion.  These totals represent the second highest amount spent on 
new earmarks since earmark spending reached its greatest amount in FY 2006 
appropriations with 13,997 earmarks totaling $29 billion (Lacefield, 2008, 109).  
Earmarks, however, only amount to about one percent of total spending, and are a very 
small part of the discretionary spending total, which is a declining share of total federal 
spending (Doyle, 1996, 91–92). 
Supplementals can also carry earmarked funds.  Supplemental appropriations are 
usually used for national defense contingencies and natural disasters and allow 
emergency adjustments in the current year.  The executive branch decides when the 
supplemental goes to Congress and how big it is.  Either the President or Congress can 
recommend a supplemental for dire emergencies, which means it does not need to be 
offset by reduced spending elsewhere.  If a supplemental does not meet the dire 
emergency designation, an additional funding source must be found or funding must be 
taken from another program.  Supplementals are normally passed quicker than normal 
appropriations, and with less scrutiny.  While appropriation bills are a forecast of the 
future, supplementals are intended to address immediate problems (Jones, 2008, 285–
291).  
The amount of money provided in a continuing resolution might be the current 
rate or an amount established in a bill passed by one chamber or committee in one 
chamber.  The likely rate chosen will be the lowest one possible during a CRA.  When a 
CRA is passed, there is usually a restriction on hiring new personnel, starting new 
programs, and buying new equipment.  Thus, a CRA is restrictive, with no or nominal 
new activities.  Usually CRAs are not intended to be controversial.  Congress will pick a 
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certain time period, whatever it thinks is necessary, when it votes for a CRA.  The time 
period the CRA is chosen for corresponds to how long Congress thinks it will take to 
reach a compromise and pass the remaining appropriation bill or bills.  There may be 
numerous successive CRAs passed until all the individual appropriation bills have been 
covered (Jones, 2008, 17–18). 
B. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET FORMULATION 
1. Congressional Budget Resolution Overview 
As entitlements gained importance in the 1970s, Congress realized it could not 
control total federal spending through annual appropriations bills as in the past.  It needed 
a broader process that contained all expenditures and linked revenue and spending.  The 
budget resolution, an innovation of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974, was to be that 
process.  The budget resolution encompasses all federal spending, no matter what type, 
and requires Congress to make clear decisions on total revenue and spending, budget 
priorities, and the surplus or deficit.  Each year the House and Senate budget committees 
prepare a resolution that covers the next five years, specifies budget totals and allocates 
spending among 20 functional categories.  Figure 6 lists the traditional (plus a new 
function called Overseas Deployments and Other Activities to account for the GWOT 
supplementals) 20 functions, along with budget authority and outlays for the FY 2009 
budget resolution.  Significantly, the budget resolution shows a deficit of over $300 
billion for FY 2009. 
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Figure 6.   Summary by Function of the Congressional Budget Resolution, FY 2009, 
Dollars in Billions, After Concurrent Resolution. 
The budget resolution is not a statute; it is enforced by points of order.  A member 
of Congress may raise a point of order on the floor if a bill exceeds its resolution limit; if 
the point of order is upheld, a 60 percent supermajority is needed to overturn it (Jones, 
2008, 226).  The resolution establishes the framework within which Congress considers 
revenue and spending measures, and varies from year to year.  In some years the 
resolution has great influence, while in others it has almost no impact.  When the budget 
resolution is influential, its targets become important guides for the budget process 
(Schick, 2007, 142–145).  
The budget resolution is supposed to be adopted by April 15 of each year, but a 
check of history shows that it is often missed by a few weeks, a few months, and once in 
a while, not adopted at all.  The delay in passing the resolution often is a measure of the 
amount of disagreement there is in Congress.  Table 3 shows the key actions in the 
budget process, and when the actions are supposed to be completed. 
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Table 3.   Congressional Budget Process Timetable, From Keith. 
All the revenue and spending that is set in the budget resolution is within the 
jurisdiction of other congressional spending and taxing committees, which complicates 
congressional budgeting.  While the resolution deals with aggregates and a small number 
of prime spending categories, the other committees make the specific program and 
spending decisions.  The resolution can play a leading role in establishing the legislative 
agenda in some years, and merely approve the status quo in other years.  The process of 
passing budget resolutions has hardly ever been the same two years consecutively in the 
more than 30 years Congress has been producing them.  Each year is unique due to the 
changes in budget and political conditions and in the relationships of party leaders, and 
other committees.  Congress cannot produce major changes in policy every year due to 
the conflict and strain among committees that would result, but it cannot accept the status 
quo each year either (Schick, 2007, 119–122).  
Four sets of committees in Congress handle the budget.  The Budget Committees 
of the House and Senate develop and report the budget resolution and compile 
reconciliation bills when reconciliation is called for by the budget resolution.  
Authorizing Committees report authorizing and direct spending legislation, oversee 
Deadline Action to be completed 
First Monday in February President submits budget to Congress 
February 15 CBO submits report on economic and budget outlook to 
Budget committees. 
Six weeks after President's budget is 
submitted 
Committees submit reports on views and estimates to 
respective Budget Committee. 
April 1 Senate Budget Committee reports budget resolution. 
April 15 Congress completes action on budget resolution. 
June 10 House Appropriations Committee reports last regular 
appropriations bill. 
June 30 House completes action on regular appropriations bills and any 
required reconciliation legislation. 
July 15 President submits mid-session review of his budget to 
Congress. 
October 1 Fiscal year begins. 
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executive agencies and submit views and estimates to budget committees in areas of their 
jurisdiction.  The Appropriations committees report regular and supplemental 
appropriations bills, submit views and estimates to budget committees, subdivide budget 
authority and outlays among their subcommittees, and establish account structures for 
federal agencies and rules for reprogramming.  Revenue committees, using guidance in 
the budget resolution, report revenue legislation, recommend changes to laws according 
to reconciliation instructions, and report legislation adjusting the statutory limit on the 
public debt (Schick, 2007, 54–56).   
Included in the budget resolution are baseline estimates of federal revenues based 
on the continuation of existing laws and any proposed changes in policy.  The budget 
resolution can contain reconciliation instructions directing the House Ways and Means 
and Senate Finance Committees to report revenue legislation to satisfy the recommended 
level of federal government revenues.  The House Ways and Means Committee and the 
Senate Finance Committee, two of the oldest and most powerful committees in Congress, 
have jurisdiction over revenues.  The Ways and Means Committee usually acts first, 
since according to the Constitution, revenue measures must originate in the House 
(Schick, 2007, 56). Revenue legislation can also begin through normal legislative 
procedures, started by revenue committees or individual members (Heniff, 2003, 2).  
Figure 7 illustrates the sources and relative sizes of federal revenues for FY 2008. 
 
Figure 7.   FY 2008 Federal Revenues, Dollars in Billions, After Congressional Budget 
Office. 
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The Budget Committees produce the budget resolution and compile reconciliation 
inputs and report them to the House and Senate.  The budget committees are powerful 
since they can commence major changes in federal tax and spending policy, but also 
weak because they need other committees to move these changes through the legislative 
process.  Party leaders play a major role in influencing the resolution’s policy orientation.  
One reason for this is because party leaders often settle the inevitable differences between 
committees and arguments over budget aggregates and functional allocations.  Another 
reason is that as one of the most partisan issues Congress tackles each year, only party 
leaders can represent the diverse views necessary to defend the party’s stance on the 
budget.  A final reason is that party leaders often make deals to get the resolution through 
the House and Senate, and in doing so have had a strong say in the content of the 
resolution (Schick, 2007, 132).   
Various committees give their budgetary views and estimates to the budget 
committees by mid-March each year.  The budget committee chairs usually convene their 
committees to mark up the resolution after reaching an agreement with the majority party.  
The markup is formulated around the “chairman’s mark,” a document that submits the 
aggregates, functional allocations, and other provisions included with the resolution 
(Schick, 2007, 66–70).  In the House, the minority party never gets its way on the 
resolution; the Democrats and Republicans usually has the opposite way on the 
resolution, and the majority party usually has the votes to pass the resolution.  In the 
Senate, partisanship has not always been as severe as in the House, but has become more 
so in recent years.  A conference committee will resolve the differences between the 
House and Senate budget resolution versions in the last stages of the resolution process.  
The budget resolution deadline is frequently missed because members often have more 
reasons to vote against it than for it, and because nothing stops in Congress, if it is passed 




Congress has used reconciliation legislation to implement many of its noteworthy 
budget policies since 1980.  Reconciliation is the process Congress uses to bring revenue 
and direct spending under existing laws into agreement with the levels established in the 
budget resolution.  Budget reconciliation bills are usually some of the most encompassing 
and controversial bills passed in Congress due to the multiple years they cover and 
revenue changes influencing a variety of programs (Doyle, 1998, 1910). Reconciliation 
was originally designed to cut the deficit by increasing revenues or reducing outlays, but 
was later converted into a means of cutting taxes. Congress tried to raise taxes with 
reconciliation between 1975 and 1995 in an attempt to decrease the deficit. Congress and 
the executive branch, however, agreed to tax cuts in opposition to this deficit reduction 
policy; so much so, that during the 1970s and 1980s, more money was removed from the 
Treasury through the tax cuts than was put in through the reconciliation tax increases 
(Doyle, 1996, 69–70). 
While this is an optional process, Congress has used reconciliation more years 
than not.  Between 1980 and 2007, 19 reconciliation measures were enacted into law and 
three were vetoed.  At times reconciliation has been used on discretionary authorizations, 
which are funded in annual appropriations acts, but this practice has not been widely 
used.  There is a very great chance that a reconciliation bill will pass once it is initiated, 
as they have been vetoed only three times in the past The 110th Congress decided that 
reconciliation should be used for its original purpose and adopted rules requiring it be 
used only for deficit reduction (Keith, 2008, 25).   
Reconciliation has two major phases.  One phase of the process is the issuance of 
reconciliation instructions in the budget resolution; the second phase is the enactment of a 
reconciliation bill modifying revenue and spending laws. The instructions in the budget 
resolution to designated committees have three components: they name the committee 
directed to report legislation; they identify the amounts of funding to be changed; and 
they usually set a deadline for the committees to report legislation to be included in 
reconciliation.  Even though the instructions do not mention the programs to be changed, 
members of Congress usually understand which programs will be affected.  Once a 
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budget resolution with a reconciliation instruction is approved by Congress, the 
instruction has the status of an order by the House and Senate.  Although the 1974 
Congressional Budget Act does not specify any sanctions against committees that do not 
carry out the instructions, it is assumed that they will (Keith, 2008, 26). 
When more than one House or Senate committee is subject to reconciliation, the 
legislative changes are given to the Budget Committee to compile the proposals into a 
single omnibus bill that is considered under special rules that accelerate its passage.  
Omnibus reconciliation bills simplify the job of coordinating the numerous pieces of 
legislation and assuring compliance with the instructions, and also structure the vote as 
one in favor of saving the surplus or lowering the deficit (with the noted exception of 
reconciliation bills used to cut taxes).  Budget rules mandate that amendments to 
reconciliation bills be deficit neutral, neither increasing the deficit nor reducing the 
surplus (Schick, 2007, 138–147).   
One method of trying to decrease the deficit has been to decrease entitlement 
spending.  There are two problems Congress encounters in such efforts.   One is inertia, 
and the other is co-optation.  The inertia problem occurs due to the status quo protecting 
entitlements from spending cuts and supporting increased spending for them.  
Entitlements begin through statutes guaranteeing payments to certain individuals, and 
these payments will continue as long as Congress does not do anything.  Some 
entitlement spending increases through periodic cost-of-living allowances that were 
written into the laws.  Once the status quo is overcome, co-optation occurs when 
proposals that work against deficit reduction are attached to reconciliation bills.  The 
Budget Committees have often been unable to stop the co-optation of reconciliation.  
Since the Budget Committees cannot substantively revise the language used by 
committees in an effort to cut entitlements or increase taxes, reconciliation bills may not 
meet their deficit reduction goals due to this limitation on the Budget Committees power 
over their content (Doyle, 1998, 71–74).   
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3. Provisions of Budget Resolutions 
There are four types of provisions that may be found in a budget resolution: 
budget aggregates and functional allocations that are required by the CBA; reconciliation 
instructions; changes in House or Senate rules overseeing action on the budget; and 
“sense of the Congress” statements and other nonbinding provisions, giving members a 
chance to go on record about federal budget issues.  The CBA requires four main 
aggregates: total revenue and the amount the total should be changed; total new budget 
authority and outlays; deficit or surplus estimates; and public debt.  The 20 budget 
functions found in a resolution are divided into a number of subfunctions.  Functional 
allocations have to add up to the corresponding budget aggregates.  The budget 
resolution, however, does not distribute funds among specific programs or accounts, 
since it would trespass on the jurisdiction of the spending committees.  While the 
functional allocations may reflect congressional majorities and influence the actions of 
the Appropriations Committees’ actions, it is unlikely that they implement the 
expectations of every single budget resolution (Schick, 2007, 124–129). 
Actual revenues and spending often differ from the amounts set out in the 
resolution due to factors outside the control of Congress, such as the performance of the 
economy.  Also, Congress sometimes fails to pass a budget resolution for the year, due to 
a variety of reasons; one is that it is not required by law, and another is Congress 
sometimes just runs out of time and does not get around to producing the resolution 
because it lacks a sufficient priority.  The first time Congress failed to adopt the annual 
resolution was in 1998; it also failed to pass a budget resolution in 2002, 2004, and 2006.  
Congress still produced its other normal budget legislation during those years—funds 
were still appropriated to federal programs, and authorization bills were passed—and the 
lack of a budget resolution was hardly noticed.     
The budget resolution is an advantageous method for the House and Senate to 
handle the budget for several reasons.  For the House, it affords a politically easy means 
of increasing the debt limit, sparing House members a separate vote on that unpopular 
decision.  Secondly, budget resolutions allow reconciliation bills to be used as vehicles 
for changes to entitlement or tax laws.  Passing such laws without the protection offered 
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by reconciliation is difficult. Congress is not obligated to act if the actual budget 
outcomes are different from the amounts set in the resolution as a result of unanticipated 
changes in economic conditions or inaccurate estimates of future revenues under existing 
law (Schick, 2007, 130, 147). 
4. Budget Support Agencies 
The CBO, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and the Congressional 
Research Service (CRS) are the primary congressional budget support agencies.  CBO 
issues reports with ten-year projections on the budget and the economy, prepares baseline 
budget projections and maintains a database for scorekeeping, assists the budget, tax, and 
appropriations committees, and reviews the president’s budget and other proposals.  The 
baseline provided by CBO is a good starting point for drafting the annual budget 
resolution.  It allows the budget committees to focus on policy changes instead of 
numerous budget line items.  GAO issues accounting guidelines and reviews agency 
accounting systems, audits operations of certain federal agencies and evaluates programs 
and recommends improvements, issues legal opinions on use of funds, and investigates 
expenditures and agency operations as requested by congressional committees (Schick, 
2007, 54–55).   
CRS analyzes legislative issues and proposals affecting agencies and programs, 
compiles legislative histories on certain legislation and programs, issues reports on the 
status of legislation, analyzes proposals to change federal budget practices, and assists 
committees and members by providing data and analyses applicable to their legislative 
responsibilities (Schick, 2007, 55–56).   
Over the last 30 years, the CBO has found a place as an objective, skilled, and 
relevant builder of budgetary information and policy analysis.  The CBO’s skill at 
scoring—measuring the budgetary impact of new legislation and other policy changes—
is the primary reason for CBO’s success.  CBOs only rival in scoring is OMB, and the 
media often portray OMB’s numbers as less reliable.  CBO must be both independent and 
subservient of Congress if it is to succeed in its environment.  Although the CBO was 
created to carry out its mission as a nonpartisan body indifferent to political issues, the 
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great gulf between Democrats and Republicans on major issues has complicated CBO’s 
mission.  The scoring of legislation is done while it is pending in Congress or just 
enacted.  The score has a 10-year horizon, based on assumptions about future conditions, 
and is likely to be in error.  CBO does not rescore previously enacted legislation, 
however, to correct for differences between projected and actual results (Schick, 2007, 
135). 
5. Enforcement 
Various enforcement devices promote legislative compliance, including revenue 
floors and ceilings, spending allocations to committees, cost estimates and scorekeeping 
reports, and various points of order to block legislation that violates budget rules.  The 
original resolution budget process implemented ceilings on total budget authority and 
outlays and established a floor for total revenue.  Totals were eventually seen as 
ineffective due to the tension between them and the numerous budget pieces.  Many 
people want more programs and less government, and the totals usually move upwards 
since program advocates are usually more powerful than budget defenders.  While 
revenue and spending totals are still managed, Congress now relies primarily on 
allocations to legislative committees and appropriations subcommittees to enforce its 
budget decisions.  These allocations acknowledge that Congress operates through its 
committee system, and are required by section 302 of the Congressional Budget Act.   
Section 302 states that spending totals in each budget resolution are first allocated 
among the House and Senate committees, and then the appropriations committees 
subdivide the amounts allocated to them to their subcommittees (Schick, 2007, 147–151).  
   
 61
IV. U.S. FUNDING OF UN 
A. INTRODUCTION TO HISTORY OF U.S. FUNDING FOR UN 
1. Largest Contributor 
Throughout the UN’s history, the U.S. has been the largest financial contributor. 
The U.S. share of the regular budget has been lowered on three occasions, from a high of 
39 percent in 1946.  In 1954, the U.S. share of the regular budget went from 39 percent to 
32 percent (Moore and Pubantz, 2002).  In 1973, the U.S. contribution went from 32 to 
25 percent.  Starting January 1, 2001, the U.S. was assessed to pay 22 percent of the 
regular annual UN budget (Browne, 2008).  Those changes, however, took place without 
violating the UN principle that UN members should be assessed on the basis of their 
capacity to pay, based on a nation’s share of the global economy, including discounts for 
countries with large debt burdens, and countries such as China whose large populations 
lead to a low per-capita income.   
In addition, the U.S.’s share of the peacekeeping budget decreased from 30.4 
percent to 28 percent in 2001 and then to 26 percent by 2003 (Browne, 2008).  The 
decision the General Assembly made on December 24th, 2000 to lower the rate was in 
response to U.S. efforts to meet the conditions set by Congress for release of funds 
appropriated for U.S. payment of its arrears to the UN regular budget and UN 
peacekeeping accounts (GAO, Regular Budget Contributions, 2001, 1).  The amount the 
U.S. has been assessed by the UN, compared with the degree of influence the U.S. has on 
the UN’s budget, has been a contentious issue.  Approximately 50 percent of the total 
regular budget assessment is collected in the first and second quarters (GAO June 2001, 
38). The U.S. does not pay its regular budget assessment until the last quarter of the 
calendar year 
Arrears, or delinquent payments, occur whenever a member country has failed to 
pay all of its assessed dues to the UN. A member’s entire regular budget assessment is 
due on January 31 of each year, and is in arrears if not paid by December 31. (GAO June 
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2001, 38).  Arrears can arise for a number of reasons, but in the case of the U.S. it is often 
due to a disagreement with the UN on how much it should be assessed. 
As the largest financial contributor to UN peacekeeping, the U.S. pays 25 percent 
or more of the annual peacekeeping budget and made payments in excess of $1 billion in 
2006.  The UN assesses the U.S. around 26 percent of the total peacekeeping budget 
annually, but by law (PL 103–236) the U.S. capped payments in 1995 at 25 percent, 
leading to arrears.  The cap was changed in 2001 and stayed at 27 percent from 2001 to 
2005, and returned to 25 percent in 2006.  As of April, 2009, the total U.S. peacekeeping 
arrears were $635 million (Better World Campaign, 2009).     
The disagreement over arrears has also been a major argument between the U.S. 
and UN.  While simultaneously always being the largest contributor to the UN budget, 
the U.S. has also been the leader in arrears to the UN.  Table 4 lists the U.S. regular UN 




PAYMENT (ACTUAL, NOT 
ASSESSED) 
CONTRIBUTIONS OUTSTANDING 
AS OF DEC. 31 
1989 25 $158,840,023 $365,131,467 
1990 25 $302,615,852 $296,169,865 
1991 25 $301,325,450 $266,407,875 
1992 25 $325,495,230 $239,531,646 
1993 25 $289,062,441 $260,392,163 
1994 25 $310,800,851 $247,851,724 
1995 25 $150,130,049 $414,423,874 
1996 25 $359,040,601 $376,775,346 
1997 25 $315,585,677 $373,239,953 
1998 25 $355,262,548 $315,704,661 
1999 25 $452,203,605 $167,896,611 
2000 25 $303,576,746 $164,629,456 
2001 22 $328,206,625 $165,423,794 
2002 22 $258,168,464 $190,331,651 
2003 22 $263,845,890 $267,960,871 
2004 22 $390,292,007 $240,520,860 
2005 22 $428,280,567 $251,851,905 
2006 22 $383,908,137 $291,408,623 
Table 4.   United States UN Regular Budget Contributions, After Brown and 
Blanchfield 
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While the UN budget has grown over the years when measured by current dollars, 
if one looks at constant dollars it has not grown appreciably over the last 30 years.  Figure 
8 lists regular UN budget expenditures in constant and current dollars from 1971 to 2005. 
Since the U.S. represents about 26 percent of the world economy, many foreign 
diplomats say that the 22 percent contribution the U.S. pays is an unfair discount.  The 
European Union nations paid close to 40 percent of the total cost of peacekeeping 
operations in 2000, much greater than their share of the global economy (CQ Weekly, 
September 2, 2000).  The top five UN contributors contributed over 58 percent of the UN 
regular budget in 2008.  Table 5 lists the top ten largest UN contributors for 2008. 
 
 




Table 5.   Top Ten UN Regular Budget Contributors for 2008, From Browne and 
Nakamura 
The UN has operated under a tradition of approving budgetary decisions only by 
consensus for the past 20 years.  Recently, however, certain actions have violated this 
informal consensus budgetary approval process.  In December 2007, despite strong 
resistance from the U.S., the UN’s Administrative and Budgetary Committee 
recommended a $4.17 billion biennial budget for 2008–2009.  The U.S. was concerned 
that the final budget will be significantly higher than the proposed budget due to a 
number of projected expenses omitted in the budget.  The overall budget is projected to 
be more than $1 billion over the approved budget, making this the largest increase in UN 
history.  The General Assembly adopted the budget by a vote of 142–1, indicating that 
the majority of UN states that contribute very little to the budget no longer feel the need 
to listen to what the U.S. has to say on the budget (Schaefer, January 29, 2008).  This 
makes it difficult for the U.S. to achieve its proposed UN reforms, an issue that will be 
examined in chapter V.  
2. Kassebaum–Solomon Amendment 
Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, Congress became increasingly dissatisfied with 
the UN’s spending habits.  Under the Kassebaum–Solomon Amendment in 1985, 
Congress required the U.S. to reduce its regular budget payments from 25 to 20 percent.  
The goal of this withholding was to force the UN to adopt a system of reforms on 
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budgetary matters and give the major contributors to the UN regular budget an influence 
on budget questions proportionate to their rates of contribution.  The U.S. did not wish to 
be subjected to budgetary decisions arrived at arbitrarily by the Third World majority of 
smaller contributors.   
In December 1986, a UN resolution was passed that gave the major contributors 
more control in the early stages of budget formulation, but left the final decision for the 
budget to the General Assembly.  The General Assembly thus changed its budget process 
with the 1986 resolution so that decisions would be made by consensus, giving the U.S. 
veto power.  If the budget committee could not reach a decision, however, the General 
Assembly would decide.  The U.S. was not satisfied with this measure and only 
appropriated two-thirds of its assessed contributions in 1988 and 1989 (McDermott, 
2000, 68–69).  The weighted voting proposed by the Kassebaum amendment, therefore, 
did not take effect (Krauthammer, 2004).   
3. Addressing Arrears 
In August 1999, the UN said the U.S. owed $1.7 billion in unpaid dues and other 
assessments, while the U.S. believed it owed $1 billion.  The difference included around 
$300 million affecting how the U.S. should be assessed for peacekeeping missions, 
around $100 million the U.S. refused to pay for its own policy reasons, and another $100 
million for a dispute over double taxation for Americans employed by the UN (Wren, 
September 28, 1999). The U.S. accounted for 65 percent of all unpaid assessments owed 
by members and 81 percent of unpaid dues for the UN’s regular budget (Wren, October 
6, 1999).  An American judge who served as president of the World Court said in a 1999 
interview that the U.S. was legally obliged to pay the debt it owes (Crossette, October 31, 
1999).  Congress, however, disagreed with the judge. 
Senator Jesse Helms and Senator Joseph Biden sponsored legislation in 1999, 
ultimately incorporated into P.L. 106–113, that authorized $926 million in payment to the 
UN over three years.  The law included a number of conditions.  First, other member 
countries must accept the $926 million as payment in full and agree not to keep billing 
for the remaining arrears; second, the U.S.’s share of the UN budget must be decreased 
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from 25 percent to 22 percent; third, the U.S.’s share of peacekeeping costs must be 
decreased from 31 percent to 25 percent; finally, the UN budget cannot include any 
growth in spending, even allowing for inflation (Wren, November 16, 1999).  Of the 
total, $819 million would be paid out over a three-year period—$100 million in FY 1998, 
$475 million in FY 1999, and $244 million in FY 2000.  Another $107 million owed by 
the UN to the U.S. as reimbursable peacekeeping payments was authorized to be used to 
reduce U.S. arrears to the UN (Bite, 2001, 5).   
The issue of abortion played a role in UN funding throughout President Clinton’s 
administration, particularly his second term.  When President Clinton issued an executive 
order in January 1993 ending the prohibition on U.S. aid to international family planning 
organizations that perform or actively promote abortion, Representative Chris Smith and 
other sympathetic members of Congress began trying to force a reversal.  Representative 
Smith attached a rider limiting aid to the groups to the 1998 State Department 
authorization bill, HR 1757.  Neither the Clinton administration nor GOP leaders could 
persuade Smith to change his mind.  Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman 
Jesse Helms, R-N.C., desperate for an authorization bill with the State Department, 
couldn't persuade Smith to back off (Cassata, 1997). 
House-Senate conferees eventually reached an agreement on a bill to authorize 
U.S. payments to the United Nations.  But the bill, HR 1757, also contained modified 
abortion-related language that led to a Clinton veto.  Before Clinton vetoed HR 1757, 
GOP leaders promised anti-abortion advocates such as Representative Smith that the 
provision would be attached to appropriation bills for UN funding (Taylor, 1998). 
On October 21, 1998, Clinton vetoed the authorization bill, HR 1757 that would 
have paid off U.S. debts to the UN because it banned aid to international family planning 
groups that advocate abortion.  HR 1757, the Foreign Relations Authorization bill for FY 
1998–FY 1999, conditioned the release of $901 million for contributions to International 
Organizations for FY 1998 and $900 million for FY 1999 on a number of factors.  They 
included: making $80 million for the UN available only upon certification by the 
Secretary of State that during 1998 the UN has not increased funding for any program 
without offsets elsewhere and not exceeded its biennial budget; withholding 20 percent of 
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available funds until a certification is made about the UN inspector general or OIOS and 
withholding $50 million of FY 1999 funds pending certification that the UN has reduced 
1,000 personnel from the 1996–1997 UN level.  Although the authorization bill did not 
pass during 1997, FY 1998 appropriations for U.S. contributions to the UN below 
Administration-requested levels were provided for in P.L. 105–119 (Bite, 2001, 4–7).   
A State Department Authorization Act, HR 1777, PL 100–204, was eventually 
passed for FY 1998–1999.  Title VII of the State Department Authorization Act, FY 
1998–1999, established a new payment schedule that tied full funding of U.S. 
contributions to the UN regular budget to further progress toward reform.  It stipulated 
that 40 percent of contributions could be paid on October 1 of each year and a second 40 
percent could be paid when the President certified that progress was happening in 
implementing UN reform in three areas.  The three areas were: consensus decision 
making on budget questions, reductions in UN secretariat staffing, and reductions in the 
number of Soviet UN employees on fixed-term contracts.  The remaining 20 percent 
could be paid 30 days after Congress had received the certification, unless Congress 
passed a joint resolution prohibiting the payment (Browne and Nakamura, 2008, 32).  
Among the benchmarks included in authorization bills for FY 2000 were that the 
World Health Organization (WHO), International Labour Organization (ILO), and FAO 
must have regular reports by independent inspectors general and the UN must have given 
GAO access to financial data for nationally mandated reviews (Bite, 2001, 4–7).  As was 
the case with previous U.S. demands, the UN implemented the benchmarks and the U.S. 
released payment to the UN in late September 2001.  Back payments to the UN and UN 
peacekeeping funds were contained in HR 2670, the fiscal 2000 Commerce, Justice, State 
appropriations bill.  Clinton vetoed it on October 25, 1999 for reasons similar to those 
cited in opposition to H.R. 1757 (CQ Weekly, November 6, 1999).   
According to the UN Charter, the U.S. could have been stripped of its vote in the 
General Assembly at the end of 1999 if it did not pay enough of its debts (NYT 
September 22, 1999).  In December 1999, with just a week left until the U.S. would have 
lost its vote in the General Assembly for its debt, the Clinton administration cleared a $51 
million payment to the UN (Crossette, December 22, 1999).   
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A compromise was reached where his language was attached to some of the 
money, but not all of it, allowing the U.S. to keep its vote in the UN (Compromise, 
1999).  The White House accepted the language as part of spending legislation that would 
formally bar any non-U.S. agencies from either performing abortions or advocating 
liberalized abortion laws, but the president would have the option of waiving the law if he 
thought it necessary.  The waiver, however, would result in a six percent cut in the $385 
million international family assistance funding provided by the U.S. (November 15, 
1999).  Some lawmakers think Clinton changed his mind on the anti-abortion restrictions 
in the language because he was facing two deadlines.  The U.S. would have lost its seat in 
the General Assembly if Congress did not pay at least $111 million of the money the U.S. 
owed.  This was also the last year that spending like this could be written off as 
emergency spending without offsetting budget cuts, as spelled out in the 1997 balanced-
budget law (CQ Weekly, November 20, 1999). 
In 2000, the Senate voted 99 to 0 to release $582 million in back dues in 
recognition of important efforts made by the UN toward improving its operations.  A 
third installment of $244 million was to be released in 2002 if some auditing procedures 
at the World Health Organization were made (Alvarez, February 8, 2001).  A little later 
in 2001, however, some members of Congress threatened to withhold $244 million in 
dues to the UN when the U.S. lost a seat on the Human Rights Commission during a 
secret ballot (Sanger, May 9, 2001). 
On 25 September 2001, the House voted to release $582 million that the U.S. 
owed to the UN in back dues.  Representative Tom Lantos, the senior Democrat on the 
International Relations Committee, said that is was not time to argue with the UN over 
money and holding up the money was an irrelevant issue.  With 9/11 occurring just a few 
weeks prior, and President Bush scheduled to speak at the UN, there were more than 
enough incentives  to release the money (Alvarez, September 25, 2001). 
4. Peacekeeping 
UN peacekeeping operations are actions conducted as a result of mandates created 
by UN Security Council resolutions designed to further international peace and security 
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(GAO, UN Peacekeeping, 2007, 3).  Some objectives of the peacekeeping funds are: to 
promote peace and regional security by supporting multilateral peacekeeping initiatives; 
to encourage fair share contributions to peacekeeping efforts from countries with 
increased potential to pay, and also to increase participation of poorer countries when 
resource constraints would otherwise prevent them from participating; and to encourage 
more participation of foreign forces in international peacekeeping activities (SOS, 
Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, 2000).   
Since 1994, the number of new UN peacekeeping operations has fallen 
significantly.  This decrease was due in part to the U.S. decision, in Presidential Decision 
Directive 25 (PDD 25), signed May 1994, to follow specific criteria for assessing its 
support of an operation.  A Security Council statement adopting similar criteria soon 
followed the U.S. decision (Browne, 2008, Peacekeeping, 1).  Between 1988 and 1995, 
however, appropriations for peacekeeping operations rose from close to $600 million to 
almost $3 billion (Browne, 2008, Peacekeeping, 1). 
The U.S. provides peacekeeping funding through contributions to UN peace 
operations, providing funds to carry out international peace operations outside the scope 
of the UN, and by funding DoD to support the use of its forces in peace missions.  The 
U.S. provides funding directly to the UN through the State Department’s appropriation,  
under Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities in the International 
Organizations and Conferences Account.  U.S. payments to the UN for peace operations 
rose from less than $40 million in 1988 to more than $1 billion in 1994 (CBO Paper, 
December 1999).  
Contributions to peacekeeping subsequently fell in the mid to late 1990s, then 
rose again in the first part of the 21st century.  Figure 9 gives the amount of U.S. 
peacekeeping contributions to the UN from 1996 to 2007.  
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Figure 9.   U.S. Payments for UN Peacekeeping, From GAO Peacekeeping Observations 
Congress has at times approved both more and less than the amount requested by 
presidents for peacekeeping.  In FY 2001, the Administration estimated $739 for 
international peacekeeping, but the Senate and House committees only allocated $500 
and $498 million respectively.  In the middle of 2000 Congress denied a request for $107 
million in supplemental funds for peacekeeping in Kosovo and East Timor.  Also, the 
Senate Appropriations Committee advocated rescinding up to 43 percent of the $498 
appropriated for FY 2000 due to “changing circumstances” (Smith, UN Peacekeeping,  
2000).  In early 2001, UN officials estimated peacekeeping expenses could jump by 50 
percent or more in 2001, with four missions in Africa making up the majority of the 
increase.  The UN peacekeeping budget was $2.5 billion in 2001, and since Congress was 
recommending less than the Administration proposed, meeting this UN peacekeeping 
budget would be difficult (May 10, 2001). 
Kofi Annan asked Lakhdar Brahimi, a former Algerian foreign minister and 
advisor, to do a high level review of peacekeeping in 2000.  Some recommendations that 
Brahimi’s panel proposed included: allowing peacekeepers to defend themselves and the 
mission in a stronger manner; delaying a formal authorization of a mission from the 
Security Council until member states have confirmed enough troops to carry it out; 
making sure troop contributors have the right equipment and training to carry out UN 
 71
missions; create a list of 100 military officers who could be available on a week’s notice 
to help start up a new mission (CQ Weekly, September 2, 2000).  Mr. Brahimi also stated 
in his report that the “rules of engagement should be sufficiently robust and not force the 
UN contingents to cede the initiative to their attackers” (General Assembly, 2000, 10).  
Figure 10 lists the number of UN military and police deployed to missions from 1996 to 
2007. 
 
Figure 10.   UN Military and Police Deployed to Peacekeeping Missions, From GAO 
The French government objected to a U.S. proposal to create a new position, 
deputy undersecretary for peacekeeping, and put an American into the position.  Kofi 
Annan subsequently denied the request.  France controlled the top peacekeeping post and 
saw the proposal as a challenge to its influence at the UN.  The U.S. was no longer 
providing peacekeeping troops for the UN’s missions at the time of the French objection, 
but did have 700 police officers supporting NATO operations in the Balkans (Lynch, 
August 4, 2000). 
Another example of Congress taking an active interest in peacekeeping operations 
occurred in 2000 when Senator Judd Gregg objected very strongly to the Sierra Leone 
agreement that let Foday Sankoh retain control over the diamond mines in Sierra Leone. 
Senator Judd used his power as the Chairman of the Senate appropriations subcommittee 
on State Department funding to block the transfer of $368 million for four UN 
peacekeeping missions in 2000 (June 7, 2000).  Representative Harold Rogers, Chairman 
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of the House Appropriations Committee with jurisdiction over UN funding in 2000 also 
placed holds on $223 million for peacekeeping in Africa and East Timor because he 
wanted State Department assurance that peacekeeping funds committed to Kosovo would 
not be spent on other UN missions (Lynch, May 26, 2000). 
The House of Representatives authorized funds to be appropriated for the 
Department of Defense for fiscal year 1999 for incremental costs of the Armed Forces for 
Bosnia peacekeeping operations in the amount of $1.858 billion.  In that same conference 
report the House put limitations on assignment of U.S. forces for certain UN purposes.  
No more than eight Armed Forces at any time could be assigned during fiscal year 1999 
to the UN Rapidly Deployable Mission Headquarters.  Also, no funds were made 
available to the Department of Defense for the establishment of a standing international 
force under the UN or the assignment and detail to duty with a UN Stand by Force 
(Making Appropriations Conference Report, 1999, 36–37). 
The House didn’t want to pay for African peacekeeping for FY 2001 because 
some members felt the missions were poorly managed and would most likely not be 
effective.  The House also refused to allow disbursement of $240 million of the $500 
million approved for FY 2000 due to concerns that UN missions in the Congo, Sierra 
Leone, and East Timor were not effective.  The Senate made it known that they would 
only fund missions that are well managed, have shown success, and uphold U.S. 
priorities (Smith, D, 2000, 33). 
UN peacekeeping mandates are approved for 6-month periods, with periodic 
assessments.  Therefore, only half of a mission’s annual cost can be assessed at one time, 
so the total 12 month cost to a member state can only be estimated.  Since the UN budget 
begins in June, three months before the U.S. budget year ends, and peacekeeping costs 
are allocated on a percentage basis, the Administration does not have a reliable estimate 
of the peacekeeping cost for the July–September period when it prepares the U.S. budget.  
The Administration prepares budgets to be submitted to Congress well in advance of the 




missions are started or expanded when re-authorized during the July–September time 
period, because assessments will be made for the missions when they are created or 
expanded (Smith, D, 2000, 33). 
Since UN peacekeeping requirements may arise out of step with the U.S. budget 
planning cycle, the President and Congress have implemented creative methods for initial 
funding for U.S. contributions to these operations.  Within the past several years, one 
method was to reprogram funds from other parts of the international affairs budget, such 
as Economic Support Fund money obligated in past years for specific countries but not 
disbursed.  Another was the transfer of funds to the international affairs budget from the 
Department of Defense for funding UN peacekeeping operations.   
In addition, the President has requested, and the Congress has appropriated, 
funding for U.S. assessed contributions for new operations by supplemental 
appropriations.  In 1995, President Clinton suggested that U.S. assessed contributions for 
any UN peacekeeping operations where there is a large U.S. combat contingent present 
be financed from Defense Department money, but Congress did not agree with the idea 
(Browne, 2008, 19–20). 
Since the 1997 State Department Appropriations Act, Congress has required the 
Secretary of State to notify it 15 days before U.S. support of a UN Security Council 
resolution regarding setting up a new or expanding an ongoing peacekeeping operation.  
The notification must include the estimated cost and length of the mission and a planned 
exit strategy.  Also, the Committees on Appropriations and other appropriate committees 
are to be told that the UN has taken steps to prevent UN employees and peacekeeping 
forces from trafficking in persons or committing acts of illegal sexual exploitation 
(Browne, 2008, 12). 
On February 5, 2007, the Bush Administration requested $1.1 billion for the 
Contributions to International Peacekeeping Activities (CIPA) account as part of the FY 
2008 budget.  The House Appropriations Committee recommended $1.3 billion and $293 
million for the CIPA and Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) accounts respectively, and the 
Senate Appropriations Committee $1.3 billion and $273 million for these accounts.  The 
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CIPA account funds UN peacekeeping, and the PKO account non-UN peacekeeping 
missions.  Thus, both the House and the Senate thought the Administration’s requests 
were too low.  The House Appropriations Committee was concerned that “peacekeeping 
missions could be adversely affected if the requested fiscal year 2008 funding level is 
enacted” (Browne, 2008, 4).  The Senate Appropriations Committee said that they do 
“not support the administration’s practice of under-funding peacekeeping activities and 
relying on limited supplemental funds” (Browne, 2008, 5).  The President signed the 
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, which provided $1.7 billion for CIPA and $263 
million for the PKO account.   
On June 27, 2007 the Senate approved a bill to increase the amount the U.S. pays 
for UN peacekeeping missions from 25 percent to 27 percent.  It also stipulated that the 
U.S. pay some of its peacekeeping back dues, which the UN estimated at $677 million for 
the missions as of Jan 1 2007 (Pomper, September, 2000).  The Act that was signed by 
the President included language setting the peacekeeping assessment cap at 27.1 percent 
for calendar year 2008 (Browne, 2008, 4–5). 
On February 4, 2008, the President requested $1,497,000,000 for U.S. 
contributions to UN peacekeeping operations assessed accounts in the CIPA account.  
Bush also requested $247,200,000 in voluntary contributions for the FY 2009 PKO 
account.  In addition, the President requested authority to pay up to 27.1 percent of the 
cost of any UN peacekeeping operation assessments received from calendar year 2005 
through 2009, in order to pay the assessments withheld due to the 25 percent statutory 
cap through those years (Browne, 2008, 3). 
President Bush signed into law a $186.5 billion supplemental appropriations bill 
in June 2008 that provided more than $10 billion in non-Defense Department 
international affairs spending, including $373,708,000 for the CIPA account and 
$95,000,000 for the PKO account (Browne, 2008, 3–4).  Also attached was an additional 
$524 million for UN peacekeeping and $141 million for U.S. membership dues to 47 
international organizations, including the UN.  The bill provided $20 million more for a 
U.S. voluntary contribution to the UN World Food Program to help farmers in countries 
dealing with food shortages (UNA–USA, Supplemental, 2009).  Table 6 gives the 
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amount the U.S. gave to individual UN peacekeeping missions in 2007, an estimated 
amount for 2008, and the requested amount for 2009. 
The U.S. gave close to $3.45 billion to support UN peacekeeping from 1996 
through 2001.  Around $3.2 billion of that was from the Department of State for current 
and past due peacekeeping assessments.  In addition, nearly $250 million were 
voluntarily given by the State Department and the Department of Defense to support U.S. 
civilian police, military units, and military observers to serve as part of a UN 
peacekeeping operation. The annual assessed cost of UN peacekeeping operations fell 
from more than $3 billion in 1995 to less than $1 billion in 1999.  This was due partly to 
the Security Council’s reluctance to begin new operations or expand existing ones 
because of member state concerns over the failure of UN operations in Somalia, Bosnia, 
and Rwanda.  Table 7 depicts the expenditures associated with UN peacekeeping 
operations from 1995 to 2002. The total cost of peacekeeping operations was about $16.3 
billion in constant 2001 dollars (GAO UN Peacekeeping, 2007, 5). 
GAO estimated that the U.S. gave close to $24.2 billion in both direct and indirect 
support to UN peacekeeping over the period 1995–2002.  GAO defined indirect support 
as U.S. programs that are not part of an official UN operation, but that have objectives 
that assist an ongoing UN peacekeeping operation in the same area.  Approximately 90 
percent, or $21.8 billion, of the indirect contribution was due to U.S. military operations 
and services that helped provide a secure environment for UN operations.  Around six 
percent was from USAID and around four percent from the Department of State.  The 
largest contribution was for assistance in the UN Iraq–Kuwait Observation Mission, 
which involved monitoring the demilitarized zone between Iraq and Kuwait.  GAO 
remarked that their report should not be used to argue for offsetting UN assessments.  
GAO does not believe indirect contributions should be seen as something for which the 
UN should reimburse the U.S.  The U.S. does not methodically define indirect 
contributions to peacekeeping and does not collect cost and other data on these indirect 



















Table 7.   Total UN Peacekeeping Costs, Fiscal Years 1995–2002, Constant 2001 
dollars in billions, From GAO UN Peacekeeping 
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V. DISTRIBUTION OF FUNDING FOR UN IN U.S. BUDGET 
A. BUDGET FUNCTION 150 
The foreign policy budget, known as the International Affairs Budget Function, or 
Function 150, comprises a variety of U.S. government programs and activities.  Included 
in Budget Function 150 are foreign economic and military assistance, contributions to 
international organizations and multilateral financial institutions, State Department, and 
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID).  Budget Function 150 
can be divided into two components: State Department/Diplomacy/Broadcasting and 
Foreign Operations (Veillette & Epstein, 2007, 1–4).  As the next section will show, the 
majority of U.S. funds designated for the UN, including dues and peacekeeping funds, 
flow through the State Department and Budget Function 150.  While some UN funding 
originates in other U.S. departments besides State, the funding is contained in Budget 
Function 150.  In addition to the State Department, Budget Function 150 encompasses 
some funding to the Departments of Agriculture, Treasury, Defense, and the Agency for 
International Development for the UN (Collender, 1999, 183).  
The International Affairs budget was between 3.6–4.7 percent of the total 
Discretionary Budget Authority between 1980 and 2000 (Nowels, 2000, 11).  Figure 11 
shows the composition of the Foreign Affairs budget for FY 2008.  The largest single part 
of the foreign policy budget supports a broad range of development, humanitarian, 
security/economic, and military assistance programs.  In most years, around two-thirds of 
Budget Function 150 is comprised of foreign aid (Nowels, 2000, 10).  Table 8 shows how 
the budget authority for Function 150 has grown from 1977 to 2006 in both current and 
constant dollars. 
The Senate Foreign Relations, the House International Relations Committees, and 
the Senate and House Appropriations Committees play a large role in UN funding, 
especially in the subcommittees that address Department of State funding, such as the 
House Subcommittee on Appropriations for Commerce, Justice, and State and Senate 
State and Foreign Operations Subcommittee, Committee on Appropriations (Bite, 2001, 
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2).  The regular assessed budgets of the UN system organizations are included in the 
Contributions to International Organizations (CIO) account, and peacekeeping is funded 
from the CIPA account (Bite, 2001, 2).  The CIO account funds the U.S. assessed dues to 
47 international organizations, including the UN.  Prior to 2008, accessed contributions to 
the UN, autonomous UN agencies and peacekeeping funding were provided in the State, 
Justice, Commerce, and Judiciary Appropriation bill.  In 2008, however, the State, 
Justice, Commerce, and Judiciary Appropriation bill was separated into two appropriation 
bills, a Commerce, Justice, and Science Appropriation bill and a State and Foreign 
Operations Appropriation Bill.  Funding for the UN was included in the State and 
Foreign Operations Appropriation legislation (Senate Committee on Appropriations, 
2008).  Included in the State, Justice, Commerce, and Judiciary Appropriation bills, and 
subsequent State and Foreign Operations Appropriation bills, are assessed dues to the UN 
and UN affiliated agencies, peacekeeping funding and foreign aid. 
Assessed UN dues and peacekeeping funding are authorized through the Foreign 
Relations Authorization Act.  Included in this act is the State Department Authorization 
Act.  The House Committee on International Relations and the Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations have jurisdiction over this legislation, which includes the majority of 
UN funding. 
The UN receives funds from the U.S. designated for foreign aid.  The five major 
categories of foreign assistance are: bilateral development aid, economic assistance 
supporting U.S. political and security goals, humanitarian aid, multilateral economic 
contributions, and military aid (Tarnoff and Nowels, 2005, 1).  The Foreign Operations 
budget contains the majority of U.S. foreign assistance programs, both bilateral and 
multilateral. A portion of humanitarian aid and multilateral economic contributions go to 
UN affiliated organizations (Tarnoff and Nowels, 2005, 6–7).  The annual State and 
Foreign Operations Appropriations bill funds the majority of U.S. assistance programs, 
which are overwhelmingly managed by USAID and the State Department (Veillette & 




administered by the State Department, such as the UN High Commission for Refugees.  
Multilateral assistance funds activities implemented by international organizations, 
including UNICEF and the UNDP (Tarnoff and Nowels, 2005, 6–7). 
The House International Relations and Senate Foreign Relations Committees have 
the main congressional responsibility for authorizing UN foreign aid programs.  The 
House and Senate Appropriations Foreign Operations Subcommittees handle bills 
appropriating most foreign assistance funds, including funds designated to UN affiliated 
agencies (Tarnoff and Nowels, 2005, 1).  Food assistance is appropriated by the 
Agriculture Subcommittees (Tarnoff and Nowels, 2005, 29).  The Senate Subcommittee 
on Labor, Health and Human Services, Committee on Appropriations, provides funds for 
global health programs, some of which are affiliated with the UN, such as the UN 
Population Fund (UNFPA) (Senate Committee on Appropriations, 2008).   
Congress has not enacted a major foreign assistance authorization measure since 
1985.  Congress has instead authorized foreign assistance initiatives for specific regions 
or aid sectors.  As a consequence, appropriation bills have played a large role in 
influencing U.S. foreign aid policy.  The Foreign Operations spending bill sets spending 
levels each year for nearly ever foreign assistance account and also incorporates new 
policy measures that would normally be enacted as part of authorizing legislation 
(Tarnoff and Nowels, 2005, 29–30). 
The congressional Budget Committees, in setting overall spending levels for 
broad U.S. government activities, including international affairs, also has an important 
role, but their interest is more focused on domestic economic conditions than on the UN.  
The 1997 Budget Resolution, for example, provided for payment of arrears to the UN 
agencies at the level requested by the Administration.  The resolution left the decisions 
about the amount and conditions of repayment, however, to the authorizing and 












Figure 11.   Composition of Foreign Affairs Budget, FY 2008, From Veillette and 
Epstein, State FY 2008 Appropriations 
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Table 8.   International Affairs Discretionary Budget Authority, $ in billions, From 
Nowels 
The costs of membership in the UN and other international organizations, and 
assessed contributions to UN peacekeeping operations, are part of the State Department 
and Public Diplomacy section of the budget.  Also included in this section are the 
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construction, maintenance, and security of American embassies around the world.  Table 
9 shows how the State Department and Public Diplomacy Budget Authority has grown 
from 1977 to 2006. 
 
Table 9.   State Department and Public Diplomacy Budget Authority, $ in billions, 
from Nowels, 2006 
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1. Sources of UN Contributions 
A request was made in 2006 to OMB for the total U.S. contributions to the UN by 
Tom Coburn, the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, 
Government Information, and International Security (OMB, 2006).  In response to 
Senator Coburn’s request, OMB sent requests to all federal agencies for any contributions 
they made to the UN.  OMB compiled and published all the U.S. government agency 
responses.  Table 7 lists the various U.S. Departments that made contributions to the UN 
from FY 2001 to FY 2005.  The Department of State is by far the largest contributor to 
the UN compared to all the other Departments, contributing over 96 percent of the U.S. 
total contribution in FY 2005 (OMB, 2006).  
The amounts the departments contributed to the UN sometimes varied 
significantly form year to year.  For example, the Foreign Agricultural Service 
contributed over $746 million to the World Food Program in FY 2001, but only $54 
million in FY 2005 for humanitarian assistance and school feeding through the 
Department of Agriculture (OMB, 2006, 2).  Some of the larger contributions from the 
Departments include:  
 The main contributor through the Department of Commerce was the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), which gave 
around $500,000 to the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission in 
FY 2005 to support the Global Ocean Observing System (OMB, 2006, 5). 
 The largest UN contributor for FY 2001 to FY 2005 from the Department 
of Defense was the Air Force, which gave $48 million in FY 2002 to the 
UN Office of the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs for Bosnia–
Herzegovina (OMB, 2006, 8).   
 The Department of Energy gave most of its UN funding to the 
International Atomic Energy Agency to prevent the proliferation of 
Nuclear Materials, giving over $2.4 million in FY 2005 (OMB, 2006, 10). 
 The Department of Homeland Security’s $33,000 went to the UN multi-
national force UN Stabilization Mission in Haiti, MINUSTAH, for a Coast 
Guard Liaison Staff Officer (OMB, 2006, 11). 
 The U.S. Marshals Service gave $282,000 in FY 2005 to the UN General 
Assembly through the Department of Justice for salary and benefits of 
deputy U.S. Marshals on security details (OMB, 2006, 15). 
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 The Bureau of International Labor Affairs, part of the Department of 
Labor, gave over $80 million in FY 2005 to the International Program on 
the Elimination of Child Labor for the elimination of the worst forms of 
child labor (OMB, 2006, 16). 
 The Department of Transportation gave $50,000 to the World Health 
Organization to develop a report on road traffic injury prevention (OMB, 
2006, 52). 
 The U.S. Treasury Department’s Foreign Operations account contributed 
over $14 million between FY 2003–FY 205 to the International Fund for 
Agricultural Development for development assistance (OMB, 2006, 53). 
 The UN Environment Program, part of the Environmental Protection 
Agency, contributed close to $10 million to the Multilateral Fund under 
the Montreal Protocol to help eliminate ozone depleting substances (OMB, 
2006, 55).  
 The National Aeronautics and Space Administration gave $600,000 to the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change for climate science 
assessment (OMB, 2006, 57). 
 The National Science Foundation gave the bulk of its contribution, around 
$360,000, to UNESCO for various conference support (OMB, 2006, 58). 
 Other organizations that gave to the UN included the Inter-American 
Foundation and U.S. Postal Service, giving $160,000 to the International 
Labour Organization and $183,000 to the Postal Union for the Americas, 




















Contributing Bureau / Account   FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 
Department of Agriculture   747,319 341,937 122,096 29,139 55,824 
Department of Commerce   1,005 1,492 1,707 1,494 1,971 
Department of Defense   65,016 73,918 25,916 19,826 11,708 
Department of Energy   0 4,763 4,611 6,572 2,613 
Department of Homeland Security   0 0 0 33 133 
Department of Interior   255 649 816 726 672 
Department of Justice   0 279 134 210 282 
Department of Labor   118,800 112,868 108,357 98,930 81,217 
Department of State and Other 
International Programs 
  2,228,265 3,362,673 3,544,914 3,923,516 5,139,721 
Department of Transportation   0 0 50 0 0 
Department of Treasury   4,989 20,000 14,906 14,916 14,880 
Environmental Protection Agency   17,061 15,785 16,611 18,388 16,817 
National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration 
  150 150 640 650 600 
National Science Foundation   120 120 227 575 495 
Other Organizations   186 180 340 180 343 
Total   3,183,166 3,934,814 3,841,323 4,115,155 5,327,276 
 




As the largest contributor to the UN among the various departments, the 
Department of State and USAID’s total UN contribution were $5.139 billion in FY 2005, 
with USAID’s portion being $1.991 billion.  Among the largest USAID contribution was 
to the World Food Program, which received $995 million for food aid, while UNICEF 
received $400 million for polio immunization, and the Joint UN Program on HIV/AIDS 
received $27 million (OMB, 2006, 27).       
Some of the State Department’s larger contributions included: 
 UN Drug Control Program receiving over $10 million to combat illegal 
drugs in FY 2004.   
 International Atomic Energy Agency received over $52 million for 
nuclear energy, safety, and security in FY 2004.   
 UN Fund for Montreal Protocol was given $18 million for environmental 
conservation in FY 2005.   
 UN Children’s Fund received $124 million in FY 2005 from the State 
Department for child health and education. 
 UN Development Program received $96 million for humanitarian 
assistance (OMB, 2006, 18–19). 
Three of the most expensive peacekeeping assessments in FY 2005 were the UN 
mission to Liberia, with a $312 million contribution, the UN Operations in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo with a $284 million contribution, and the UN 
Stabilization in Haiti with a $192 million contribution (OMB, 2006, 21). 
Payments for the portion of the assessed budget included, in FY 2005, $362 
million for the UN regular budget, $96 million to the World Health Organization, $89 
million to the IAEA, $71 million to the Food and Agriculture Organization, and $65 
million to the International Labor Organization.  $351 million was contributed to the UN 
High Commissioner for Refugees for humanitarian assistance, and $108 million was 
given to the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East, also 
for humanitarian purposes (OMB, 2006, 22–23).  Table 11 lists the State Department’s 
UN contributions to the UN and various UN agencies for FY 2007 and 2008, and the 
request for FY 2009.  Table 12 shows the U.S. assessment levels for various UN agencies 










Table 12.   U.S. Assessment Levels: UN Specialized Agencies and IAEA, From 
Browne and Nakamura 
2. Voluntary Contributions 
Each year the U.S. provides a large amount in voluntary contributions to the UN 
and UN-affiliated organizations and activities, mainly for humanitarian and development 
programs.  In 2004, the U.S. contributed 48 percent of the World Food Program budget, 
helping to feed 104 million people in 81 countries; 17 percent of UNICEF to feed and 
educate children in 157 countries; and 31 percent of the UN High Commissioner for 
Refugees budget to safeguard the rights of 19 million refugees in 116 countries (U.S. 
Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, 2005).  Table 13 gives the U.S. voluntary 




Table 13.   U.S. Voluntary Contributions to UN Programs, $ in millions, from 
Browne and Nakamura, 2008 
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3. Withholding and Reform Efforts 
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has held numerous hearings on the UN.  
On July 21, 2005, the Committee held a hearing on UN reform.  Richard G. Lugar, then 
chairman, was a cosponsor of a S. 1383 bill on UN management personnel and policy 
reform.  Sen. Lugar said that this legislation: 
provides President Bush with the flexibility and tools he needs to achieve 
the objective of a reformed UN.  Should the President believe that, in spite 
of his best efforts, the other member states of the UN do not share our 
conviction regarding these reforms, our bill grants him authority to 
withhold up to 50 percent of our UN dues until such time as reform has 
taken hold.  On the other side of the equation, some Senators may oppose 
the Coleman–Lugar bill because it does allow the President to cut U.S. 
contributions to the UN by up to 50 percent.  Senators may contend that 
the U.S. contributions should be predictable and off the table in 
negotiations on reform.  But the UN reform is urgent and is not likely to 
happen if Presidential initiatives are backed up by a full range of options, 
including withholding funds. (United Nations Reform Hearing, 2005, 2)  
Though his views were not shared by all members of Congress, Sen. Lugar was 
clearly a proponent of withholding funds to enact reform, which is a tool Congress has 
used for this purpose in the past. 
In a briefing and hearing on reforming the UN before the House International 
Relations Committee on May 19, 2005, Representative Tom Lantos expressed the 
frustration many congressional members felt over the inability of the U.S. to influence 
the UN, despite its role as the largest contributor.  Rep. Lantos asked Mr. Mark Mallock 
Brown, former Chief of Staff to the UN Secretary General Kofi Annan:    
to what extent Secretary General Annan and you and your team have 
focused on the inherent structural problem of the UN wherein tiny 
destitute dictatorships have the same vote in the General Assembly that 
the United Kingdom or the U.S. have.  It has created over the years an 
untold series of problems, making the UN irrelevant in the eyes of many, a 
worthless debating society.  …we constantly see attempts to equate the 
General Assembly to a parliamentary body.  Well, it clearly is not a 
parliamentary body.  A tiny dictatorship, destitute in its economy, is not 
the equivalent of the U.S. of America in either voting strength or the 
weight that its views ought to carry. (Reforming the United Nations 
Hearing, 2005, 79) 
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Testifying at this same hearing, Mr. Brown shed some light on the struggle that 
occurs in the UN and why reform efforts face difficulties.  According to Mr. Brown,   
At the moment, we have the very powerful but very exclusive Security 
Council and the relatively unpowerful but very noisy General Assembly.  
It is not a terribly functional arrangement.  It is a club of the included and 
the excluded in terms of the culture of the UN.  Those who are in the 
General Assembly, for from feeling it to be very powerful, are frustrated 
by its lack of relevance to real decisions. (Reforming the United Nations 
Hearing, 2005, 79)   
Representative Grace Napolitano stated that some of the Members of Congress 
would like to force the UN to agree to remove programs that they do not see as part of the 
organization’s core mission out of the portion of the UN budget that is assessed as dues.  
This would theoretically free up a large portion of the U.S. contribution to be redirected 
toward U.S. policy priorities.  She asked how realistic this idea was and would a threat by 
the U.S. to withhold a portion of our dues be likely to leverage this change in the 
budgeting process (Reforming the United Nations Hearing, 2005, 94).  Mr. Brown 
responded to the difficulty of redirecting money, and also cautioned against withholding 
dues:  
On the first point, the Secretary General also has proposed that there be a 
sunsetting of old programs which are no longer high priority.  One has to, 
however, be aware that a lot of the programs all of us in this room do not 
like are relatively cheap, whereas the programs we want to build up, like 
peacekeeping, are very expensive.  The non-peacekeeping budget of the 
UN is $2 billion a year.  The peacekeeping budget is $4 billion.  So you 
would have to make a lot of savings in the first to provide more money for 
the second.  Similarly, UNDP, which you all like, or I hope like, is $4 
billion a year.  So the good things are more expensive that the bad things, 
which makes the complete trade off of old priorities for new ones not 
dollar neutral.  The second issue, I would just say, on the withholding is, 
you know, we feel very strongly that your reform ideas, what we know of 
them, are very good, very strong and very consistent with what other 
reforming countries want at the UN and that you need to work with them 
to achieve them.  And that the option of withholding immediately 
separates you from your allies, because it is seen as America acting alone 
rather than in partnership with reform-minded allies. (Reforming the 
United Nations Hearing, 2005, 95) 
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The idea that withholding dues would further alienate the U.S. from other UN 
members is a common argument against using withholding as a tool to effect UN reform. 
The U.S. Ambassador to the UN for Management and Reform, Richard Sklar, stated 
before Congress that there is a great fear among UN members that the current reform 
efforts are part of a U.S. attempt to downsize the UN and decrease the power and 
influence of the General Assembly (Bite, 2001, 13).   
Representative Dana Rohrabacher felt that withholding funds had been successful 
in the past, and asked Timothy Wirth, President of the UN Foundation the following:  
Isn’t being unwilling to withhold funds to the UN not just giving away all 
the leverage you have with someone who will not act?  I mean, do people 
not act when you have leverage?  Did we not bring about UNESCO’s 
reform by withholding our funds from UNESCO for a number of years? 
(Reforming the United Nations Hearing, 2005, 95)   
Mr. Wirth did not seem to agree with Representative Rohrabacher and responded 
that the U.S. should pay its dues on time:  
UNESCO was a very specific and targeted effort.  I think the lesson 
overall is a more profound one and a more complicated one.  If we look at 
the time when we withheld funds before, Congressman, in the 1990s, and 
we would say the withholding of funds accomplished certain goals.  Well, 
actually, it made it much harder for the U.S. to reach its broader goal, 
which was a reduction in our dues, which as a reduction in our share of 
peacekeeping.  That was the central set of issues that we were trying to 
pursue at that time.  It was very, very hard to get done because other 
countries were looking at us and saying, “Hey, you are the biggest 
scofflaw in the world.  You owe more than $1 billion dues.”  You have 
peacekeeping well over $1 billion in arrears and it was extremely difficult.  
It took the jujitsu of Helms–Biden and then just endless amounts of 
diplomacy at the UN to bring people on board and then finally to bridge 
this gap.  Now that is not a very sound way of doing business.  It is a much 
sounder way of doing business, let us pay our dues in full, let us pay them 
on time.  Let us be a good, upstanding citizen and with our own backyard 
cleaned up, then let us go and try to help the UN make the changes that 
ought to be made. (Reforming the United Nations Hearing, 2005, 172) 
Overdue U.S. payments have been the subject of political disputes on multiple 
occasions (Mufson and Sipress, August 16, 2001).  Representative Rohrabacher was 
referring to events in 1994 when Congress used the power of the purse to influence UN 
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policy.  Congress withheld 10 percent of U.S. contributions to the UN regular budget in 
FY 1994 until the Secretary of State certified that the UN had appointed an independent 
inspector general.  On July 29, 1994, the General Assembly created the OIOS (Bite, 
2001, 4). 
More examples of withholding, this time due to poor performance at 
peacekeeping, took place in 1999 and 2000.  Chris Smith, a Republican representative 
from New Jersey, and Chairman of the Subcommittee on International Operations and 
Human Rights of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, said in 1999 that the U.S. 
Congress was upset at the expensive and unsuccessful UN operation in Bosnia, and 
refused to pay a $504 million supplemental bill for the operation.  The U.S., Smith 
argued, paid even more for a NATO force that did the job the UN failed to do, showing it 
was the principle, not the money that was important (Smith, November 3, 1999). 
Congress used the threat of withholding payment again in 2001 for another issue.  
Conservative lawmakers threatened to stall the $582 million payment for back dues 
unless Congress approved the American Service Members’ Protection Act (ASMP).  This 
legislation was designed to exclude U.S. personnel from the International Criminal Court 
(ICC), a tribunal being established in The Hague to handle war crimes, genocide, and 
crimes against humanity.  The ASMP Act was attached to the House version of a State 
Department authorization bill that included UN money, and would cut off U.S. military 
assistance to any non-NATO country that ratified the ICC treaty.  It would also have 
excluded U.S. troops from being a part of any UN peacekeeping force unless the UN 
Security Council gave American soldiers immunity from ICC jurisdiction (Mufson and 
Sipress, August 16, 2001). 
The administration wanted a Senate bill that would separate the UN debt from the 
State Department authorization, but some House members opposed that suggestion, 
including Speaker J. Dennis Hastert, International Relations Committee Chairman Henry 
Hyde and Majority Whip Tom DeLay.  
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While Congress has stressed the need for UN reform, certain members have 
defended the UN and acknowledged the service it provides.  In a hearing on the future of 
the UN in 2007, Tom Lantos, Chairman of the House of Representatives Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, said that the UN plays a vital role: 
[w]e now have two ways to proceed in New York: Write the UN off as a 
lost cause, or ratchet up our diplomacy to bring about much-needed 
reforms.  And the choice is simple.  As tempting as some might find it to 
contemplate, we cannot abandon the UN.  The UN provides vital support 
to core U.S. foreign policy initiatives in Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, North 
Korea, Sudan and a dozen other places.  It manages response to 
transnational threats such as AIDS, avian flu, famine and refugee crisis 
that no nation, not even one as powerful as the U.S., can tackle alone….It 
is tempting to avoid the messy and tedious, behind-the-scenes work so 
essential to the UN’s efficient operation.  It is tempting to threaten to cut 
off a share of our UN dues until the management in Turtle Bay and each 
and every one of the 191 other states does exactly what we tell them to do.  
But this approach is wrong-headed.  Instead of playing to the crowd, we 
need to ratchet up a level of diplomacy there. (Future of the UN Hearing, 
2007, 1–2)  
Representative Bill Delahunt added that having the UN also saves the U.S. money 
it would have to spend if it were to go it alone.  He stated that, according to a GAO 
report, if the U.S. replaced the current UN peacekeeping mission in Haiti with a U.S. 
force, it would cost the American taxpayers eight times as much as it costs the UN to do 
the job (Future of the UN Hearing, 2007, 5).  
John Bolton, former U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN, is in favor of more 
voluntary funding of the UN to achieve reform.  He quoted Catherine Bertini, who served 
as Executive Director of the World Food Programme:  
Voluntary funding creates an entirely different atmosphere at the World 
Food Programme than at the UN.  The World Food Programme, every 
staff member knows that we have to be as efficient, accountable, 
transparent and results-oriented as possible.  If we are not, donor 
governments can take their funding elsewhere in a very competitive world 
among UN agencies, NGOs and bilateral governments. (Future of the UN 
Hearing, 2007, 25)   
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Bolton said that after two years of intense effort to bring about reform at the UN, 
there is precious little to show for it.  He noted that the Fifth Committee of the General 
Assembly voted against Secretary Annan’s system reforms by a vote of 108–50–3.  The 
fifty countries that supported reform contribute around 90 percent of the assessed 
contributions to the UN, while the over 100 against the reform proposals contribute 
around 10 percent (Future of the UN Hearing, 2007, 27).  
The UN is one of many competitors in a marketplace of global problem solving.  
That realization should be an incentive to reform, Ambassador Bolton said a few years 
earlier.  One alternative is for regional organizations to play a role.  The U.S. pays 22 
percent of the UN regular budget, yet has only one vote out of 191 cast, meaning that the 
U.S., with one half of one percent of the total votes, pays 44 times more than its voting 
power (Pianin and Harris, November 15, 2005). 
Senator Tim Wirth, director of the UN Foundation, the leading NGO supporting a 
revitalized UN, noted at a hearing that U.S. actions with respect to peacekeeping do not 
seem to align with what it is saying:  
We are currently withholding on peacekeeping by ourselves.  We dropped 
out assessment on peacekeeping from 31 percent down to 27 percent, but 
the Congress has put a lid of 25 percent on peacekeeping despite the fact 
that the U.S. votes for all of these peacekeeping expeditions.  So we say 
we are going to support all these, but, by the way, we are not going to put 
our money where our votes are, in support of these peacekeeping 
efforts…makes the UN less and less capable of carrying this peacekeeping 
out, and is extremely dysfunctional and the 25 percent cap should be 
gotten rid of. (Future of the UN Hearing, 2007, 33) 
During a Hearing before the House International Relations Committee on 
improving internal oversight within the UN in 2006, Chairman Henry Hyde quoted a 
GAO report:  
UN funds are unnecessarily vulnerable to waste, fraud, and abuse because 
the UN lacks an effective organizational structure for managing 
procurement, has not demonstrated a commitment to a professional 
procurement workforce, and has failed to adopt specific guarantees for 
procurement officials. (UN Reform Internal Oversight Hearing, 2006, 2)  
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Representative Hyde also quoted an OIOS report that said “despite numerous 
recommendations by OIOS in past audit reports; management has failed to establish 
accountability where irregularities occurred” (UN Reform Internal Oversight Hearing, 
2006, 2).   
Representative Eni Faleomavaega, a member of the committee, commented on the 
corruption within the UN and the need for the U.S. to address it:  
Unfortunately, the millions in United Nations funds that were apparently 
stolen by Mr. Yakovlev, an employee of the United Nations procurement 
office, and his cronies in the service of the most base form of personal 
greed, have unfairly cast a black cloud over thousands of hard-working 
UN employees.  Many of these international civil servants selflessly 
sacrifice comfort and safety to advance humanitarian interests and security 
in all of the world’s hot spots.  It is absolutely critical to the U.S. and 
global interests that critical controls be established so that the black cloud 
that is hanging over the UN can be lifted and confidence in the UN and its 
thousands of hard-working officers can be restored. (UN Reform Internal 
Oversight Hearing, 2006, 3) 
David M. Walker, then Comptroller General, commented on the abuse in the UN, 
particularly with respect to the OIOS at the hearing: 
The UN is vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement due to a 
range of weaknesses in existing management and oversight practices.  In 
particular, current funding arrangements adversely affect OIOS’s 
budgetary independence and serve to compromise its ability to investigate 
high-risk areas.  OIOS’s independence is impaired for two primary 
reasons.  First, while OIOS is funded by the UN’s regular budget and 12 
other extra-budgetary revenue streams, UN financial regulations and rules 
severely limit OIOS’s ability to respond to changing circumstances and to 
reallocate resources among revenue streams, locations, and operating 
divisions.  As a result, OIOS cannot always deploy the resources 
necessary to address current and emerging high-risk areas that may 
emerge after its budget is approved.  Secondly, OIOS is dependent upon 
UN funds and programs for resources for the services that it provides.  
OIOS must obtain permission to perform audits or investigations from 
managers of funds and programs, and they must negotiate the terms of 
work and payments for those services that are provided.  Moreover, these 
entities have the right to deny funding for the work that OIOS proposes.  
By denying OIOS funding, UN entities can avoid any oversight by OIOS 
and high-risk areas can be excluded from timely examination. (UN 
Reform Internal Oversight Hearing, 2006, 8–9)   
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GAO found that in late 2007 some member states had still not yet agreed on whether to 
grant OIOS financial and operational independence (GAO, Progress on Management 
Reform, 2007, 6). 
Representative Henry Hyde, then Chairman of the Committee, was a strong 
proponent of withholding of UN funds, saying “there will be no reform at the UN of the 
slightest kind even if it involves accounting for paper clips until funding is withheld from 
the UN as a penalty for failing to adopt reform.” (UN Reform Internal Oversight Hearing, 
2006, 33). 
Senator Lugar, then Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, said at 
a Hearing on UN reform in 2006 that while progress had been made, there was still some 
reform to take place at the UN:   
I wrote to Secretary General Kofi Annan advocating the resolute and 
timely implementation of 10 reforms that would go far to build confidence 
in the United Nations.  These 10 reforms do not conflict with the U.N. 
Charter or its mission.  They would improve management practices and 
morale.  They would enhance the U.N.’s global standing.  Several of the 
10 reforms have already been initiated, including the funding of an ethics 
office that will enforce lower gift limits, the establishment of a zero-
tolerance policy regarding sexual exploitation by U.N. personnel, the 
strengthening of the Office of Internal Oversight Services, the launching 
of a review of U.N. mandates that are more than 5 years old, and the 
creation of a whistleblower protection policy.  A number of the reforms, 
however, are still being discussed, including an overhaul of the U.N. 
procurement system to prevent bribes and kickbacks, the establishment of 
an oversight body that will be able to review the results of investigations, a 
one-time staff buyout to allow for a more efficient use of personnel, and 
improvements in external access to all U.N. documents.  The adoption of 
these reforms would not end the reform debate, nor should it.  Reform 
cannot be treated like a one-time event.  Rather, it should be an inherent 
part of the U.N. operating culture. (A Status Report on UN Reform 
Hearing, 2006, 2)   
Senator Norm Coleman expressed frustration the same Hearing at the pace of UN 
reform:  
We fund the voluntary budget, and we are not talking about $430 million, 
we are talking over $3 billion of U.S. taxpayer money that goes to the 
United Nations.  The sense I have among my colleagues is we really want 
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to see reform.  We are not going to continue throwing money at an 
organization if, in fact, it is not credible, it is not transparent, it has not 
dealt with the corruption. (A Status Report on UN Reform Hearing, 2006, 
23)  
Ambassador Bolton’s response to a question on withholding U.S. funding from 
the regular UN assessed budget as a means of promoting UN reform efforts showed that 
while he thought the UN had much reform still to do, withholding dues would not be a 
good idea at this time:  
We do not believe that this is the appropriate time to withhold dues from 
the UN.  Although much work remains to be done, we have made some 
progress on reform.  The U.S. is still actively negotiating many additional 
reforms proposed by the Secretary General, though we must acknowledge 
it will be an uphill battle.  Although far more progress is needed, the 
General Assembly has now enacted some important steps: Establishment 
of an Ethics Office; strengthened financial disclosure requirements; 
increased protection from retaliation for reporting misconduct; increased 
resources for oversight; a commitment to modernize the information 
technology infrastructure; some limited authority for the Secretary General 
to redeploy staff and resources; improved financial management practices; 
and adoption of the International Public Sector Accounting Standards.” (A 
Status Report on UN Reform Hearing, 2006, 51–52) 
Actions by Congress in 2001 show that it was willing to use U.S. payments to the 
UN as leverage to get what it wants, but also that it will give the UN credit when they do 
make progress with reform.  The House reluctantly agreed to authorize the installments 
due for 2001 on U.S. debts to the United Nations.  The House did, however, vote 252–
165 on May 10, 2001 to block the final payment due in October 2002 unless the U.S. gets 
its Human Rights Commission seat.  House members voted 193–225 to reject an 
amendment that would have removed the $67 million for the U.S. to rejoin the United 
Nations Educational Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO).  The Reagan 
administration pulled the U.S. out of UNESCO in 1984 because it thought it was poorly 
managed and biased against Western institutions and Israel.  The organization has 
improved according to critics, including Senator Jesse Helms, the Foreign Relations 
Chairman, who was one of the UN’s staunchest critics.  Then acting U.S. UN 
Representative James Cunningham ascribed the UN vote on the Human Rights 
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Commission seat to an increasing perception among some countries that the U.S. wants 
to take more unilateral action on arms control and environmental issues instead of using 
multilateral cooperation (CQ Weekly, May 12, 2001). 
In May 2001, the Bush Administration urged lawmakers to not withhold dues 
from the UN in response to the lost U.S. seat on the human rights panel, saying it could 
undo a deal struck last year to settle U.S. debts to the UN.  “I think it would be absurd to 
expect Congress to merely absorb without reaction this outrageous and unwarranted act,” 
said Rep. Tom Lantos (Pisik, 2005). “This will teach irresponsible members a lesson, that 
actions mean consequences,” he added (Pisik, 2005).  Lantos joined Rep. Henry Hyde, 
chairman of the International Relations Committee, in amending the State Department’s 
annual budget reauthorization bill to halt the $244 million payment in 2002 (Pisik, 2005). 
a. United Institute of Peace Report 
In December 2004, the U.S. Congress, at the behest of Representative 
Frank Wolf, chairman of the House Subcommittee on Appropriations for Commerce, 
Justice, and State, mandated the establishment of a bipartisan Task Force on the United 
Nations. The legislation stipulated that the Task Force, to be organized by the United 
States Institute of Peace (USIP), should report to Congress within six months with its 
conclusions and recommendations on how to make the United Nations more effective in 
realizing the goals of its Charter (USIP, 2005). 
George Mitchell, Cochairman of the task force, noted that it undertook this 
effort at a time of growing consensus on the imperative for reform at the UN, and in light 
of the Secretary General report, entitled In Larger Freedom, that covered UN reform 
efforts.  The task force found that management systems common in other public and 
private institutions were lacking in a number of UN agencies and bodies that were 
reviewed (United Nations Reform Hearing, 2005, 6).  Newt Gingrich, Co-Chairman of 
task force, had this advice for Congress on the appropriateness of withholding dues and 
the U.S. desires for UN reform: 
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I do think there is a middle ground between compulsory withholding of 
the U.S. dues and automatically accepting whatever happens in New York 
or Geneva, and I would commend this committee, as you’ve already 
begun with the Lugar-Coleman bill, to look for common ground which, 
frankly, should be one I would hope that would make the executive branch 
a little uncomfortable by requiring a level of annual reporting and a level 
of certification in order to get the money.  And I would also remind the 
executive branch that the Congress always has the legitimate right, every 
year, to reconsider appropriate appropriation levels.  And I say that 
because I think the UN bureaucracy and the 120-some countries who 
collectively pay less than 1 percent of all UN dues have to be reminded 
that a free people do reserve some standards to set on whether or not 
reforms have occurred. (United Nations Reform Hearing, 2005, 11)   
Gingrich also said in his prepared statement that Congress can be a 
significant force in UN reform:  
Congress needs to get its act together for UN reform to happen.  When the 
Congress of the U.S., which has the power of the purse, the power of law, 
and the power of investigation, takes UN reform seriously and sticks to it 
year after year, it will surely have a significant impact. (United Nations 
Reform Hearing, 2005, 20)  
Senator Mitchell was not in favor of withholding of UN dues.  Mitchell 
said:  
[T]here is obviously an inevitable tension between the legislature and 
executive branches that was intended by the Framers as a way of 
distributing power.  I think that it is possible to achieve a constructive 
tension, preserving an important role for the legislative branch while not 
tying the hands of a President and Secretary of State.  And I believe that 
the mandatory withholding would effectively tie a President’s hands in a 
way that would be counterproductive for U.S. policy. (United Nations 
Reform Hearing, 2005, 28)   
R. Nicholas Burns, Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, said at 
the same hearing that a lot of diplomatic time was being spent on suggestions for Security 
Council reform.   
Germany, Brazil, Japan, and India have a proposal that the four of them 
should come onto the Security Council as permanent members.  And 
we’ve had to, very reluctantly, say that we would vote against that 
proposal.  So we’ve taken the tactic of standing back and saying, “The 
Security Council is actually one of the strongest features of the UN.  It’s 
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not most badly in need of reform.  What needs reform is the management, 
budget, human rights, peacekeeping.  And so we prefer to see all of these 
reforms pushed forward, and then we’ll be happy to look at Security 
Council reform. (United Nations Reform Hearing, 2005, 64) 
As was seen earlier, this illustrates the tension in the UN between those 
countries that are part of the Security Council, and those members of the General 
Assembly who feel the Council has too much power. 
b. Restrictions Related to Peacekeeping 
Congress frequently restricts the use of funds it provides to the UN.  In 
Conference Report 105–825, Congress said that $100 million may be made available on a 
semi-annual basis to the UN.  The Secretary of State had to certify, however, that the UN 
took no action during the past six months to increase funding for any UN program 
without first identifying an offsetting decrease elsewhere in the UN budget.  The 
committee further authorized $231 million for international peacekeeping expenses, 
provided that none of the funds  
shall be obligated or expended for any new or expanded UN peacekeeping 
mission unless, at least 15 days in advance of voting for the new or 
expanded mission in the UN Security Council: (1) the Committees on 
Appropriations or the House of Representatives and the Senate and other 
appropriate committees of the Congress are notified of the estimated cost 
and length of the mission, the vital national interest that will be served, 
and the planned exit strategy; and (2) a reprogramming of funds pursuant 
to section 605 of this Act is submitted, and the procedures therein 
followed, setting forth the source of funds that will be used to pay for the 
cost of the new or expanded mission: Provided further, That funds shall be 
available for peacekeeping expenses only upon a certification by the 
Secretary of State to the appropriate committees of the Congress that 
American manufacturers and suppliers are being given opportunities to 
provide equipment, services, and material for UN peacekeeping activities, 
equal to those being given to foreign manufacturers and suppliers: 
Provided further, That none of the funds available under this heading are 
available to pay the U.S. share of the cost of court monitoring that is part 
of any UN peacekeeping mission. (Making Omnibus, 1998, 100)  
Congress also commented on the link between DoD and peacekeeping 
efforts in the report, noting that loan guarantees in support of U.S. defense exports for 
UN peacekeeping operations or any other humanitarian assistance operations could be 
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made, not to exceed $15 billion.  None of the funds available to DoD could be obligated 
to make a financial contribution to the UN for the cost of a UN peacekeeping activity.  
The Secretary of Defense was also told to submit on a quarterly basis a report to the 
Congressional Defense Committees, the Committee on International Relations of the 
House and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate on all costs incurred by 
DoD in the preceding quarter supporting UN Security Council resolutions, such as 
peacekeeping and humanitarian missions by DoD.  Also, all efforts to seek credit against 
past UN costs and compensation from the UN for costs incurred by DoD in supporting 
UN activities were to be included in the report (House of Representatives, Making 
Omnibus, 1998, 174–175). 
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VI. FACTORS AFFECTING U.S. SUPPORT FOR THE UN 
BUDGET  
 A. INTRODUCTION TO MAJOR THEMES AFFECTING UN BUDGET 
U.S. contributions to the UN have been affected by a number of issues including 
international foreign family planning policies, issues related to the implementation of the 
Iraq Oil for Food Program, and findings of the Volcker Committee Inquiry into that 
program, findings of sexual exploitation and abuse by UN peacekeeping operations 
personnel, other misconduct by UN officials at UN headquarters in New York, and 
efforts to bring about substantial reform of the UN organization (Veillette & Epstein, 
2007, 7). 
Some members of Congress have expressed concern that fiscal mismanagement, 
lax personnel policies, and extravagant spending at the UN have misused U.S. 
contributions.  As the largest UN contributor, the U.S. has had an interest in the UN, 
including how efficiently it operates, since its inception.  While some members of 
Congress have been more critical of the UN than others, Congress has in the past voted to 
reduce U.S. contributions to the UN in order to bring about reforms designed to reduce 
waste.  Some believe that continuing to withhold money to the UN is making efforts to 
reform the UN more difficult (Bite, 1998, 1). 
1. Peacekeeping Issues 
Congress has taken a lot of interest in UN peacekeeping operations and has 
closely scrutinized the amount the U.S. spends on peacekeeping.  Peacekeeping 
expenditures account for a significant amount of the total UN budget.  Table 14 lists total 
UN peacekeeping expenditures from 1947 until 2005.  A large increase in peacekeeping 
expenditures occurred in 1992 and then again in 1993.  Costs decreased significantly in 
the later 1990s, but have increased every year from 1999 onwards.  As of December 31, 
2007 there were 84,309 uniformed peacekeepers in UN operations, of which 316 were 
U.S. personnel (GAO June 2007, 2).  The percentage the U.S. has been accessed for 
peacekeeping over the years has changed, in addition to the amount the U.S. has actually 
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recognized.  Table 15 lists the UN assessment rate and the amount recognized by the U.S. 
from 1992 to 2009.  In 2001 the U.S. passed S. 248 which authorized payment of U.S. 
peacekeeping arrears to the UN, increasing the level recognized by the U.S. to 28.15 
percent (Brown, 2008, 10). 
 
 
Table 14.   Peacekeeping Operations Expenditures, in millions, From Renner 
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Table 15.   UN Peacekeeping Assessment Levels for the U.S., From Browne 
Lawmakers are inclined to have a narrower view than UN officials concerning 
UN peacekeepers deployment, maintaining that peacekeepers should be restricted to 
more traditional peacekeeping operations.  Lawmakers have also been uncomfortable 
with operations that are seen as peacemaking instead of peacekeeping.  For example, in 
2000, no U.S. soldiers were serving in UN peacekeeping operations, but several hundred 
civilian police officers were serving in the Balkans, and a few dozen military observers 
were spread around the world (CQ Weekly, September 2, 2000). 
For FY 2000, the conference report (H.R. 2561) on defense appropriations 
required the Department of Defense, if engaged in peacekeeping or humanitarian 
operations with the UN, to provide a description and value of any equipment, supplies, or 
services transferred to the operations.  In addition, in the case of a proposed transfer of 




have been met, and if they will have to be replaced, how the President proposes to 
provide funds for the replacement (House of Representatives, Making Appropriations, 
1999, 100). 
For the 2001 Commerce, Justice, and State Appropriations bill (HR 4690), the 
House and Senate Appropriations Committees cut Clinton’s budget request for 
peacekeeping by almost one-third, and Clinton threatened to veto the bill unless his 
budget request was met.  Senator Rod Grams, who chaired the Foreign Relations 
subcommittee that monitors the UN (now called the Subcommittee on International 
Operations and Organizations, Human Rights, Democracy, and Global Women’s Issues) 
said, “What they’re talking about without saying it is establishing a standing UN army.  
They’re moving in the wrong direction” (Pomper, September 2000).  Despite Congress’ 
objections to an increasing peacekeeping budget, Clinton vetoed HR 4690 and his budget 
request for peacekeeping was met in 2001.  
Lawmakers also denied Clinton’s request to have $107 million for UN 
peacekeeping operations in Kosovo and East Timor in a fiscal year 2000 supplemental 
spending bill (PL 106–246).  The Clinton administration then tried to get congressional 
approval to redirect some peacekeeping funds to missions in Kosovo and East Timor, in 
addition to some new missions in Africa.  Congress gets notification of all peacekeeping 
missions and can block the use of those funds to carry them out under U.S. law.  The 
reprogramming undertakings were blocked by Senator Judd Gregg and Representative 
Harold Rogers, who were chairmen of the Appropriations Subcommittee State, Foreign 
Operations, and Related Programs in the Senate and House, respectively, subcommittees 
with jurisdiction over funds for peacekeeping operations (Pomper, September 2000).    
Joseph Christoff, Director International Affairs and Trade, gave testimony in 2007 
to the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human Rights, and Oversight, 
House Committee on Foreign Affairs, on a GAO report on the costs, strengths, and 
limitations of U.S. and UN operations.  He told Congress that the UN is able to carry out 
missions at a fraction of what it would cost the U.S.  He estimated that it would cost the 
U.S. about twice as much as it would the UN to conduct a peacekeeping operation similar 
to the UN mission in Haiti.  The UN budgeted $428 million for the first 14 months of the 
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mission—the U.S. was responsible for $116 million.  A similar U.S. operation would 
have cost around $876 million (GAO June 2007, 2).  Some members of Congress may 
not want a standing army, but they see that the UN fulfills a role at a fraction of what it 
would cost the U.S. to do on its own. 
Cost is not the only factor in deciding whether the U.S. or the UN should lead a 
peacekeeping operation.  Each has its strengths and limitations.  The U.S. strengths are 
rapid deployment, strong command and control, and well-trained and equipped 
personnel.  The operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have, however, reduced personnel and 
equipment readiness levels and led to shortfalls for military police, engineers and civil 
affairs experts.  The UN lends broad multinational support for its missions, with a UN 
Security Council mandate and direction for its operations.  In addition, the UN can access 
international civil servants, police, and senior officials with nation-building experience 
and various language skills.  Historically, though, the UN has trouble in quickly 
deploying its forces and ensuring unified command and control over its peacekeeping 
forces (GAO June 2007, 3).   
GAO also stated that in some areas, a U.S. led force may not be seen by the local 
population and neighboring countries as an impartial and fair force.  These two qualities, 
according to UN and U.S. officials, are integral in attaining the confidence and trust of 
the people (GAO June 2007, 13). 
The UN conducted a major review of peacekeeping in 2000.  From that review 
came a number of recommendations.  One area that received a lot of attention was to the 
use of force.  The review stated that mandates must provide authority to use force, 
concluding that “UN peacekeepers who see violence against civilians should be 
presumed to be authorized to stop it, within their means, to support UN principles” 
(General Assembly Security Council, 2000, 10). 
The panel that conducted the review said it was necessary to gather the leadership 
of a new mission as soon as possible at UN Headquarters to shape the mission’s concept 
of operations, support plan, budget, staffing and Headquarters mission guidance (General 
Assembly Security Council, 2000, 11). 
 110
It was further recommended that a revolving “on-call list” of around 100 
experienced, well-qualified military officers, be created.  Teams drawn from the list 
would translate strategic level mission concepts into operational and tactical plans before 
the deployment of troops.  There should also be, according to the panel’s report, on call 
lists of civilian police, international judicial experts, penal experts and human rights 
specialists to bolster rule of law institutions.  The panel also recommended the 
development of new and streamlined procurement policies and procedures, increased 
delegation of procurement authority to the field, greater flexibility for field missions in 
the management of budgets, the creation of a global logistics support strategy that would 
oversee the stockpiling of equipment reserves and standing contracts with the private 
sector for common goods and services (General Assembly Security Council, 2000, 12).  
GAO found that the UN was better able to unify policy and integrate planning for 
peace operations with the creation of the Senior Management Group and Executive 
Committee on Peace and Security.  Leadership by the Senior Management Group 
allowed various UN units to integrate their peacekeeping efforts and led to improved 
operational plans for new missions.  These reform initiatives, however, did not address 
the overall ability of the UN to manage, logistically support, and respond to rapid 
changes in the demand for and scope of peace operations needed by member states.  
Numerous UN officials who had worked in both UN headquarters and in field 
peacekeeping operations told GAO that there was a need for increased interdepartmental 
coordination and cooperation on day-to-day policy and operational matters (GAO June 
2007, 31–33). The Secretariat uses over 20 UN units to conduct evaluations and therefore 
lacks a centralized organizational strategy to monitor and evaluate program results and 
impact (GAO June 2007, 69). 
2. Reform Efforts 
In July 1997, the Secretary General of the UN stated that the organization had 
become fragmented, duplicative, and ineffective in some areas, and that it could become 
irrelevant if it did not conduct its missions more efficiently.  He drafted a reform program 
with three main elements: restructuring UN leadership and operations to unify 
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organizational efforts to accomplish core missions; developing a performance based 
human capital system; and developing programming and budgeting processes focused on 
managing program performance (GAO Reform Initiatives, 2000, 6).   
The Subcommittee on International Operations, Senate Committee on Foreign 
Relations, requested a GAO report on UN reform initiatives in 2000.  The GAO assessed 
whether the UN had put into place the three main elements of its reform and whether UN 
management and performance were improving as planned (GAO Reform Initiatives, 
2000, 6). 
GAO found that the UN had considerably restructured its leadership and 
operations and partly implemented a performance oriented human capital system.  The 
UN, however, had not accomplished its goal of creating an organization with an 
orientation towards results and continuous improvement.  The UN has taken steps to 
create a more cohesive leadership structure, such as the creation of a senior management 
group, composed of the Secretary General, under secretaries general, and the heads of 
programs.  The UN has also established executive committees on peace and security, 
development assistance, humanitarian relief, and economic and social affairs.   
GAO concluded that while these actions have helped unify policy and integrate 
planning, they do not address the overall capacity of the UN to manage, logistically 
support, and finance changing demands to the number and scope of peace operations it is 
conducting.  GAO found barriers to effective cooperation at the working level on peace 
and security issues and with UN agencies involved in humanitarian actions in the field.  
Around one-third of the UN officials interviewed in the field did not have a job 
expectation of cooperation with other agencies.  These officials said their careers would 
not be advanced by working on cooperative development assistance with other UN 
partners (GAO Reform Initiatives, 2000, 7–10). 
While the UN Secretariat had a computerized data system on its staff, a merit 
based appraisal system, and a code of conduct in 2000, some fundamental tasks were still 
not completed in 2000.  Some of things not accomplished included: strengthening the 
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UN’s capacity to plan for long term human capital needs; developing an efficient 
recruitment and placement system; and making sure managers have authority to 
implement their programs and are held accountable (GAO Reform Initiatives, 2000, 10). 
The Secretary General tried to limit the number of work requirements or mandates 
that were passed each year by the General Assembly and what the Secretariat was 
expected to do, but these initiatives were not adopted.  For 1997 and 1998 the GAO 
discovered the number of new tasks mandated by the General Assembly increased from 
246 to 587 and that 20 percent of these mandates had vague or open-ended expectations 
(GAO Reform Initiatives, 2000, 11).  In September 2007, member states agreed to 
continue reviewing mandates in the 62nd session of the General Assembly, but they did 
not determine how the review would progress (GAO Progress on Management, 2007, 7).  
The Secretary General also proposed that budgets specify not only program costs, 
but also expected program results and performance indicators, which would allow 
member states to hold the Secretariat accountable for results.  The General Assembly, 
however, did not approve them; some member states feared that performance oriented 
budgeting was a tactic to cut the UN budget.  There was no centralized strategy that 
pointed out limitations in existing efforts, used guides to help provide some consistency 
and reliability in evaluation, or created an approach to join monitoring and evaluation 
functions to support performance oriented budgeting (GAO Reform Initiatives, 2000, 12). 
The position of Deputy Secretary General was created in December 1997 as part 
of the new leadership structure.  Prior to creating this post, the Secretary General was the 
only official with the authority to coordinate activities among UN agencies.  According to 
U.S. and UN officials, the Secretary General was not able to fully handle this task in 
addition to the task of dealing with pressing world issues (GAO Reform Initiatives, 2000, 
28). 
The 2005 World Summit convened in New York to review the progress made in 
achieving the 2000 Millennium Summit goals and commitments made in other major UN 
conferences.  While UN members acknowledged the progress that has been made with 
the reform, there were also numerous new proposals.  The resulting documents from the 
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Summit contained the groundwork for achieving significant change in the UN system 
through numerous reforms.  Some of these reforms included creating a Peacebuilding 
Commission; establishing a Democracy Fund; strengthening the Security Council; 
improving UN system coordination; and creating a new Human Rights Council.  Member 
states also agreed to Secretariat and management reforms, including the creation of an 
ethics office; more whistle-blower protection; strengthening oversight capacity; review of 
all General Assembly mandates over five years old; and complete financial disclosure by 
UN staff (Blanchfield, 2007, 4). 
Many of these reforms have been implemented, including the creation of an 
Ethics Office, whistle-blower protection, creation of a Human Rights Council and 
Peacebuilding Commission, and improved financial disclosure policies for UN staff.  The 
current Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, has stated that reform is a pressing issue and 
would be a top priority during his tenure (Blanchfield, 2007, 4–6). 
Some challenges to reform include national self-interest and differing reform 
perspectives among UN member states resulting in a failure to reach a consensus and 
implement the reform.  Also, the inability to effectively prioritize reform initiatives may 
slow UN reform.  The highly decentralized and complex UN organization itself is a 
potential roadblock to reform efforts.  Limited resources are another challenge in trying 
to implement reforms under current UN budgets (Blanchfield, 2007, 23–24). Assistant 
Secretary General John Ruggie said the chief problem at the UN was its high degree of 
fragmentation (CQ Weekly, January 16, 1999). 
GAO believes the UN must show improved results at the point of delivery—the 
country level—for reform efforts to succeed.  Individual UN agencies with different 
priorities and administrative procedures that preclude more integrated UN programming 
and coordination of UN humanitarian relief still was a problem as of 2000.  UN agencies 
have a tendency to put their individual organizational interests before the broader UN 
interests.  Another major obstacle to reform efforts is that some agency officials have not 
supported the framework process of UN reform.  Around 33 percent of UN officials 
GAO interviewed had no requirement to participate in the framework (GAO Reform 
Initiatives, 2000, 36–40). 
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The Secretariat, according to the Assistant Secretary General for Human 
Resources, does not have mechanisms to deal with poor performance.  Managers who 
often make poor judgments are not disciplined, primarily because there were no 
mechanisms in place to do so in 2000 (GAO Reform Initiatives, 2000, 57). 
A 1999 study by the UN Joint Inspection Unit found that 11 or 12 UN specialized 
agencies were using results-based budgeting or some of its techniques.  None used it as a 
means to cut funding or reduce staff.  Some UN specialized agencies said that results- 
based budgeting helped demonstrate the potential consequences of cutting programs and 
assisted member states in choosing priorities (GAO Reform Initiatives, 2000, 66). 
In 2007, GAO conducted another report on the progress on management reform 
efforts and submitted it to the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on 
Homeland Security and Government Affairs, U.S. Senate.  GAO looked at five areas—
ethics, oversight, procurement, management operations of the Secretariat, and review of 
programs and mandates—and found reform efforts varied.  GAO also found that 
disagreements between member states have slowed the pace of reform efforts.  The UN 
ethics office has improved organizational ethics by implementing a whistleblower 
protection policy, but GAO found issues that may hinder its impact.  Organizational 
ethics have also increased ethics office staff, developed ethical standards, and enforced 
financial disclosure policy.   
The UN established an Independent Audit Advisory Committee (IAAC) in June 
2007, improving oversight, but UN funding arrangements impede the independence of 
the Secretariat’s internal audit office and its ability to audit high-risk areas.  The UN has 
also improved procurement practices, but has not undertaken an independent bid protest 
system or approved a lead agency concept, which would enhance division of labor, 
reduce duplication, and reduce costs.  Steps have been taken by the UN to improve 
certain management operations of the Secretariat, but almost no progress has been made 
in others, such as budgetary, financial management, and administrative functions.  The 




reform, the absence of comprehensive implementation plans, internal processes issues, 
and competing UN priorities, such as the proposal to reorganize the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (GAO Progress on Management Reform, 2007, 1). 
None of the six UN organizations the GAO examined required their internal 
oversight staff to disclose their financial interests, which could ensure that employees do 
not have conflicts of interest.  In addition, the governing bodies responsible for oversight 
in the six organizations the GAO examined lacked full access to internal audit reports, 
which could give greater insight into the organizations’ operations and identify critical 
weaknesses.  Four of the six audit committees examined did not adhere to international 
best practices, and one of the entities did have an audit committee (GAO Progress on 
Management Reform, 2007, 3). 
Since the October 2006 report, the UN has made progress in improving ethics.  
The whistleblower protection policy, however, is dependent on reforms in the UN 
internal justice system that is not expected to be completed until 2009.  Also, the policy is 
potentially limited by the ethics office’s lack of jurisdiction over UN funds and programs 
(GAO Progress on Management Reform, 2007, 5). 
The UN has made progress in procurement reform by strengthening procedures 
for UN procurement staff and suppliers, developing a comprehensive training program 
for procurement staff, and developing a risk management framework (GAO Progress on 
Management Reform, 2007, 6). 
Some management reform proposals, however, were missing comprehensive 
implementation dates, including time frames, completion dates, and cost and savings 
estimates for completing certain management reforms (GAO Progress on Management 
Reform, 2007, 7). 
Only three of the six audit offices told GAO that they had enough resources to 
complete their audit work plans, which include high-risk areas.  The World Food 
Programme’s (WFP) audit chief told GAO the audit office did not have sufficient 
resources to conduct its planned work for 2007 and so it was deferring audits to future 
years (GAO Progress on Management Reform, 2007, 9).  
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Delegates from 15 of the 17 member states the GAO met with, indicated the 
number one challenge to continued progress on management reform efforts is member 
state disagreements on the priorities and importance of the remaining reform efforts 
(GAO Progress on Management Reform, 2007, 7).  As long as these disagreements 
remain, the U.S. faces a slow uphill battle to continue to implement UN reform. 
3. UN Employment 
GAO conducted a study in 2001 to see whether UN organizations have increased 
employment of Americans.  The report looked at data from 1992 through 2000 from 
seven UN organizations, including the UN Secretariat and UNDP.  GAO found that, 
while some UN organizations have increased the number of Americans employed, most 
organizations have fallen short of their own targets.  In addition, GAO found that 
American representation in senior level and policymaking positions is less than several 
major contributors in a number of UN organizations.  Out of the six UN organizations in 
the study with either formal or informal geographic targets, only the Secretariat employed 
Americans in sufficient numbers to regularly meet its goal for equitable representation of 
Americans from 1992 through 2000.  Also, of the four organizations that were examined 
with formal geographical targets, only the Secretariat employed Americans in senior and 
policymaking positions at levels equivalent with those of selected major contributors 
relative to their contribution levels (GAO Targeted Strategies, 2001, 8–9).   
Although UN officials argue that merit is the overriding criterion used for 
appointing staff, the policies of UN organizations mandate that priority considerations be 
given to qualified applicants from unrepresented and underrepresented countries.  Article 
101 of the UN Charter states that staff be hired on the basis of “the highest standards of 
efficiency, competence, and integrity” as well as from “as wide a geographical basis as 
possible.”  Geographical representation targets do not apply to every staff position in the 
organizations that have established them.  Hiring data from the 1990s, however, shows 
that new hires from equitably represented or overrepresented countries outnumber those 
from unrepresented and underrepresented countries (GAO Targeted Strategies, 2001, 9–
11). 
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The State Department is primarily responsible for recruiting Americans for work 
at UN organizations and identified participation of Americans on UN staff as a “high 
priority” (GAO Targeted Strategies, 2001, 9).  According to GAO, however, the State 
Department’s efforts to recruit qualified Americans for UN positions do not reflect this 
priority, as it does not have recruiting and hiring strategies or action plans in place to 
support UN employment of Americans.  Some U.S. officials told the GAO that while 
U.S. representation may seem to be less than ideal, U.S. influence in certain organizations 
is not lacking given its voice and leadership in the governing bodies and size of U.S. 
contributions (GAO Targeted Strategies, 2001, 9, 20).   
GAO found that U.S. government wide efforts to hire Americans in specific areas 
that are important to U.S. interests within the UN system are done principally on an ad 
hoc, case-by-case basis when a key post critical to the U.S. needs to be filled.  There does 
not appear to be a formal mechanism to organize U.S. government efforts, and in the past 
it took high-level management support and attention for the recruiting to occur (GAO 
Targeted Strategies, 2001, 9, 20).   
Among the larger UN contributors, Japan and Germany were underrepresented in 
each of the UN organizations the GAO examined, while France and the United Kingdom 
were well represented.  GAO also concluded that, as the largest contributor to the UN, the 
U.S. has higher representation targets to fill than Japan or Germany, but it takes a less 
active approach in helping its citizens get hired by the UN (GAO Targeted Strategies, 
2001, 35–37). 
In 1999, there was not a single American in the top UN decision-making posts 
involving peacekeeping, economic or social programs, even though the U.S. was paying 
one-forth of all UN costs.  Just one American, an accountant, was a substantive decision 
maker in the Secretary General’s Cabinet.  The relative absence of U.S. representation at 
the highest policy making levels of the UN was noticed during disagreement over U.S. 
bills.  There were no top decision makers in the UN’s Department of Economic and 
Social Affairs from the U.S. either.  In addition, the U.S. lost its seat on the powerful 
financing panel, the Advisory Committee on Administrative and Budgetary Questions in 
1996, and the U.S. had no representatives on the UN Board of Auditors, which looks for 
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fraud in the UN’s yearly operations (Archibald, January 4, 1999).  The absence of U.S. 
officials in the top UN positions may increase the challenge of getting any desired reform 
efforts passed. 
B. DISCUSSION OF PRESENT FACTORS INFLUENCING U.S. SUPPORT 
FOR THE UN BUDGET 
1. UN Headquarters 
The UN headquarters complex in New York City was constructed from 1949 to 
1952, but the buildings have exceeded their economic life expectancy, a GAO report 
concluded in 2001.  They do not conform to current safety, fire, and building codes nor to 
UN technologic or security requirements.  A Capital Master Plan was given to the 
General Assembly in June 2000 by the Secretary General with options for headquarters 
renovation.  The Secretary predicted the renovations would take six years to complete 
and cost around $1 billion (GAO June 2001, 3).  As the largest contributor to the UN, the 
U.S. is concerned over the potential cost and reasonableness of the planning for this 
work.  GAO was asked to assess the reasonableness of the renovation planning and 
comment on the potential cost to the U.S., including financing issues and options (GAO 
June 2001, 3). 
The Capital Master Plan listed three financing options: cash payments by member 
states; interest-free loans by members; and bond financing in commercial capital markets 
(GAO June 2001, 6–7).  In 1948, the U.S. gave the UN an interest free loan to build the 
headquarters and was repaid from the regular UN budget over a 31–year period.  Special 
assessments would be used with the cash payment method, and the Secretariat believed it 
would be challenging for members to agree on a scale within the time frame to begin 
renovation work proposed by the Capital Master Plan.  With the bond offering, even 
though there would be interest costs, it would allow member states to pay for the cost of 
the renovation over the life of financing instead of a large outlay of funding upfront, as 




potential problem with the bond offering was that some member states do not pay their 
regular budget assessments until the second half of the calendar year.  The regular budget 
assessment would thus be used to secure the debt service payments on the bonds.   
GAO concluded by saying the headquarters complex definitely needs to be 
renovated, and as the host country the U.S. needs to play a major role in making 
decisions for the renovation to proceed. Some member states feel the U.S., New York 
State, and New York City get economic benefits due to the UN headquarters being in 
New York, and thus should pay more of the renovation costs than the U.S. share of the 
regular UN budget.  The administration and State had not, however, by GAO’s 2001 
report, created a comprehensive U.S. position on the renovation (GAO June 2001, 8–10). 
Discussions within the UN and with New York City continued, and in 2007 a plan 
was finally established for UN headquarters renovations.  Renovation is now scheduled 
to begin in mid-2009.  The projected cost to complete the renovations is now estimated at 
$1.974 million as of September 2008.  The General Assembly agreed on two different 
options for renovation financing.  Twelve member states selected the one-time payment 
option and 180 states, including the U.S., selected the equal multi-year assessment of five 
years (General Assembly Sixth Annual Progress Report, 2008, 4–11).  The U.S. is 
expected to pay its assessment of $377 million over 5 years, for a total of $75 million per 
year (GAO February 2007, 2). 
2. UN Population Fund 
The UN Population Fund (UNFPA) has proved controversial in U.S. politics, 
which has impacted funding.  Established in 1969, the UNFPA is the world’s largest 
source of population and reproductive health programs and the main unit in the UN for 
global population issues.  In 2006 UNFPA had $605.5 million in funds from voluntary 
contributions from 180 nations and some foundations.  During its first 25 years, the 
UNFPA transitioned from an agency centered on collection and analysis to an agency 
providing maternal and child health/family planning assistance.   
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There has been a lot of debate over the last 20 years in Congress on whether the 
U.S. should financially support the UNFPA.  The issue has focused on the amount, if any, 
that UNFPA provides to China’s coercive family planning programs and policies such as 
abortion or involuntary sterilization.  In 15 of the last 24 years the U.S. has not given any 
money to the organization due to the Kemp–Kasten amendment of 1985, which bans all 
U.S. aid to organizations involved in the management of coercive family planning 
programs.  When the U.S. has contributed to the UNFPA, its contributions have covered 
around 8 percent of UNFPA’s regular budget.  For FY 2009, the Bush Administration 
requested that $25 million go to UNFPA if it was deemed eligible under the Kemp–
Kasten amendment.  Congress approved funds for UNFPA in the 2009 state and foreign 
operations appropriations bill.  The appropriated funds would come from the Child 
Survival and Health Programs account (Blanchfield UN population, 2008, 1).   
From 1986 to 1992, USAID requested funds for UNFPA with the understanding 
that a decision to transfer the money would be reviewed under the terms of the Kemp–
Kasten amendment, which Congress also continued to enact each year as part of the 
foreign assistance appropriation bill.  Throughout those years, UNFPA was ineligible for 
U.S. support.   
President Clinton thought the Kemp–Kasten amendment was ambiguous and said 
it could be interpreted differently.  The Clinton administration thought that the UNFPA 
did not knowingly or intentionally support abortion or involuntary sterilization.  Congress 
continued to keep Kemp–Kasten language in the Foreign Operations Appropriations acts, 
and from 1994 to 1998 and 2000–2001, attached conditions on UNFPA contributions that 
required the organization to keep U.S. funds in a separate account and forego transfers 
from the U.S. equal to the amount UNFPA allocated to its China program (Blanchfield 
UN population, 2008, 12). 
In 2002 the State Department announced the UNFPA remained in violation of the 
Kemp–Kasten amendment and was ineligible for funding.  From FY 2002 through FY 
2008, a $25 million reserve was available in the Administration budget request for 
UNFPA, subject to Kemp–Kasten conditions, and each year the UNFPA received no 
funding from the U.S. based on the State Department findings that its was not eligible 
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under Kemp–Kasten conditions.  From 2002 to 2008, Congress continued to stipulate that 
no UNFPA funds be available for programs in China and that money available to UNFPA 
be subject to Kemp–Kasten conditions.  Congress would also say in the legislation that if 
no funds were made available to UNFPA in that year that they be transferred to other 
family planning and maternal health services (Blanchfield UN population, 2008, 25–28).   
3. Human Rights 
On March 15, 2006, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution replacing the 
Commission on Human Rights with a new Human Rights Council.  The Council is 
supposed to be an improvement over the Commission, which was controversial because 
of some of its members’ human rights policies.  For example, in 2001 Sudan, which was 
criticized by governments and human rights organizations for its ethnic cleansing in the 
Darfur region, was elected to the Commission.  Although the U.S. was one of four 
members to vote against the resolution establishing the Council, stating the Council was 
no better than the Commission, the Administration said it would continue to fund and 
support the work of the Council (Blanchfield human rights, 2008, 1–2). 
The U.S., while supporting the mission of the Council, does not feel it goes far 
enough to maintain credible membership.  On March 6, 2007, the Administration said the 
U.S. would not run for a Council seat in the May 2007 elections.  A State Department 
spokesperson said the Council had not proved itself a credible body, showing a nearly 
singular focus on Israel, while not addressing human rights abuses in Cuba, Burma, or 
North Korea.  The opinion in Congress on refusing a seat on the Council was mixed, with 
some members supporting it and some not (Blanchfield human rights, 2008, 18). 
On April 8, 2008, the U.S. Permanent Representative to the UN, Zalmay 
Khalilzad, stated the U.S. would withhold a portion of the U.S. contributions to the 2008 
UN regular budget equivalent to the U.S. share of the Human Rights Council budget.  
Khalilzad said the Council “is less willing to take affirmative action, but is more willing 




policy toward the Council may depend on whether Congress and the Administration see 
the Council’s future work as effective and credible (Blanchfield human rights, 2008, 20–
22).     
4. Withholding Dues 
According to Brett Schaefer and Steven Groves of the Heritage Foundation, 
history shows that the U.S. needs to use financial leverage if it wants to advance UN 
reform.  In 2008 the UN, against U.S. objections, passed the largest budget increase in its 
history without, according to Schaefer and Groves, adopting needed reforms, breaking a 
20-year tradition of consensus-based budget decisions.  The decision to overrule the U.S. 
was met with a standing ovation by the other UN member states (Schaefer & Groves, 
2009, 3). 
Schaefer says that informal, consensus-based budgeting, while successful in 
blocking initiatives that could cause large budget increases by allowing a single state to 
veto the budget, also made it difficult to eliminate ineffective UN activities as long as one 
nation supported the ineffective UN activity.  Because the consensus-based budgeting is 
an informal agreement compared to a hard rule, it has allowed many member states to 
override the U.S. and other major contributors without consequences.  According to Brett 
Schaefer, Congress should withhold the U.S. contribution to the UN regular budget if the 
UN adopts a budget over the objections of the U.S.  Congress could release those funds if 
the UN either reinstated the consensus-based budget process as a hard rule, or adopted 
weighted voting for budgetary voting.  Schaefer believes financial leverage has been 
effective in the past, and Congress should withhold funds again to force the UN to 
institute reforms (Schaefer, January 29, 2008). 
The total impact of withholding a proportionate share of assessed payments may 
depend on the source of the program’s funding.  If a program is funded by the UN regular 
budget, and the U.S. withholds a proportionate share of its normal contribution, the cost 
of the program will probably be supplemented by surplus regular budget funds.  If a UN 
program’s funding comes from multiple sources, as some do, it may be difficult for U.S. 
proportionate withholdings to have a major impact.  In those cases, a U.S. withholding 
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may be primarily a symbolic gesture.  If the U.S. withholds funds from a program funded 
primarily by member state contributions, however, the impact of a withdrawal could be 
more significant.  Presently, the only proportionate U.S. withholding from the regular UN 
budget is for some programs associated with the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(Blanchfield, 2007, 8). 
An alternate strategy for Congress to use in its reform policy is a resolution.  
Members of Congress may propose resolutions in one or both chambers of Congress.  
Based on the little evidence of resolutions being passed by Congress, they do not appear 
to be very useful.  In addition, as some members of Congress have done in the past, 
working with the UN Secretary General to earn his support can be valuable.  Having the 
chief administrative officer of the UN as an advocate can help if there is disagreement 
among member states on certain issues.  Also, building consensus with other UN member 
states on reform issues can help to decrease the tendency for some states to view U.S. 
support of certain reform initiatives as self-serving (Blanchfield, 2007, 10). 
In 2005, the House of Representatives passed, but Congress did not enact, H.R. 
2745, The Henry J. Hyde UN Reform Act.  The act would have required the U.S. to 
withhold 50 percent of its assessed payments in 2007 if the UN did not implement 32 of 
40 changes, with 15 mandatory reforms.  The proposed changes included: establishing an 
internal oversight board and a position of UN Chief Operating Officer; transferring 18 
UN programs from mandatory to voluntary funding; and banning countries under 
investigation for human rights violations from membership in UN human rights bodies 
(Blanchfield, 2007, 26).   
Some foreign diplomats have grown tired of the repeated pattern of the U.S. 
threatening to withhold dues unless a change is made at the UN.  Although the UN did 
not always make changes requested by member states, each time it did make the change, 
the U.S. would come up with a new demand and a threat to withhold all of its dues.  
Secretary General Annan spent a good deal of his time the first two years as secretary-
general implementing numerous changes, many at the request of the U.S. Annan held the 
budget steady at around $2.5 billion for a two-year cycle, even with inflation and 
pressures for growth, and reduced the secretariat’s work force from 10,000 to about 9,000 
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(Pomper, January 16, 1999, 124).  The secretariat has almost no impact on the specialized 
agencies, since they receive their own budgets and contributions from member states.  
The UN organization cannot run a deficit according to its own rules, and it did not 
reimburse some countries for peacekeeping operations to make up for the shortfall in 
payments during the 1990s.  Popular UN programs were eliminated, cut back, or not 
begun at all due to the shortfalls.  Due to the failure of the U.S. to pay its debts, UN 
members in the late 1990s rejected the bid of Susan Shearouse, a U.S. diplomat 
specializing in budget issues, to be a member of the Advisory Committee on 
Administrative and Budgetary Questions, which is the UN equivalent of an 
Appropriations Committee.  Therefore, the U.S. lost the ability to look over the UN 
spending reports in their entirety (Pomper, January 16, 1999, 127). 
5. The Oil for Food Program 
In 1996, the UN Security Council and Iraq began the Oil for Food program to 
address Iraq’s humanitarian situation after sanctions were imposed in 1990.  More than 
$67 billion in oil revenue was generated through the program, with $31 billion in 
humanitarian assistance given to Iraq.  GAO said it would have been beneficial for the 
UN Oil for Food program to have an internationally accepted internal control framework 
to provide reasonable assurance in protecting assets and meeting program objectives.  
Internal control problems allowed the former Iraqi government to get billions of dollars 
in illicit payments through surcharges and kickbacks that ranged from $7.4 billion to 
$12.8 billion.  The Oil for Food Program also had a very complex organizational 
structure with unclear lines of responsibility and authority, which helped lead to an 
ineffective control environment (GAO April 2006, 1–3). 
The GAO found that the Oil of Food program had key weaknesses in four key 
internal control standards: risk assessment, control activities, information and 
communications, and monitoring.  The UN did not do any timely assessments to identify 
high-risk areas and prevent fraud.  None of the Secretariat’s 90 or 180-day reports to the 
Security Council noted illicit payment demands tied to oil or commodity contracts (GAO 
April 2006, 3).  There were not enough oil experts reviewing contracts, leading to Iraq 
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smuggling oil and charging kickbacks on its contracts.  OIOS noted more than 700 
problems with the Oil for Food program and compensation fund, but the recurring nature 
of these problems over time showed that systemic weaknesses were not fully addressed 
(GAO April 2006, 4–5). 
Even though many blamed the UN for the majority of the failures in the Oil for 
Food Program, the U.S. and other Security Council were not immune from criticisms.  
Successive U.S. administrations issued annual waivers to Congress exempting Turkey 
and Jordan from unilateral U.S. sanctions for transgressing the UN sanctions against Iraq.  
In addition, the Security Council was aware of the Iraqi smuggling of oil but took no 
actions to prevent it (GAO April 2006, 3, 14). 
The lessons learned from the internal control weaknesses in the Oil for Food 
program, the GAO said, could prove helpful as the U.S. presses the UN to conduct 
fundamental reforms to address its key efficiency, management, and accountability 
challenges (GAO April 2006, 36).   
6. Procurement Reform 
GAO issued a report in 2006 on UN internal controls on procurement from a 
request by the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, and Committee on International 
Relations, House of Representatives.  The UN Secretariat procured more than $1.6 billion 
in goods and services in 2005, mostly in support of peacekeeping programs.  GAO 
concluded that UN resources are extremely vulnerable to mismanagement, fraud, waste, 
and abuse.  It concluded that the UN lacks an effective organizational structure for 
managing procurement, has not shown a commitment to maintaining a professional, 
trained procurement workforce, and has not adopted the full range of ethics guidance for 
procurement officials.  The UN has no single organizational entity able to 
comprehensively manage procurement.  Also, the UN has not exhibited a commitment to 
improving the professionalism of its procurement staff by way of training, a career 
development path, or other key human capital practices important to attracting and 
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retaining a qualified professional workforce.  In addition, the UN has not adopted a full 
range of ethics guidance for procurement officials, despite directives from the General 
Assembly in 1998 and 2005 (GAO April 2006, 1–4). 
Weaknesses were found in key procurement control activities designed to give 
assurance that management directives are followed.  These activities include processes 
for reviewing high-value procurement contracts, considering vendor protests, revising the 
procurement manual, and keeping qualified vendor rosters.  While UN procurement has 
tripled over the past seven years, the size of the UN’s principal contract review 
committee and its support staff remained relatively stable.  The UN has not created an 
independent process to consider vendor protests despite a 1994 recommendation by a 
high-level panel of international procurement experts to do so immediately.  This 
deficiency may prevent senior UN management from being alerted to compliance 
problems affecting procurement regulations (GAO April 2006, 4). 
GAO recommended that member states encourage the UN Secretary General to 
take steps to address these problems, including creating clear and effective lines of 
authority and responsibility between headquarters and the field over UN procurement; 
establishing an exhaustive training program and formal career path for procurement staff; 
providing the Headquarters Committee on Contracts with enough structure and 
manageable workload; and creating an independent bid protest process.  A procurement 
career path would also recognize procurement as a specialized profession in the UN.  
This would help give procurement more qualified personnel and aid reforms (GAO April 
2006, 6, 17). 
The UN does not uniformly implement its process for helping to ensure that it is 
conducting business with qualified vendors.  The UN may thus be susceptible to favoring 
certain vendors or dealing with unqualified vendors, according to the GAO (GAO April 
2006, 24).  Also, with the lack of a comprehensive risk assessment framework, the UN 
cannot have reasonable assurance that it allocates sufficient attention to procurement 
activities that could be most prone to fraud, waste, and abuse (GAO April 2006, 26).  
Field procurement managers do not have a standardized and systematic approach for 
monitoring procurement activity to provide adequate assurance that the Financial 
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Regulations and Rules of the UN are followed (GAO April 2006, 29).  With no single 
organizational entity capable of comprehensively managing procurement, it is unclear 
which department is responsible for addressing problems in the UN’s field procurement 
process (GAO April 2006, 12). 
The UN has conducted piecemeal reforms while failing to clearly establish 
management accountability for correcting procurement weaknesses.  The harmful effects 
of this lack of UN leadership in procurement has been manifested further by a 
peacekeeping program that has more than quadrupled in size since 1999 and could 
expand even further (GAO April 2006, 34).  With peacekeeping expenditures continuing 
to rise each year, the U.S. is sure to pay attention to instances of procurement fraud and 
corruption and push for procurement reforms. 
7. Auditing Standards 
The Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, of the Committee on Homeland 
Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs, 
House of Representatives, asked GAO to investigate oversight and accountability in the 
UN in 2007.  The GAO report reviewed six UN internal audit offices—FAO, ILO, 
UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, and WHO.  GAO found that these organizations have made 
progress in implementing international auditing standards, but they have not fully 
implemented key components of the standards.  Examples of the standards include basing 
annual work plans on organization wide risk-management frameworks and obtaining the 
necessary resources to conduct their work.  Although the audit offices are at different 
stages of developing and implementing their own risk-based work plans, the offices are 
doing so without the benefit of completed organization wide risk-management 
frameworks, which are necessary to identify areas with the greatest vulnerability to fraud, 
waste, and abuse.  Three of the six UN audit offices did not have sufficient staff to cover 
high-risk areas of the organizations.  In addition, three of the audit offices had not fully 
implemented quality assurance processes, such as internal and external peer reviews. 
Three of the organizations did not have professional investigators and depended mostly 
on auditors to probe allegations of wrongdoing, a practice that could affect the 
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organizations’ ability to provide adequate audit coverage and ensure that investigations 
are fully carried out.  None of the organizations had adopted financial disclosure 
requirements for their oversight staff to monitor potential conflicts of interest (GAO June 
2007, 4–21). 
GAO said that establishing an independent audit committee, composed of 
members external to the management of the organization and reporting to the governing 
body on the effectiveness of the audit office and on the adequacy of its resources, as part 
of the governance structure of each of the UN governing bodies could strengthen 
oversight.  GAO also recommended that audit reports should be available to the 
governing bodies in the UN to provide further insight into the operations of the UN 
organizations and point out critical systemic weaknesses (GAO June 2007, 5–6). 
The UN’s OIOS conducts internal audits of the UN Secretariat and other UN 
organizations, including several funds and programs, under the authority of the UN 
Secretary General.  The specialized agencies, e.g., the FAO, ILO, and WHO, do not fall 
under the OIOS’s authority.  The Joint Inspection Unit (JIU), which is the only 
independent system-wide external oversight body, has the authority to perform 
inspections, evaluations, and investigations in the UN system, including specialized 
agencies.  According the JIU, however, it does not have the resources to carry out its 
mandate to investigate wrongdoing.  Senior audit officials of FAO, UNICEF, and WFP 
also stated that they do not have enough resources to conduct their audit work plans 
(GAO June 2007, 9–10, 18). 
Although most of the organizations have audit committees that review internal 
audit activities and report to heads of the organizations, only WHO has a committee that 
is independent of senior management and is part of its governing body.  GAO concluded 
that without the insights given by access to internal audit reports, an independent audit 
committee, and an internal audit activity with a high level of independence, the governing 
bodies could face challenges in fully carrying out their responsibilities of monitoring the 
effective and efficient use of resources, senior management actions, and the 
organization’s operations (GAO June 2007, 39, 50).  
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FAO, UNDP, WFP, and WHO officials said they have hired consultants to 
conduct investigative work due to the lack on in-house resources.  FAO, UNDP, 
UNICEF, and WFP had a backlog of cases in 2007 that not have been resolved due to the 
shortfalls in resources (GAO June 2007, 26). 
On January 24, 2008 the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the U.S. 
Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs issued a report 
confirming findings by prior inquiries and audits that deficiencies in UNDP rules, 
procedures, and management allowed North Korea to dictate the makeup of UNDP staff, 
access hard currency, and avoid standard monitoring procedures for projects and financial 
transactions.  The report also concluded that North Korea used a bank account reserved 
for UN activities to secretly transfer funds to North Korean bank accounts in the U.S. and 
Europe, and that the UNDP was used to facilitate payments to a company with links to 
arms dealing.  Brett Schaefer and Steven Groves think that these issues are serious and 
should lead Congress to reconsider its willingness to fund UNDP activities without 
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VII. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATION 
A. CONCLUSION 
The primary question this study tried to answer was: how does the U.S. budget for 
the UN and what are the primary policy issues affecting that budget? The majority of 
U.S. funds designated for the UN, including dues and peacekeeping funds, flow through 
the State Department and Budget Function 150.  The Department of State is by far the 
largest contributor to the UN compared to all the other Departments, contributing over 96 
percent of the $5.3 billion the U.S. contributed in FY 2005 (OMB, 2006).   
U.S. funding for the UN includes contributions to the general UN budget, 
peacekeeping, and voluntary contributions. The regular assessed budgets of the UN 
system organizations are included in the Contributions to International Organizations 
account, and peacekeeping is funded in the Contributions to International Peacekeeping 
Activities account (Bite, 2001, 2).   
Several authorizing and appropriation committees and subcommittees play key 
roles in determining the budget outcome for the U.S. contribution to the UN.  The Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee and the House International Relations Committee develop 
legislation authorizing funds for the UN, while the Senate and House Appropriations 
Committees provide appropriations legislation for these funds.  Key subcommittees are 
the House and Senate Subcommittees on Appropriations for State, Foreign Operations, 
and Related Programs.  Assessed UN dues and peacekeeping funding are authorized 
through the Foreign Relations Authorization Act.  Included in this act is the State 
Department Authorization Act.  The House Committee on International Relations and the 
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations have jurisdiction over this legislation, which 
includes the majority of UN funding.  Included in the State, Justice, Commerce, and 
Judiciary Appropriation bills, and State and Foreign Operations Appropriation bills are 
assessed dues to the UN and UN affiliated agencies, peacekeeping funding and foreign 
aid.   
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While the focus of UN funding is often centered on the dues for the regular UN 
budget and peacekeeping, voluntary contributions encompass approximately 30 percent 
of total UN funding as well.  From the voluntary contributions the U.S. makes to the UN, 
the two receiving the largest amounts are the UN Development Fund and the UN 
Children’s Fund, which are funded in the State and Foreign Operations Appropriations 
bill.  
The annual State and Foreign Operations Appropriations bill funds the majority of 
U.S. assistance programs, which are overwhelmingly managed by USAID and the State 
Department (Veillette & Epstein, 2007, 12).  The majority of humanitarian aid goes to 
refugee programs administered by the State Department, such as the UN High 
Commission for Refugees.  Multilateral assistance funds activities implemented by 
international organizations, including UNICEF and the UNDP (Tarnoff and Nowels, 
2005, 6–7). 
The House International Relations and Senate Foreign Relations Committees have 
the main congressional responsibility for authorizing UN foreign aid programs.  The 
House and Senate Appropriations Foreign Operations Subcommittees handle bills 
appropriating most foreign assistance funds, including funds designated to UN affiliated 
agencies (Tarnoff and Nowels, 2005, 1).  Food assistance is appropriated by the 
Agriculture Subcommittees (Tarnoff and Nowels, 2005, 29).  The Senate Subcommittee 
on Labor, Health and Human Services, Committee on Appropriations, provides funds for 
global health programs, some of which are affiliated with the UN, such as the UN 
Population Fund (Senate Committee on Appropriations, 2008).   
The U.S. share of the regular budget has been lowered on three occasions, from a 
high of 39 percent in 1946.  In 1954, the U.S. share of the regular budget went from 39 
percent to 32 percent (Moore and Pubantz, 2002).  In 1973, the U.S. contribution went 
from 32 to 25 percent.  Starting January 1, 2001, the U.S. was assessed to pay 22 percent 
of the regular annual UN budget (Browne, 2008, 1).  Of the $930 million the U.S. 
contributed in dues in 2007 to the UN and UN affiliated agencies, $423 million went 
towards the UN regular budget.  The World Health Organization, the Food and 
Agriculture Organization, and the International Atomic Energy Agency were the next 
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three organizations receiving the highest dues.  Approximately 50 countries have the 
lowest UN assessment, just .001 percent of the regular budget, paying only about $19,000 
each per year.  They still get one vote, the same as the U.S.  The 128 lowest-paying 
countries, which are about two-thirds of the General Assembly, all together pay less than 
1 percent of the UN budget.  This imbalance makes reform difficult due to the lack of 
incentive for the lowest contributors and has been the subject of numerous hearings in 
Congress.  These countries are focused on enlarging the UN’s power as a way of 
increasing their own influence and priorities and having the organization give out more 
international aid and transfers.  The largest intergovernmental organization of developing 
states in the UN, the G–77, has effectively promoted their collective economic interests 
and enhanced their joint negotiating capacity on all major international economic issues 
within the United Nations system, and resisted at times efforts to reform the UN. 
As of 1992, the U.S. was contributing more money to UN peacekeeping each year 
than it paid in assessed regular UN budget dues.  The U.S.’s share of the peacekeeping 
budget was between 30 and 32 percent since the first UN peacekeeping mission in 1948, 
and decreased from 30.4 percent to 28 percent in 2001 and then to 26 percent by 2003 
(Browne, 2008).  U.S. payments to the UN for peace operations rose from less than $40 
million in 1988 to more than $1 billion in 1994 (CBO Paper, December 1999).  
Contributions to peacekeeping subsequently fell in the mid to late 1990s, then rose again 
in the first part of the 21st century.  In 2007, the U.S. contributed $1.4 billion to the UN 
for peacekeeping.   
The rapid growth of UN peace operations and costs in the early 1990s and 2000s 
is evidence of their utility and importance to the U.S., as it could have forestalled any 
such increase by using its veto power to prevent the creation or expansion of a mission.  
The UN has had some successful peacekeeping missions, but it has often failed in its 
peacekeeping role, and in some ways may have made the conflicts it has attempted to 
settle worse (Krauthammer, 1987, 11).  While peacekeeping missions such as in Rwanda 
and Somalia have gone horribly wrong, the current world situation seems to provide 
plenty of need for peacekeeping missions, and the UN is sometimes the best and 
frequently the only organization to undertake them. 
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Peacekeeping expenditures have grown at a faster rate than the UN’s regular 
budget.  From 1948 to 2008, the UN’s regular budget increased from $5 million to $4.17 
billion for the 2008–2009 budget.  The peacekeeping budget expanded from $4 million in 
1948 to $7.4 billion for the 2008–2009 budget.  While the UN budget has grown over the 
years when measured by current dollars, if one looks at constant dollars, it has not grown 
appreciably over the last 30 years.  The UN has operated under a tradition of approving 
budgetary decisions by consensus for the past 20 years.  This tradition was broken in 
December 2007 when, despite strong resistance from the U.S., the UN’s Administrative 
and Budgetary Committee recommended a $4.17 billion biennial budget for 2008–2009. 
The UN has been a constantly evolving and expanding organization since its 
inception.  It survived the Cold War, where its relevance and effectiveness was frequently 
questioned.  Even though some may question its effectiveness today, it appears to have a 
place in international affairs in the foreseeable future.  The UN Association of the U.S.A 
thinks the UN has an important role to play.  They say that UN programs allow the U.S. 
to share with other countries the costs of meeting transnational challenges that no one 
nation can solve on its own.  The U.S. annual contributions to the UN and its affiliated 
agencies, which are about one-tenth of one percent of the federal budget, provide a cost-
effective means of resolving global problems such as terrorism, weapons proliferation, 
poverty, and environmental degradation (UNA–USA, Talking Points, 2009).   
The U.S. has been the largest contributor, and also largest debtor to the UN 
throughout the UN’s history.  The U.S. accounted for around 80 percent of unpaid dues 
for the UN’s regular budget throughout the 1990s and early 2000s.  While the UN could 
not survive in its current state without the U.S., some argue that the U.S. would have a 
hard time asserting its role as a world leader if it does not support the UN (Center for 
Defense Information, August 17, 2000). 
The argument can also be made that the U.S. gets a bargain with its UN dues.  In 
2008 the U.S. economy accounted for around 27 percent of the global GDP, but has been 
assessed only 22 percent for the regular UN budget since 2001.  Since 2003, the U.S. has 
been assessed 26 percent for the UN peacekeeping budget.  Other member states are 
assessed more than their share of the global economy to make up for the reduction given 
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to the U.S. (UNA–USA, Talking Points, 2009).  The European Union nations paid close 
to 40 percent of the total cost of peacekeeping operations in 2000, much greater than their 
share of the global economy (CQ Weekly, September 2, 2000).  The top five UN 
contributors—U.S., Japan, Germany, United Kingdom, France—contributed over 58 
percent of the UN regular budget in 2008 (Renner, 2005).   
Numerous U.S. companies are also direct beneficiaries of some UN spending.  In 
2004, U.S. companies received $637 million of the $6.4 billion the UN spent on goods 
and services, which is more than twice as much as the next largest provider (UNA–USA, 
Talking Points, 2009).   
While there are benefits of having an organization such as the UN, the U.S. has 
often been very critical of the way the UN operates.  Joseph Conner, former UN 
Undersecretary for Management, said, “The UN is a collection of funds and programs 
pretending to be an organization” (CQ Weekly, January 16, 1999).  Some U.S. elected 
officials have felt the same way, and their perception of the UN has influenced how the 
U.S. funds the UN. 
One policy issue that has significantly affected many individuals’ perception of 
the UN, and affected the U.S. budget for the UN, has been UN reform.  Although the UN 
implemented numerous reform efforts in the 1990s and 2000s, many of which were 
proposed by the U.S., there are other areas where progress has been slow.   
On March 15, 2006, the UN General Assembly passed a resolution replacing the 
Commission on Human Rights with a new Human Rights Council.  The Council is 
supposed to be an improvement over the Commission, which was controversial due to the 
human rights policies of some of its members.  For example, in 2001 Sudan, which was 
criticized by human rights organizations for its ethnic cleansing in the Darfur region, was 
elected to the Commission.  Although the U.S. was one of four members to vote against 
the resolution establishing the Council, stating the Council was no better than the 
Commission, the Administration said it would continue to fund and support the work of 
the Council (Blanchfield human rights, 2008, 1–2). 
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The verdict on the effectiveness of withholding payment to stimulate UN reform 
has been mixed.  Since the UN receives funds from assessment and voluntary 
contributions, some argue that withholding funding is more effective with voluntary 
funding than with dues assessments.  If a country were to withhold voluntary funding to a 
particular UN agency, and another country did not make up the difference, that agency 
would feel a definite financial impact, while if a country withheld a portion of their dues 
in protest to a certain agency policy, the agency may still be able to fund the protested 
policy in full by using money that would have gone to another function in the agency.  
The U.S. has disagreed with the UN on the amount of dues it should be assessed and has 
withheld funding.  Whether the withholding of UN funding to encourage the UN to 
implement reform measures has been helpful or hurtful is unclear. 
UN procurement fraud cases and the “Oil for Food” program in the 1990s indicate 
that the UN is prone to waste and fraud.  UN procurement has been one of the problems 
most targeted by Congress.  The changes and lessons the UN incorporates within itself as 
a result of these reform efforts will affect how countries view the UN, and perhaps their 
financial support as well.  The U.S. will undoubtedly continue to monitor reform efforts 
by the UN in the years to come, and new instances of waste and abuse at the UN will give 
ammunition to those that want to reduce UN funding. 
The ability of the UN to audit itself and implement management controls is 
another reform area that Congress has concentrated on.  The UN established an 
Independent Audit Advisory Committee in June 2007 and improved procurement 
practices, but has not undertaken an independent bid protest system or approved a lead 
agency concept, which would enhance division of labor, reduce duplication, and reduce 
costs in procurement.  GAO found that steps have been taken by the UN to improve 
certain management operations of the Secretariat, but almost no progress has been made 
in others, such as budgetary, financial management, and administrative functions.  The 
pace of UN management efforts has been slowed by member states’ arguments on 
reform, the absence of comprehensive implementation plans, internal process issues, and 
competing UN priorities, such as the proposal to reorganize the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations (GAO Progress on Management Reform, 2007, 1). 
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While U.S. personnel do hold a number of key, high-level UN posts, it seems that 
the U.S. has not done everything it can to push for recruiting and filling as many UN 
positions as possible, compared to other countries.  Having as many U.S. personnel in the 
UN as possible would help the U.S. to implement reform proposals it feels are important.  
The UN, in turn, needs to hire the most qualified personnel, not just strive for regional 
representation, although that is important and should be pursued whenever possible. 
The issue of abortion became a major factor in UN funding during the 1980s and 
up until the present.  From 1986 to 1992, USAID requested funds for UN Population 
Fund with the understanding that a decision to transfer the money would be reviewed 
under the terms of the Kemp–Kasten amendment, which Congress also continued to 
enact each year as part of the foreign assistance appropriation bill.  Throughout those 
years, UNFPA was ineligible for U.S. support.  President Clinton thought the Kemp–
Kasten amendment was ambiguous and said it could be interpreted differently.  The 
Clinton administration thought that the UNFPA did not knowingly or intentionally 
support abortion or involuntary sterilization.  Congress retained Kemp–Kasten language 
in the Foreign Operations Appropriations acts, and from 1994 to 1998 and 2000–2001, 
attached conditions on UNFPA contributions that required the organization to keep U.S. 
funds in a separate account and forego transfers from the U.S. equal to the amount 
UNFPA allocated to its China program (Blanchfield UN population, 2008, 12).  The 
White House accepted language as part of spending legislation that would formally bar 
any non-U.S. agencies from either performing abortions or advocating liberalized 
abortion laws, but the president would have the option of waiving the law if he thought it 
necessary. From FY 2002 through FY 2008, a $25 million reserve was available in the 
Administration budget request for UNFPA, subject to Kemp–Kasten conditions, and each 
year the UNFPA received no funding from the U.S. based on the State Department 
findings that its was not eligible under Kemp–Kasten conditions. 
Both the Senate and House have members who have been very critical of the UN.  
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee has held numerous hearings on the UN, 
particularly on the issue of UN reform.  In the Committee’s July 21, 2005 hearing on UN 
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reform, Richard G. Lugar, then chairman, advocated that the U.S. withhold UN funds to 
try and affect UN reforms.  Congress tended to focus on procurement reform, internal 
management reform, and an effective Human Rights Council. 
On the House International Relations Committee, Chairman Henry Hyde has 
expressed unfavorable opinions about the UN.  In a hearing on improving internal 
oversight within the UN in 2006, Hyde said that UN funds are unnecessarily vulnerable 
to waste, fraud, and abuse.  Lugar and Hyde were Republicans, as was the majority of the 
members of Congress who were critical of the UN. 
In a briefing and hearing on reforming the UN before the House International 
Relations Committee on May 19, 2005, Representative Tom Lantos expressed the 
frustration many congressional members felt over the inability of the U.S. to influence 
the UN, despite its role as the largest contributor.  He also, however, has defended the 
UN and acknowledged the service it provides.  In a hearing on the future of the UN in 
2007, Lantos said that the UN plays a vital role in the world.  Other members of Congress 
were also supportive of the UN as a whole, including Senator Joseph Biden. 
The large UN system, coupled with the complex U.S. budget system, makes it 
challenging to get a complete picture of all the U.S. funding to the UN.  To have 
meaningful discussions on UN funding, however, it is imperative to be able to state how 
much funding the UN is receiving, and what from which part of the U.S. budget. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
This study of U.S. funding of the UN suggests areas of further research.  There 
have been numerous CRS and GAO reports on various aspects of U.S. funding of the 
UN.  A number of the reports focused on reform at the UN.  One area that could be 
further investigated would be a comparison between non-UN international organizations 
to which the U.S. contributes and evaluate factors that influence the U.S. funding of those 
institutions.  A study could be conducted of why certain factors, such as reform progress, 
play a major role in UN funding and if those same factors influence U.S. funding of any 
non-UN institutions.  
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With the expanding UN peacekeeping budget, there are topics that could be 
investigated further.  Some topics that could be investigated are: will the U.S. likely 
continue to support an expanding UN peacekeeping role?  How can the UN peacekeeping 
structure be improved to addresses the complex issues the UN has faced and will likely 
face in the future?  Is there a better alternative to the present peacekeeping model, such as 
regional international organizations like NATO?   
The topic of Security Council reform has been an ongoing issue at the UN for 
many years.  Some countries feel that Security Council reform should occur before any 
other types of reform at the UN, while other countries, such as the U.S., believe general 
reform should occur before the issue of Security Council reform is addressed.  Further 
study of the issue of Security Council reform could be conducted, investigating whether 
conducting Security Council reform would improve the pace of general UN reform.  
With the difficulty in identifying and totaling all the funding the UN receives in a 
given year, another area of further research would be to look at the feasibility of 
developing a single funding line item for the UN that would be broken down into the 
different ultimate UN organization destinations of the funds.  Just as budget function 150 
comprises State Department, diplomacy, and foreign operations, there could be a budget 
function that captures the entire amount of UN funding.  Alternatively, OMB could 
conduct yearly reports as it did in 2006 to capture, however imperfectly, the amounts 
each department contributed to the UN in that year by compiling each department’s input.   
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